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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TAX NEWS 
 
This dissertation explores the effect of tax news on national and state-level 
economic activity. 
 
In the first chapter, I explore the effect of tax news on state economic activity. I 
estimate a factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) model, which allows us to 
consider the possibility that unobserved regional factors --such as credit and fiscal 
conditions-- might be relevant for modelling the dynamic response of aggregate and 
state-level economic activity. Tax news is identified as a shock to the implicit tax rate, 
measured by the yield spread between the one year tax-exempt municipal bond and the 
one-year taxable Treasury bond. My results suggest that an increase in the implicit tax 
rate raises national output over much of the anticipation period. In addition, anticipated 
tax increases give rise to expansions in state personal income and employment. I find that 
the variation in the responsiveness of economic activity across states is mostly explained 
by differences in industrial composition as well as by some demographic characteristics 
such as education attainment and median age. 
 
In the second chapter, I examine the impact and transmission of the effect of tax 
news on U.S. economic activity. I find that news related to higher federal income taxes 
raise the real GDP over the anticipation period. In addition, aggregate and disaggregate 
industrial production, employment per worker, hours worked per worker and capacity 
utilization rate respond positively to tax news in the short run. An historical 
decomposition shows that tax news and federal funds rate shocks have been the main 
source of fluctuations in real GDP. In particular, tax news associated with legislation in 
1986, 1993, and 2001 contributed to the movements in the real GDP. 
 
In the third chapter, I investigate whether the effect of tax news shocks differs 
across periods of recession and expansion. I follow Jorda’s (2005) local projection 
method to estimate tax news effects on the economy. I find that news about future tax 
cuts reduces economic activity for about four quarters and has a significant effect on the 
U.S. economy in the short run. The behavior of output following tax news shocks is 
similar in both recession and expansion phases of the business cycle and indicates that 
news about future tax cuts are contractionary. However, the rebound in economic activity 
four quarters after the news shock is higher in the recessionary phase than in the 
expansionary phase. Finally, the state dependent model shows that news shocks have a 
stronger positive impact on consumption expenditures and residential investment in the 
recession phase than in the expansion phase. 
 
KEYWORDS: Fiscal Policy, Policy Foresight, FAVAR, Tax Policy, State Business 
Cycles 
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1 Introduction
Over the past several years, the discussion regarding macroeconomic effects of tax policy
changes has gained interest among researchers and policy makers. In general, U.S. tax
policy changes goes through legislative and implementation lags. Hence, news about
future changes in tax policies reach the individual well before the change is effected,
which implies that forward looking individuals will adjust their consumption and work
patterns before the tax change has been implemented. A large body of literature has
underlined the necessity of accounting for tax foresight when analyzing the effects of tax
policy changes (see e.g., Yang (2005), Leeper, Richter and Walker (2012), Mertens and
Ravn (2011, 2012), and Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2013)). Understanding how U.S. states
and national economy respond to tax news is of interest to policy makers and researchers
alike. Given the presence of long delays in tax policy changes, this dissertation
investigates the dynamic effects of tax news shocks in the United States. The first and
second chapters examine the impact of tax new on U.S. state and national economy
respectively, while the third chapter estimates the effect of anticipated tax cuts on the
economy conditioning on business cycle dynamics.
In the first chapter, I build upon the macroeconomic literature on tax foresight to inquire
about the effects of news regarding federal taxes on state level employment growth and
personal income growth. In particular, I investigate whether news about future tax
increases depress or stimulate state-level economic activity? The estimated impulse
response functions reveal a statistically significant increase in personal income and
employment for most of the states. While tax foresight generates a response that is similar
in shape for all states, the magnitude of the effect differs greatly across them. For instance,
one year after the shock, an increase of one percentage point in the implicit tax rate results
in an increase of personal income that ranges between -0.02% for North Dakota and
0.78% for Massachusetts. The effect on employment ranges from 0.20% and 1.97% for
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West Virginia and California, respectively.
Further, this chapter examines what drives the large differences in the magnitude of the
responses across states? Theoretical models on the effect of income taxes suggest that
dissimilarities in the elasticity of labor supply, in the magnitude of adjustment costs, and
variable capacity utilization might lead to differences in the effect of tax changes across
economies (Auerbach, 1989; House and Shapiro, 2006; Mertens and Ravn, 2011). To
further inquire into this issue I regress the one-year cumulative responses for the 48 states
in the sample on a set of state-level characteristics. I find a larger impact of tax news on
personal income for states where the share of agriculture is low and that of manufacturing
and retail are high, and where the median age is lower. As for the response of
employment, I find the effect to be greater for states where the shares of manufacturing
and retail are high, where the proportion of highly educated individuals is larger and that
of whites is lower.
While the first chapter focuses on the response of U.S. states to tax news, there has been
little empirical analysis in the macroeconomic literature to understand the propagation
mechanism of tax news at the national level. The main focus of the second chapter is to
study how changes in expectations about future tax rates contribute to fluctuations in
macroeconomic aggregate and disaggregate variables during the period 1960-2003.
Analyzing the responses at disaggregated level data will enable us to understand the
transmission mechanism of tax news on the U.S. economy.
The second chapter also helps to understand how much of fluctuations in the real GDP are
driven by the shocks to tax news, government spending, tax revenues, and the federal
funds rate. I find that tax news associated with legislation in 1969, 1975, 1986, 1993, and
2001 contributed to the historical fluctuations in real GDP. In addition, I investigate how
much of the anticipatory effects of tax news shock persists after policy realization? I
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conduct a counterfactual analysis for the full sample to investigate whether adding a tax
policy realization shock diminishes the effect of the news shock on the economy. I find
that adding a tax realization shock tapered off the anticipatory effects on the
macroeconomic variables.
The third chapter examines the role of news about future tax policy, in particular
anticipation of future tax cuts, on the economy in both a linear and a nonlinear framework.
A large set of empirical macro literature that evaluates the effect of tax policy changes on
the economy generally follows a linear structural vector autoregression (VAR) model.
While a linear model has numerous advantages (e.g., ease of computation and inference),
it imposes the restriction that the economy’s response to tax news shocks is identical
during different phases of the business cycle. Hence, this chapter contributes to empirical
macro literature by departing from using standard VAR models to use a local projection
technique to estimate the effects of news shock on the economy. Precisely, I investigate
whether the news about future tax cuts has a different effect depending on the state of the
economy.
Using Jorda’s (2005) local projection method, I find that news about future tax cuts has a
contractionary effect on the economy for about four quarters. The behavior of output and
investment following tax news shocks is similar in both high unemployment and low
unemployment states of the economy. Additionally, the state dependent model shows that
news shocks have a stronger positive impact on consumption expenditures and residential
investment in the recession phase than in the expansion phase.
Together, all three dissertation chapters seek to better understand the anticipatory tax
effects on the U.S. economy. The first two chapters seek to understand the effect of tax
news shocks on national and state level economy. In addition, these two chapters provide
evidence for channels of tax news shocks. While, the third chapter questions whether the
3
effect of tax news shocks is identical during different phases of the business cycle.
Overall, the results from three chapters show a strong evidence of anticipatory effects on
U.S. economy.
Copyright c©Sandeep K. Rangaraju, 2015
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2 The Quantitative Effects of Tax Foresight: Not All States Are Equal
2.1 Introduction
The discussion regarding the macroeconomic effects of tax changes has gained
momentum in academic and policy circles since the tax cuts of the 2000s and, especially,
following the large stimulus package implemented to stave off the Great Recession. This
discussion has bolstered a line of research into the economic effects of anticipated and
unanticipated tax changes. On the one hand, work by (Yang, 2005; Leeper et al., 2012;
Mertens and Ravn, 2011, 2012; Leeper et al., 2013) has underlined the necessity of
accounting for tax foresight when analyzing the effects of tax policy changes. This
literature has provided key insights into the importance of modeling information flows, the
relevance of identifying the fiscal shock correctly in VAR models, and the incidence of
ignoring fiscal news in estimated impulse response functions. On the other hand, public
economics has long been interested in the effect of state level taxes on the economic
activity of neighboring states (see, Wildasin (2011)), as well as on the effect of tax
changes on state income growth (Reed, 2008; Bania et al., 2007; Mullen and Williams,
1994; Helms, 1985). This literature has underscored the importance of modeling
subnational and national governments as interconnected jurisdictions that compete for
resources, and has revealed a robust negative relationship between taxes used to fund
general expenditures and income growth.
Despite this rich theoretical and empirical literature, and in contrast with the growing
evidence on the effect of tax changes on macroeconomic aggregates, much less is known
about the dynamic response of state-level economic activity to tax news. In particular,
does news about future tax increases depress or stimulate state-level economic activity?
Are the effects of this shock similar across regions in the United States? Should we expect
regions with differing geographical concentrations of industries to exhibit similar changes
5
in personal income and employment patterns when it is well known that there exists
variation in the way states adjust to other aggregate shocks such as monetary policy
shocks (Carlino and DeFina, 1998) or government spending shocks (Owyang and
Zubairy, 2013; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2014)? To grasp the importance of these
questions, consider the recent debate regarding the economic effects of raising the top tax
rates (Porter, 2012; Piketty et al., 2014; Mankiw, 2013). The income distribution in the
U.S. has worsen since the mid-1970s, with the very top earners obtaining most of the
productivity gains and recovering faster from the Great Recession (Piketty and Saez 2003,
Saez 2013). This has fueled a heated debate regarding the need of a more progressive tax
system. Yet, the percentage of top earners varies greatly across states and, thus, changes in
federal taxes are not likely to affect all states equally. Can we obtain some useful
information from analyzing the differences in the states-level responses to news regarding
federal taxes, in addition to tracking the response of aggregate GDP? How should policy
makers in states with very dissimilar income levels react to the debates on lowering
federal income tax rates that typically follow an economic recession?
This chapter takes a step toward addressing these questions. Economic theory suggests a
number of ways in which foresight regarding federal tax policy could affect states
differently. First, real frictions –such as investment adjustment cost, imperfect competition
in goods and input markets, and variable capital utilization– smooth the response of agents
to news about fiscal policy changes (see, e.g., Leeper et al. (2012); Mertens and Ravn
(2011); Leeper et al. (2013)). For instance, capital adjustment costs stemming from
disruptions during installation, costly learning, delivery lags, or time to install/build new
equipment imply a sluggish and muted response of investment, and thus of production, to
shocks. Similarly, monopolistic distortions in factor markets drive a wedge between the
real returns to factors and their marginal product. Monopolistically competitive producers
are unable to completely adjust prices in response to a news shock and the response of
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economic activity will be slower than in a perfectly competitive economy. Yet, not all
industries face the same degree of capital adjustment costs 1, nor the same degree of
monopolistic competition, and not all states have the same industrial composition. All else
equal, states with a higher concentration of industries that face larger real rigidities should
exhibit a slower and smaller response of economic activity to tax news. Conversely, the
lack of significant frictions should be reflected in a faster response to tax news, which
dissipates earlier.
Second, the proportion of non-savers in the economy affects how responsive economic
activity is to fiscal foresight (see, e.g., House and Shapiro (2006); Leeper et al. (2012)).
Consider, for instance, the effect of news regarding a tax increase on labor income. Such
news would give firms and workers an incentive to shift production to the anticipation
period where taxes are lower. However, the ability to intertemporally substitute is limited
for households that operate hand-to-mouth and, thus, cannot take advantage of the news of
an impending tax increase. All else equal, economic activity in states with a higher
proportion of non-savers should be less responsive to tax news.
Third, Leeper et al. (2012) show that the degree of foresight plays an important role in
determining how responsive economic activity is to fiscal news. For instance, foresight
can amplify the effect of a raise in capital taxes on investment and output. The higher the
degree of foresight, the greater the incentive for firms to accumulate capital and increase
production before the tax raise is implemented. It is conceivable to think that the degree of
fiscal foresight might not only vary across time but also across states as federal tax
changes might be more of a surprise –or be less well understood– for residents of some
states.
In addition, Gruber and Saez (2002) find that the elasticity of taxable income differs
1Hall (2004) estimates of capital adjustment costs reflect a great degree of dispersion across the industries
included in the NIPA data.
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significantly between high income tax payers who itemize deductions and other income
groups. Thus, if high income tax payers are regionally concentrated, the effects of changes
in federal taxes may vary systematically across states. Similarly, differences in fiscal
burden and on whether a state imposes or not personal income taxes may lead to variation
in the magnitude and timing on the responses. States differ in their tax treatment of
personal income. Thus, a 1% increase in the federal personal income tax rate will result in
a differential increase in the effective marginal tax rate and the tax burden across states,
which may lead to disparities in the response of firms and households.
To measure tax foresight, we adopt the methodology of Leeper et al. (2013) who use the
implicit tax rate –measured by the yield spread between the one year tax-exempt
municipal bond and the one-year taxable Treasury bond– to isolate news about changes in
future taxes. This tax rate represents the rate at which investors are indifferent between the
tax-exempt municipal bond and the taxable Treasury bond. Hence, if bond traders are
forward looking, this rate predicts future changes in personal income tax rates as an
anticipated increase in individual tax rates will induce investors to reduce their demand for
taxable bonds, thus driving up the yield on taxable bonds.2 We then estimate a factor
vector autoregressive (FAVAR) model to trace out the dynamic response of state personal
income and employment growth. Our results suggest that a 1 percentage point increase in
the implicit tax rate leads to higher GDP growth and increased state economic activity
during the anticipation period. Although all states exhibit a similar humped shaped
response, the timing and magnitude of the effect varies greatly across states.
To probe deeper into the differential response of state-level economic activity, we then
turn to disentangle the channels whereby news of a federal tax increase affect personal
income and employment. To this end, we first compute the one-year cumulative response
of personal income growth and employment growth for each of the states. Next, we
2As we will discuss in section 2, using this measure of tax shocks has a number of advantages over using
other measures of anticipated (or unanticipated) tax changes.
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project the cumulative responses on a set of state-level covariates (i.e., state GDP
composition, demographic and fiscal characteristics). The results reveal a larger effect of
tax news on personal income growth for states that have a low agriculture share in GDP,
high manufacturing and retail shares, a lower median age, and those states with higher
per-capita federal tax burden. Regarding the response of employment growth to news of a
federal tax increase, we find that the magnitude of the effect increases with the share of
manufacturing and retail, the degree of education and it decreases with the proportion of
white population.
Our finding of a positive response of aggregate economic activity to tax news is not new
(see e.g., Leeper et al. (2012, 2013); Mertens and Ravn (2012); Kueng (2014)). What is
novel is that our study provides new insights into how the response of economic activity
diverges across states and on the sources of these differences. Our results point to the
importance of three mechanisms in the transmission of tax news. First, tax news appear to
have a larger effect in economies with a larger percentage of educated individuals who are
likely to save more and, thus, have the ability to re-optimize by changing their
employment and investment decisions. Second, differences in industry composition
–possibly linked with differences in input adjustment costs and capital-labor ratios-play a
crucial role in how responsive personal income and employment are to tax news. Third,
the larger the per-capita federal tax burden, the greater the response of state economic
activity. This result suggests that the initial tax burden faced by a state is key in gauging
the effect of anticipated tax changes.
The remainder of this chapter unfolds as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the identification
of tax foresight. Section 2.3 describes the factor augmented vector autoregression
(FAVAR) model, the data set and the estimation method. In section 2.4, we describe the
responses of aggregate and state-level economic activity to tax news. We investigate the
drivers of the state-level responses in section 2.5. Section 2.6 summarizes and concludes.
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2.2 Identifying Tax Foresight
A crucial issue in quantifying the effect of changes in federal taxes on economic activity is
that changes in taxes occur for different reasons. Some tax changes are implemented in
order to finance a war, others because the economy is weak, or because the budget deficit
is considered too high. Other tax changes take place automatically because the tax base
varies with the income level or with other variables that affect the tax base, such as
inflation or changes in the stock market. Therefore, an important difficulty in quantifying
the effect of tax changes is disentangling the macroeconomic effect of exogenous and
endogenous variations in tax changes.
Another key issue in estimating the macroeconomic effect of changes in tax policy is that
what is considered a shock to federal taxes might be anticipated by economic agents.
Indeed, a review of the tax events that took place in the United States during the
1957-2006 period suggests a long lag between the time the tax law was proposed and the
time it was enacted. This legislative lag ranged between 4 and 17 months for the period
under analysis. Furthermore, the process of changing taxes also involves an
implementation lag: there is a delay between the moment when a tax change is signed into
law and when it is implemented. Hence, news about future changes in tax policies reach
the individual well before the change is effected, which implies that forward looking
individuals will adjust their consumption and work patterns before the tax change has
been implemented.
Recent research on the macroeconomic effects of tax policies has, thus, underlined the
importance of identifying exogenous variations in tax policy and of accounting for tax
foresight (see Mertens and Ravn (2011, 2012) and Leeper et al. (2013).3 The two leading
methodologies used to tackle the issue of endogeneity are: (a) the narrative approach, and
3A similar issue, the identification of government spending shocks, has been studied by Ramey (2011).
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(b) the structural VAR approach. Romer and Romer (2010) have perhaps the most careful
and comprehensive investigation on the effect of tax changes using the narrative approach.
Based on congressional reports and other sources, they construct an "exogenous" tax
change variable that evaluates each tax modification by its size and the timing of the
intended effect on federal tax revenues during the first year when the tax change was
implemented. Moreover, for a legislated tax change to be classified as exogenous it had to
be intended to reduce a large inherited budget deficit or to increase long-run growth.
Romer and Romer (2010) find a negative effect of exogenous tax increases on GDP. While
this variable enables the researcher to disentangle the effect of exogenous tax variations,
by construction, it measures changes that have been already legislated and, thus, is not
well suited to capture anticipation of future tax modifications.
Instead, in most vector autoregressive (VAR) models identification of the tax shock is
attained by assuming that tax returns are predetermined within the quarter with respect to
the other macroeconomic variables (e.g.,Blanchard and Perotti (2002)).4 Even though
these studies also find a contractionary effect of tax increases, there is considerable
disagreement as to the relative size of the tax multiplier associated with a shock to federal
tax revenues (Mertens and Ravn, 2013). Furthermore, an issue with this identification
strategy is that what the usual VAR analysis identifies as innovations in taxes might have
been forecasted by the economic agents. Hansen and Sargent (1991) first discussed how
foresight poses a potential problem for interpreting VARs as it could result in time series
with a non-fundamental moving average component.5 Leeper et al. (2013) and Leeper
et al. (2012) study the drawbacks of using the standard VAR approach to identify the
effect of tax changes when there is foresight about taxes. Furthermore, they propose a line
of attack for dealing with tax foresight: adding asset prices to the VAR in order to better
align the information sets of the agent and the econometrician.
4Alternatively, Mountford and Uhlig (2009) attain identification via sign restrictions.
5See also Fernández-Villaverde and Watson (2007)
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We follow Leeper et al. (2013) lead and use the yield spread between the one-year
municipal bond and the one-year Treasury bill to capture foresight regarding future tax
changes. More specifically, we compute the implicit tax rate as τ It = 1− r
M
t
rTt
, where rMt
represents the one year tax exempt municipal bond rate, and rTt the one-year taxable
Treasury bond rate at time t. Because municipal bonds in the United States are exempted
from federal taxes, whereas Treasury bonds are taxable, the implicit tax rate can be used
to identify news about future tax changes. In fact, this rate can be interpreted as the tax
rate at which investors are indifferent between yields on municipal and Treasury bonds.
Using the implicit tax rate to capture tax news raises a number of questions. First, does the
implicit tax rate have predictive content for the standard VAR tax shocks? In other words,
could the standard VAR tax shocks have been forecasted using the implicit tax rate?
Second, is the implicit tax rate informative regarding future tax changes? Finally, who is
the marginal investor? To answer the first question, we formally test the hypothesis that
the usual VAR tax shocks can be predicted using the implicit tax rate. To do so we first
compute the VAR shocks that would have resulted from estimating a VAR model in the
spirit of Blanchard and Perotti (2002). That is, we regress real per-capita net taxes on four
lags of itself and of each of the following variables: the log growth of real per-capita
government spending, the log growth of real per-capita GDP, and the federal funds rate.
The residuals of this regression constitute the VAR tax shocks obtained by estimating the
VAR equation-by-equation via OLS and imposing the identification assumption that real
per-capita net taxes are predetermined relative to the other macroeconomic variables. We
then carry out a Granger causality test between these VAR tax shocks and the implicit tax
rate. Panel A of Table 2.1 reports the test results. Clearly, whereas the implicit tax rate
Granger-causes the VAR shocks, the VAR shocks do not Grange-cause the implicit tax
rate.6 In other words, it would seem that what the usual VAR analysis identifies as
6A similar exercise is performed by Ramey (2011) to show that the usual VAR innovations in government
spending could have been forecasted by war dates.
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innovations in taxes might have been forecasted using the implicit tax rate.
As to the second question, does the implicit tax rate have any predictive content for future
tax changes, the answer is yes. To illustrate the relationship between the implicit tax rate
and a few measures of personal tax rates, Figure 2.1 plots the implicit tax rate, the top 1%
marginal tax rate, the average marginal tax rate, and the average personal income tax rate
over the sample period. In addition, the shaded areas depict the time between the initial
policy proposal and its enactment. Note that the Revenue Act of 1964, the Revenue Act of
1975, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act
(EGTRA) of 2001 appear to have led to significant variation in the personal income tax
rates and in the implicit tax rate. The Revenue Act of 1964, Tax Reform Act of 1986, and
the EGTRA of 2001 reduced the marginal tax rates on individual income; whereas the
Revenue Act of 1975 provided a temporary tax rebate. The figure shows evidence of
movements in the implicit tax rate before the tax changes were actually enacted.
Furthermore, changes in the implicit tax rate appear to precede changes in the average
personal income tax rates.
To formally test the hypothesis that the implicit tax rate is useful in predicting different tax
measures, we perform a set of bi-variate Granger causality tests between the implicit tax
rate and alternative tax measures previously used in the literature on the macroeconomic
effects of tax changes. Panel B of Table 2.1 reports the test results for the bi-variate
Granger causality tests between the implicit tax rate and the log growth of real per-capita
net taxes (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). We find that the implicit tax rate helps to forecast
changes in real net per-capita taxes, whereas we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
log growth in real net per-capita taxes does not Granger-cause the implicit rate at a 5%
level.
Instead of using net taxes as the tax measure, other researchers have used a personal
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income tax rates. For instance, Barro and Redlick (2011) use the average marginal tax
rate, whereas Mertens and Ravn (2013) use the average personal income tax rate. To
formally test the hypothesis that the implicit tax rate is useful in predicting the personal
income tax rates, we perform bi-variate Granger causality tests between the implicit tax
rate and the average personal income tax rate (Table 2.1, Panel C), and between the
implicit tax rate and the average marginal federal income tax rate (Table 2.1, Panel D).
The test results indicate that while the implicit tax rate Granger-causes the average
personal income tax rate and the average marginal federal income tax rate, neither the
average personal income tax rate nor the average marginal federal income tax rate help to
forecast the implicit tax rate. Therefore, the implicit tax rate has predictive content for the
individual income tax rate for the period under analysis. The reader might wonder whether
the implicit tax rate has any predictive content for the log growth of real per-capita net
taxes once we condition on all the information contained in the Factor Augmented VAR
that we describe and estimate in the following sections. To answer this question we
conduct a Wald test for Granger-Causality where we evaluate the null-hypothesis of no
Granger-causality from the implicit tax rate to net taxes. The results reported in Panel E of
Table 2.1 indicate that we can reject the null in a 1% level test, given further evidence of
how lags of the implicit tax rate have explanatory power for net taxes.
The third question that arises is: who is the marginal investor? Kueng (2014) provides
convincing evidence that, since the 1970s, the marginal investor is a household near the
top of the income distribution. His conclusions are based on two sources of data: the
Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds and the Survey of Consumer Finances. In fact, data from
the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds Accounts suggest the percentage of municipal debt
owned by households –either directly or through mutual funds– increased since the 1970s
and has fluctuated around 74% since the 1990s (see Figure 2.2). Moreover, Figure 2.1
reveals that the path followed by the implicit tax rate resembles that of the marginal tax
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rate faced by the top 1% of the income distribution.
Identifying shocks to tax policy as innovations in the implicit tax rate has a number of
advantages over other measures of tax shocks. First, as shown above, it does a better job at
capturing news regarding tax changes than the VAR shocks. Hence, it improves the
alignment between the information set of the agent and the econometrician. Second, it
does not require the researcher to fix the length of the anticipation period a-priori, nor to
assume that taxes are exogenous. This point is important as the legislative and
implementation lags can vary considerably from one tax change to another (see, Yang
(2007), Figure 2.1, and Table 3.1 ). Modeling tax foresight via the implicit tax rate has the
benefit of capturing these changes whereas fixing the anticipation lag a-priori does not.
Nevertheless, there are some possible limitations to using municipal bonds. First, one
concern is that the yield spread may react to changes in factors other than tax news, such
as callability, liquidity and default risks. However, as Leeper et al. (2012) show the
risk-adjustment for AAA-rated municipal bonds is not considerable. We thus use only
AAA-rated municipal bonds to construct the implicit tax rate. In addition, Kueng (2014)
provides evidence that at shorter maturities the municipal yield spread moves closer to the
top marginal rate than at longer maturities (i.e., 2 versus 15 years). Thus, we estimate our
benchmark model using the yield spread between the one-year municipal bond and the
one-year Treasury bill, which corresponds to the one year forward tax rate (see Leeper
et al. (2012)). However, we will show in section 2.4.4.2 that our results are robust to
computing the implicit tax rate using a longer maturity: the 5-year yield spread. Second,
one may argue that the marginal investor is not representative of the average tax payer as
he or she belongs to the higher tax bracket. Indeed, Kueng (2014) shows that the marginal
tax rate implied by the municipal yield spread is close to the rate faced by the top 1% of
the income distribution. Nevertheless, identification of the response of state-level
employment and personal income relies on changes in the path of the expected tax rate
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and not on the level. Therefore, as long as the marginal investor’s tax rate moves close
enough to the true tax rate, using the tax rate implied by the municipal yield spread does
not pose a problem for our identification strategy.
2.3 The FAVAR Model
This section motivates the use of the factor-augmented VAR model, describes the model,
presents the estimation procedure, and discusses the identification of the common factors
and the impulse response functions.
2.3.1 Motivation
The main objective of this chapter is to investigate the effect of tax foresight on state-level
economic activity. To do so we could proceed by estimating a structural VAR (VAR)
including a macro block and then rotating the state level variables of interest, state by
state, after the macro block. In particular, let Yt be a 5× 1 vector of observable
macroeconomic variables assumed to have an impact on economic activity throughout the
U.S. states. More specifically, suppose Yt contains the log growth of real per-capita net
taxes (∆tt), the log growth of real per-capita federal government spending (∆gt), the log
growth of real per- capita GDP (∆yt), the federal funds rate (fft), and the implicit tax rate
(τt). Then, estimating a VAR with the macroeconomic block ordered first, followed by a
state block containing the log growth of real per-capita personal income for state i (∆piit)
and the log growth of per-capita employment for state i (∆empit) would allow us to
estimate the impact of news regarding federal taxes on state level economic activity.
However, to ensure that the responses of the macroeconomic variables do not change
when different states are rotated in the VAR, we would have to assume that state-level
economic activity does not enter in the macroeconomic block.7
7See Owyang and Zubairy (2013) for an excellent discussion on alternative VAR specifications.
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Instead, we consider the possibility that unobserved factors such as regional economic,
credit and fiscal conditions –not fully captured by Yt– are relevant for modeling the
dynamic response of aggregate and state-level economic activity to tax foresight.
Furthermore, we assume that this additional economic information can be summarized by
a k×1 vector of unobserved factors, Ft, where k is small. Then, a factor-augmented vector
autoregression (FAVAR) constitutes a suitable methodology to exploit this additional
economic information. We assume that the joint dynamics of Yt and Ft are given by
Ct = B(L)Ct−1 + ut (2.1)
where
Ct =
 Yt
Ft
 ,
Yt is a 5× 1 vector of macroeconomic variables listed above,
Yt =
[
∆tt ∆gt ∆yt fft τt
]′
, Ft is a vector of k × 1 unobserved common factors,
and B(L) is a conformable lag polynomial of order p = 4.8 The error term ut is an i.i.d.
(k + 5)× 1 vector of zero mean disturbances such that E(utu′t) = Ω.
The system in (2.1) is a VAR in Ct where there is an additional complication relative the
standard VAR: the common regional factors Ft are unobserved. We assume that these
factors summarize the information contained in a large number of state-level variables,
Xt. More precisely, Xt is a N × 1 vector containing: (a) the log growth of real per-capita
personal income for each of the 48 contiguous states, ∆piit, where i = 1, 2, ... , 48,9 and
(b) the log growth of per-capita employment for each of the 48 contiguous states, ∆empit,
where i = 1, 2, ... , 48. Moreover, we assume that this vector of state-level variables is
8The lag length is set to 4 quarters as in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Ramey (2011), and Mertens and Ravn
(2013), among others.
9We follow the common practice in the literature on regional cycles of excluding Alaska and Hawaii as they
do not border with any other U.S. state and their economic activity might not be driven by the region-specific
factors.
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related to the common factors according to
Xt = ΛCt + et (2.2)
where Λ is a N × (k + 5) matrix of factor loadings with N = 96 and is k to be determined
as explained in the following section. The N × 1 vector et contains series-specific
components that are uncorrelated with the common regional factors Ct.
Our motivation for using the FAVAR methodology is threefold. First, states enter and exit
recessions at different moments in time and some regions experience separate recessions
from the rest of the U.S. (Hamilton and Owyang, 2012). For instance, historically, oil
price shocks have had a stronger recessionary effect on states located in the Energy Belt.
(See Table 2.2 for a description of the states in each economic region). However,
economic spillovers across neighboring states occur due to free factor mobility and the
ability of households and firms to purchase goods across states (Carlino and Inman, 2013).
By using the FAVAR, we are able to capture these regional cycles, which we would
neglect if we used a VAR. Second, work by Rossi and Zubairy (2011) underlines the
importance of accounting for monetary and fiscal policy simultaneously when studying
the effects of government spending shocks in VARs. Furthermore, Carlino and DeFina
(1998) show that the response of economic activity to monetary policy shocks differs
across some U.S. regions. The FAVAR enables us to control for monetary policy when
studying the effect of tax news, while at the same time allowing for common regional
factors. Finally, the sparse information set typically used in VARs could lead to a potential
problem: policy makers and the private sector might have information not reflected in the
VAR. Expanding the econometrician’s information set via the FAVAR, in addition to
measuring tax foresight through the implicit tax rate, provides a potential solution to this
limited information problem.
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One concern with factor models is that they require strong identifying assumptions and,
thus, they might muddle the effort to identify economically meaningful shocks. However,
to the extent that our identification assumptions are akin to those used in the VAR
literature on fiscal shocks –as we will discuss in the following section– and because we
identify tax news with shocks to the implicit tax rate, the identification of anticipated tax
changes is straightforward.
2.3.2 Estimation and Identification
We consider the number of factors k in Ft to be unknown but fixed as in Bai and Ng
(2002). To determine the number of factors we start with an arbitrary number
kmax = 8 ∗ int[(min(N,T )100 )1/4], given by Schwert (2002) rule, where N = 96 and
T = 200.10 Then, for a given k, we obtain estimates of Λk and F k by solving the
minimization problem
V
(
k, F k
)
= min
Λ
1
NT
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
(
Xit − λk′i F kt
)2
(2.3)
subject to the normalization that Λk′Λk = Ik. Having obtained the minimized sum of
squared residuals V
(
k, F k
)
for k = 0, 1, ... , kmax, we then select the number of
unobserved factors kˆ that minimizes the information criterion suggested by Bai and Ng
(2002):
ICp2(k) = log[V (k, F
k)] + k ∗ N + T
NT
∗ log[min(N, T )]. (2.4)
Minimization of ICp2(k) with respect to k results in an estimate of kˆ = 8. That leaves us
with the 5 observed factors in Yt and 3 unobserved factors in ft.
Having determined the number of unobserved factors, we then proceed to estimate the
FAVAR model in (2.1)-(2.2) using a two-step procedure (see Bernanke et al. (2005)). In
10We have 201 quarterly observations between 1956:IV and 2006:IV but we lose one data point when we take
first differences of the logs in order to compute rates of growth.
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the first step, we use Bai and Ng (2013) method to estimate the 3 unobserved factors and
the factor loadings from the large data set Xt. The estimated three factors are denoted as
Ft = [f1,t, f2,t, f3,t] and can be interpreted as regional economic factors, which recover the
common aspects of U.S. state level economy that are not captured by the macroeconomic
variables in Yt. In the second step, the estimated regional factors F̂t are used in
conjunction with the macroeconomic variables Yt to estimate equation (2.1) using
standard VAR techniques.
To compute the impulse response functions we employ the standard short-run restrictions
imposed in the VAR literature similar to Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Mertens and
Ravn (2012). That is, we use Choleski decomposition with the variables ordered as
described above. Thus, we impose the restriction that the log growth in net per capita taxes
(∆tt) does not respond contemporaneously to changes in ∆gt, ∆yt, fft, τt, f1,t, f2,t, f3,t;
the log growth of real per-capita federal government spending (∆gt) does not respond
contemporaneously to changes in ∆yt, fft,τt, f1,t, f2,t, f3,t, and so on. Note that our
ordering implies that there is contemporaneous feedback from the macroeconomic
variables to the implicit tax rate, which allows the implicit tax rate to respond to monetary
policy shocks affecting the T-bill rate within the quarter. In addition, our identification
assumptions imply that the monetary authority responds contemporaneously to
movements in net per capita taxes, government spending and output (i.e., ∆tt, ∆gt, ∆yt),
that the regional factors respond contemporaneously to innovations in the macroeconomic
aggregates, but that the latter only respond with a lag to innovations in the regional
factors. Hence, recessions or expansions that start in a particular region may affect the
aggregate variables only with a lag. These identification restrictions have two advantages.
First, they are in line with the short-run identification restrictions imposed in the existing
VAR literature on fiscal policy (see, e.g. Blanchard and Perotti 2002 and Leeper, Walker
and Yang 2013). Second, because the implicit tax rate and all macroeconomic variables
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are ordered before the unobserved factors, the estimated impulse responses are robust to
using alternative identification schemes for the regional factors.
Point-wise confidence intervals for the impulse response functions are computed using a
residual based wild bootstrap (Gonçalves and Kilian, 2004; Yamamoto, 2012). We use
10,000 replications and report 68% and 95% confidence intervals.
2.3.3 Data
The data set used to estimate the FAVAR model comprises both aggregate and state-level
quarterly data spanning the period between 1957:I and 2006:IV. We opt to exclude the
period of the Great Recession as the introduction of unconventional monetary policy
measures and the financial crisis are likely to have resulted in structural changes in the
monetary policy rule and in the response of macroeconomic aggregates to changes in the
interest rate (Trichet, 2013).
Regarding the macroeconomic aggregates, as mentioned, we compute the implicit tax rate
as the yield spread between the one year tax exempt municipal bond rate, rMt , and the
one-year taxable Treasury bond rate, rTt , at time t, so that τ
I
t = 1− r
M
t
rTt
. The yields on
tax-exempt prime graded general-obligation municipal bonds and the taxable U.S.
Treasury bonds data are obtained from Leeper, Richter, and Walker (2012). We follow
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and measure: (a) government spending as federal
government consumption expenditures and gross investment, and (b) net taxes as the sum
of federal, state and local tax receipts, less federal grants in aid, federal, state and local
transfer payments to persons and interest payment to persons. The source of the data for
government spending, net taxes, and real GDP is the National Income and Product
Accounts (NIPA). We compute real per-capita measures by deflating government
spending, net taxes, and real GDP using the GDP deflator and then dividing the real
variables by the U.S. civilian non-institutional population over 16 years. These three
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variables are transformed into growth rates by taking first differences of the logs to obtain
∆tt, ∆gt, and ∆yt. The data for Federal Funds rate, fft, is obtained from the Federal
Reserve of St. Louis database, FRED.
The state-level variables consist of log growth rates of real per-capita personal income and
per-capita employment for the 48 contiguous U.S. states. The data for employment is
obtained from Hamilton and Owyang (2012) whereas the personal income data is
available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Rates of growth for state-level
employment and personal income are computed by taking the first difference of the
logarithm of the respective variables. Tables A.1.1 and A.1.2 provide details on the data
and the construction of variables used in the FAVAR model and in the cross-state analysis,
respectively. All variables are standardized prior to estimating the factors.
2.4 The Dynamic Effects of Tax News
This section discusses the effect of a one percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate.
2.4.1 Macroeconomic Aggregates
Figure 2.3 plots the response of the macroeconomic variables and the estimated regional
factors to a one percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate. 68% and 95%
confidence intervals computed with a residual based wild bootstrap are denoted by dashed
and dashed dotted lines, respectively. Our estimation results indicate that a rise in the
implicit tax rate immediately results in a faster real per-capita GDP growth, which reaches
its peak value of 0.29% four quarters after the shock (see Table 2.3). The expansionary
effect lasts about a year. In fact, news of a tax liability increase results in a cumulative rise
of 0.88% in real per-capita GDP four quarters after the shock. This response falls in line
with the classical view where an anticipated rise in personal income taxes leads to an
increase in output because individuals and firms have an incentive to switch production to
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the anticipation period where income taxes are expected to be lower.
Not surprisingly, real per-capita net taxes follow a similar pattern as real per-capita GDP
growth: they increase on impact and reach a peak response of 0.62% one quarter after the
shock. Higher income results in greater tax returns during the anticipation period but, as it
is the case for real GDP, the positive effect becomes statistically insignificant after the fifth
quarter. In contrast, a positive shock to the implicit tax rate results in a slightly lower but
statistically insignificant decrease in real per-capita government spending.
Our results suggest anticipation of a tax liability increase sets off a boom in the economy
that lasts slightly over a year. This expansion then results in tighter monetary policy,
which is reflected in a higher federal funds rate. This pattern is consistent with the Fed
acting to control possible inflationary pressures stemming from heightened economic
activity.The finding of a positive relation between tax news and economic activity is
consistent with work by Mertens and Ravn (2011, 2012) and House and Shapiro (2006).
The theoretical model constructed by Mertens and Ravn (2011) simulates the response of
various macroeconomic variables to anticipated and unanticipated tax shocks for a range
of different adjustment costs, labor supply elasticity, and variable capacity utilization.
They find that announcements of future tax cuts result in curtailed output, investment and
hours worked until the tax cut is implemented. Mertens and Ravn (2012) estimate a VAR
model, which provides empirical evidence in support of the contractionary effect of
pre-announced, but not yet implemented, tax cuts on output, investment, and hours
worked. House and Shapiro (2006) find that the phased-in-tax reductions enacted by the
2001 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA) resulted in a
0.37% decline in aggregate employment. In fact, under the assumption that the
implemented tax cut was permanent, the authors find a larger decrease of 0.78% in
aggregate employment. Similarly, our estimates suggest a positive relationship between
tax news and aggregate economic activity.
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2.4.2 State Personal Income
Figures 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 display the impulse response functions for real per-capita
personal income growth –hereafter personal income growth–, as well as 68% and 95%
confidence intervals. For most states, the estimated responses reveal a statistically
significant increase in real state personal income growth in anticipation of higher personal
income taxes. The state responses reach a peak three or four quarters after the shock; that
is, a quarter before or at the same time as GDP growth (see Table 2.3).
Although the shape of the impulse responses is very similar across states, they differ
greatly in magnitude. For instance, one year after the shock, an anticipated increase in the
implicit tax rate results in a cumulative change in real personal income growth that ranges
between -0.02% and 0.78 % for North Dakota and Massachusetts, respectively (see Table
2.3). Given that the average growth rate for state personal income was 0.6% between 1957
and 2006, the effect appears to be economically significant. In fact, on average, one year
after the shock, an additional one percentage point in the implicit tax rate would result in
an increase of 0.23% in state personal income.
Differences in the dynamics of the personal income response across states appear to
follow a regional pattern. Figure 2.10 plots the evolution of the cumulative responses
across U.S. states for a few representative horizons. Darker shades of red indicate larger
positive responses to an innovation in the implicit tax rate. On impact (see Figure 2.10a),
the effect on real personal income is somewhat smaller for states in the Northern Plains
(e.g., Montana, Southern Dakota and Northern Dakota) and Plains (e.g., Kansas, Iowa and
Nebraska) regions. As it is represented by the increase in the number of states in dark red
as the horizon increases, the impact spreads across states overtime and gradually rises in
the Energy Belt, the South East and New England. A year after the shock, personal
income growth has increased, on average, by 0.56%, 0.56%, and 0.60% in the Great
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Lakes, New England and the South East regions, respectively (see Figure 2.10b). Two
years after the news of a tax increase, most states in the Great Lakes, New England, the
Energy Belt and the Far West have experienced an expansion in personal income growth
(see Figure 2.10d). One year later, the effect starts to decline for most states. Throughout
the four-year horizon the response of personal income is moderate for states that are in the
Mountains/Northern region. In contrast, states in New England and the South East show a
strong positive effect both in the short and the long run.
Summarizing, whereas the impulse responses of personal income growth exhibit a similar
humped shape across states, the magnitude and timing varies. What drives these
differences in the responses? Although we explore this issue in depth in section 2.5, we
will advance two possible hypotheses based on the patterns observed in Figure 2.10. First,
shocks to the implicit tax rate appear to have a considerably larger effect in states with
higher education attainment and higher income levels. For instance, compare the pattern
followed by most states in the New England and Mideast regions (e.g.,Connecticut, New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New Jersey) with that of West Virginia and Mississippi,
two of the states with the lowest percentage of population with at least a bachelor’s degree
and with low median income. As denoted by the faster onset of a darker red in the map,
the shock to the implicit tax rate generates a faster and greater expansion in personal
income for the former group of states. Second, states where agriculture represents a large
percentage of GDP such as North Dakota, South Dakota and Montana are less responsive
to tax news. Note how these states are represented in lighter tones of red throughout the
depicted horizons. This evidence is suggestive of a lesser ability of firms and individuals
to exploit tax news in economies with high capital-labor ratios such as those that rely
more heavily on agriculture.
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2.4.3 State Employment
Figures 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9 plot the impulse response functions for per-capita employment
growth –hereafter employment growth– to a one percentage point increase in the implicit
tax rate, and the corresponding 68% and 95% confidence intervals. As the figures
illustrate, an implicit tax rate shock results in a statistically significant increase in state
employment growth. For most states, the response of employment growth reaches a peak
three quarters after the shock and declines subsequently. As it is the case with real
personal income growth, the impulse response functions show a similar shape across
states but the magnitude of the effect differs considerably. For instance, four quarters after
the shock, the change in employment growth ranges between 0.20% and 1.97% for West
Virginia and California, respectively (see Table 2.4). To gain some insight as to the
economic significance of these results, consider that the average rate of state employment
growth during the 1957-2006 period equaled 0.56%. On average, the one-year cumulative
impact of a one percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate is estimated to be a
1.15% increase in state employment growth. Hence, the effect is not only statistically but
also economically significant.
Figure 2.11 displays the cumulative change in real employment growth across the 48
contiguous states for a few representative horizons. On impact, the difference in the
response of employment across states appears to be greater than in the response of
personal income (Figure 2.11a). Regional patterns are observable four and six quarters
after the shock (see Figures 2.11b and c, respectively). Increases in employment are
considerably larger for states in the South East and New England. Interestingly, in contrast
with the patterns observed for personal income growth, the effect on employment growth
for the Great Lakes region (0.95%) is not larger than the average effect across states
(1.15%). The effect of a shock to the implicit tax rate appears to spread throughout the
U.S. states during the first year and then starts to die out about eight quarters after the
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shock.
Is the response of employment more moderate or sluggish for states with a high
agricultural component? What demographic characteristics explain these diverse
employment patterns? Section 2.5 seeks to formally disentangle the drivers of the
variation in the response to implicit tax shocks. However, let us point here to two possible
sources. First, the patterns observed in Figure 2.11 suggest that employment is somewhat
less responsive in states where agriculture comprises a high share of GDP. Note how
North Dakota, South Dakota, Idaho, and Montana are depicted in lighter tones of red than
most other states throughout the maps in Figure 2.11. Second, a larger employment boom
appears to ensue in states that face a higher per-capita federal tax burden (e.g.
Connecticut, New Jersey and Massachusetts). To better grasp why this might be the case,
it is important to realize that per-capita federal tax burden is highly correlated with
demographic characteristics such as education and median income. Hence, such a finding
would be consistent with models that imply a larger effect of tax foresight in economies
where the percentage of savers is greater (Leeper, Richter and Walker 2012), and smaller
in economies with high capital-labor ratios.
2.4.4 Robustness Checks
In this section, we conduct additional checks to examine whether our findings are robust
to alternative specifications of the FAVAR model. For the sake of brevity, we will discuss
the responses of aggregate GDP and state-level economic activity but will relegate the
corresponding figures to the appendix.
2.4.4.1 Alternative measures of taxes: The benchmark specification employed in the
previous sections includes the log growth of real per capita net taxes –after the implicit tax
rate– as a measure of tax revenues along the lines of Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
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However, the reader may wonder whether our results are robust to including a measure of
the tax rates faced by the individual instead of a measure of tax revenue. Thus, we
experimented by rotating three different variables, one at a time, as the second variable in
the benchmark FAVAR. These variables are: (1) the average personal income tax rate,
which is measured as the sum of federal personal income taxes and contributions for
government social insurance divided by the personal income tax base; (2) the average
corporate income tax rate, which is measured as the federal taxes on corporate income
divided by corporate profits; and (3) the average marginal tax rate. The first two variables
are available from Mertens and Ravn (2013), whereas the third was calculated on an
annual basis by Barro and Redlick (2011). Here, we follow Ramey (2011) and impute the
same average marginal tax rate to each of the quarters in a given year. Arguably, the
implicit tax rate should contain less information regarding future changes in the average
corporate income tax rate than in the average personal income tax rate, as individual
holdings of municipal bonds dominate the holdings of other corporate entities (Ang et al.,
2010). Yet, as innovations in the implicit tax rate might have an effect on corporate taxes
via their effect on employment, we opt to carry out this robustness check.
We find the responses of aggregate GDP, state personal income growth and state
employment growth to be similar in shape for all three cases and to resemble the
benchmark responses (see Figures A.1.1-A.1.7 in the Appendix). The magnitude of the
responses when we rotate in the average personal income tax rate or the average marginal
tax rate are almost identical. For instance, four quarters after a shock to the implicit tax
rate, the cumulative change in average personal income (employment) growth across states
equals 0.469% (1.153%) in the benchmark model versus 0.466% (1.148%) when we use
the average personal income tax rate. Instead, the responses of both aggregate GDP and
state-level economic activity are slightly larger when we rotate in the average corporate
income tax rate. In particular, we obtain one-year cumulative changes of 0.52% and 1.30%
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percentage points for personal income growth and employment growth, respectively.
2.4.4.2 Longer Bond Maturities: The reader might also wonder whether using bonds
with longer maturities to compute the implicit tax rate affects our results. For instance,
Kueng (2014) finds that the 2-year break even tax rate (BERT) –computed using the
municipal bond spread– follows the marginal tax rate of the top 1% of the income
distribution closer than the 15 year BERT. Clearly, the longer the maturity of the bonds,
the longer the horizon over which expectations of future tax changes are computed. To
evaluate the effect of considering longer bond maturities, we re-estimated our FAVAR
model using the implicit tax rate derived from the yield data of U.S. municipal and
Treasury bonds with five year maturity. Figure A.1.8 of the Appendix illustrates that,
regardless of the maturity dates on municipal and Treasury bonds, GDP increases in
response to a tax news shock. In fact, differences between the two impulse response
functions are minimal.
As for the estimated impulse response for state-level personal income and employment,
they are also robust to considering longer maturities (see Figures A.1.9-A.1.14 in the
Appendix). Overall, we observe a similar shape in the response of personal income with a
peak around 4 quarters for most states and a significant variation in the magnitude of the
response across states. For employment, states exhibited similar shaped responses with a
peak around 1 quarter after the shock. As it is the case for aggregate economic activity, the
estimated effect on state-level economic activity is very similar. For instance, the mean of
the 4-quarter cumulative response across states for personal income is 0.41% when we use
the 5-year bonds versus 0.47% for the benchmark. This result is consistent with forward
looking agents incorporating information about the future path of the income tax rate as
soon as news become available.
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2.4.4.3 Monetary Policy: Work by Rossi and Zubairy (2011) finds that considering
fiscal and monetary policy in conjunction is key when analyzing the effect of government
spending in VARs. This is also likely to be the case when estimating the effect of tax
news. Thus, to formally evaluate the importance of accounting for monetary policy, we
re-estimated the FAVAR excluding the federal funds rate. The estimated responses are
similar in shape and magnitude to our benchmark model where the implicit tax rate is
ordered after the federal funds rate. For instance, in the model that excludes the fed funds
rate, 1% increase in the implicit tax rate leads to one-year cumulative increases of 0.74%,
0.44%, and 1.22% in real per-capita GDP, average state personal income, and average
state employment, respectively. Contrast this with our benchmark model where, four
quarters after the shock, the increase in real per-capita GDP, state personal income, and
state employment growth equaled 0.88%, 0.47%, and 1.15%, respectively.11.
We also investigated the robustness of our results to two alternative specifications of
monetary policy. First, we augmented our benchmark model by including the log growth
of nonborrowed reserves. This alternative specification is motivated by arguments
discussed in Christiano et al. (1999) whereby the Federal Reserve targeted non-borrowed
reserves during some years, in particular between 1979 and 1982. The results were
qualitatively unchanged (see Figures A.1.16-A.1.21 in the Appendix). The only difference
in the impulse responses is a smaller impact of tax news on aggregate and state-level
economic activity. For instance, if we include nonborrowed reserves in the model, we
estimate increases of 0.37% and 0.79% in the cumulative responses of personal income
and employment growth, respectively, a year after the shock.
Then, we experimented with using the term spread, measured as the difference between
the 10-year Treasury bond rate and the 3-month Treasury bill rate, as an alternative
11Unreported results, available from the authors upon request, suggest that the effect of an unanticipated tax
change is overestimated when monetary policy is ignored under an alternative identification scheme where
the implicit tax rate is ordered first (see Figure A.1.15)
30
indicator of the monetary policy stance. In particular, it has been argued that this term
spread contains relevant information for the conduct of monetary policy as it captures
expectations regarding inflation and output growth (see Ang and Piazzesi (2003), among
others). The estimated impulse response functions for aggregate and state-level economic
activity are very similar to the benchmark model. The only difference is a slightly larger
effect of the implicit tax rate shock on economic activity. More specifically, the average
response of personal income and employment growth across states equal 0.48% and
1.24%, respectively.
2.5 What Drives the Variation in the State-Level Responses?
This section investigates the reasons for the differential responses to an implicit tax rate
shock across states.
2.5.1 Possible Sources of Variation
The literature on fiscal policy suggests several reasons why the effect of anticipated
federal tax changes might vary across states. These include dissimilarities in the degree of
labor market frictions and in investment adjustment costs, diverse geographical
concentrations of industries, differences in demographics, and variation in the state’s fiscal
burden and taxes.
2.5.1.1 Adjustment Costs: It is well known that industries differ in the nature of the
labor and capital adjustment costs they face (see Caballero et al. (1997); Hamermesh and
Pfann (1996); Hall (2004); Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) and references therein), as
well as in the output shares of capital and labor (Jones, 2003; Acemoglu and Guerrieri,
2006). These differences in adjustment costs and capital-labor ratios may, in turn, interact
with diverse industry mix across states and offer a source for employment and personal
income to exhibit a different response across states. As Figure 2.12 illustrates, industry
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composition varies greatly across regions. For instance, for agriculture –an industry with a
capital share of about 40%– the share of GDP ranged between 2.5% and 10% for states in
the Northern Plains whereas it represented less than 1% for most states in the New
England region. In contrast, states in the Great Lakes and in the Southeast regions are
mostly characterized by a high manufacturing share in GDP, an industry with a capital
share of about 30%. In addition to these divergences, interregional input-output
relationships may aid in differentiating the response of federal tax shocks across regions.
2.5.1.2 Demographics: Work by Leeper, Richter and Walker (2012) suggests the
response of employment to an increase in labor taxes differs depending on the percentage
of non-savers in the economy. Households that operate hand-to-mouth cannot take
advantage of foresight regarding a future tax increase, thus such news would have little
effect on their labor and consumption decisions. In contrast, households that have the
ability to save are able to react in anticipation of a tax increase. Along the same lines,
Kueng (2014) demonstrates that households who are less educated, have lower income, or
are more credit constrained are less responsive to news regarding tax changes. Yet, he also
shows that the same households respond one-to-one to large news shocks. Gruber and
Saez (2002) find that the elasticity of taxable income differs significantly for high income
tax payers who itemize deductions and for other income groups. Indeed, marginal tax
rates differ across individuals with different income levels (Congressional Budget Office,
2012) and are higher for middle-age workers than for younger workers and retirees
(NBER, 2000).
Thus, if households that have high income, are more educated, are less credit constrained
or are middle-aged are regionally concentrated, the effects of tax news may vary
systematically across states. For instance, one could conjecture that the responsiveness of
employment and personal income to tax news is very different for a rich state like New
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Jersey –the state with the highest median income in the sample– than for Mississippi –the
poorest state in the nation. After all, the median income in New Jersey was more than
twice that of Mississippi. Similarly, we might expect tax news to have a larger impact on
Massachusetts than in West Virginia where the percentage of the population with at least a
bachelor’s degree was 20.4% and 9.9%, respectively.
2.5.1.3 State Taxes and Federal Tax Burden: The literature on fiscal competition posits
that the degree of factor mobility across jurisdictions affects the magnitude of the short
and long run response of employment and personal income to local taxes (see, e.g.
Wildasin (2006)). Our object of interest here is not the effect of changes in state taxes; yet,
to the extent that states differ on their tax treatment of personal income, an increase in
federal income taxes will effectively result in a differential increase in effective marginal
tax rates across states. In particular, not all states in the union levy income taxes on
individuals. Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming do
not impose personal income taxes, whereas Tennessee and New Hampshire impose taxes
only on income from dividends and interest. For those states that do impose personal
income taxes, the structure of individual and corporate taxes relies heavily on the structure
of the federal income tax. In fact, most of these states base the calculation of the state tax
on a federal "starting point" such as the federal adjusted gross income (AGI) or the federal
taxable income. Similarly, state deductions and exemptions are grounded on the federal
deductions and exemptions. Therefore, news of an increase in federal income taxes
constitutes news of an increase in the state tax. Furthermore, news of a one percentage
point increase in the federal personal income tax represents a different percentage increase
in marginal income taxes for each state.
In addition, states also differ on whether –and how much– they tax corporate income,
sales, particular items such as gasoline, cigarettes, alcohol, etc. Thus, the federal tax
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burden borne by an individual varies depending on her state of residence. Indeed, in 2005
the per-capita federal tax burden ranged between $11,563 and $4,287 for Connecticut and
Mississippi, respectively. Hence, systematic differences in federal tax burdens across
states –due in part to differences in demographics– suggest that the same news regarding
an increase in federal personal income taxes could lead to diverse responses in
employment and personal income.
2.5.2 Empirical Methodology and Estimation Results
The analysis in section 2.4 uncovered important differences in the magnitude of the
state-level response of economic activity to tax news. In this section we explore which
state-level characteristics drive these differences. To do so we regress the one-year
cumulative responses of personal income and employment growth for the 48 contiguous
states on a number of state-level covariates. That is, we estimate by OLS the following
cross-state equation
yi = βxi + i (2.5)
where yi is defined as the estimated one-year cumulative response of state-level personal
income or employment growth for state i, computed from the estimated FAVAR model. i
is an error term. The vector xi includes state-level measures of industry mix (i.e., the
average ratio of a sector’s output to the total state GDP), demographic characteristics
(population density, median income, median age, white, black, female, education) and a
measure of per-capita state federal tax burden.12 In addition, we include a dummy that
takes the value of one for the eight states where most municipal bonds are traded
(California, New York, Florida, Texas, New Jersey, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania),
and a dummy for the seven states that do not levy income taxes on individuals (Florida,
Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming).
12See Table A.1.2 in the appendix for a detailed description of the data construction.
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Most of the covariates in xi are computed as annual averages over the period where the
data are obtainable. In some cases, due to data availability, we measured the variable in
the year where the data were reported. In particular, to control for sectorial composition in
the state, we computed the annual average output shares of the one-digit SIC sectors in a
state’s GDP between 1963 and 2006. These shares are calculated using data from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)13 and defined as the ratio of each sector’s output to
the total GDP for the state. The variable median income is calculated as the average
median income over the 1984-2006 period. White and black are computed as the annual
average of the percentage of the total state population that is white or African American,
respectively, over the 1970-2006 period. Similarly, female corresponds to the annual
average of the percentage of females in the total state population between 1970 and 2006.
Education is defined as the annual average of the percent of total population 25 years and
over with bachelor’s degree or higher education between 1960 and 2000. Population
density is defined as inhabitants per square mile for the year 2000. Median age
corresponds to the median age in the state for the year 2000. All the demographic
variables are constructed using data from U.S. Census Bureau. Fiscal characteristics
include per-capita state federal tax burden, which is defined as the ratio of the state’s
federal tax revenues to the state’s personal income for 2005, and the dummy that controls
for whether the state levies taxes on personal income. These data are collected from the
Tax Foundation. A detailed description of the definitions, computations and sources for
the data is provided in the Appendix.
2.5.2.1 State Personal Income: Table 2.7 reports coefficient estimates and (in
parentheses) associated standard errors for the regression where the dependent variable is
the one-year cumulative change in personal income growth. The results suggest that the
response of personal income growth is significantly lower in states with large agriculture
13Data prior to 1963 are not available from the BEA.
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shares and higher in states where manufacturing and retail represent a high percentage of
state GDP. For instance, in the regression with only the statistically significant
demographics and industry shares (column 5) the estimated coefficient on agriculture
implies that state with a 1% higher share would have experienced a 0.03% smaller
increase in response of personal income a year after the implicit tax rate shock. Examples
of states with a high agricultural component are South Dakota, North Dakota, Nebraska
and Montana. In contrast, a state with a 1% greater share of manufacturing would have
exhibited a 0.02% larger increase in personal income. For instance, Indiana and Michigan
exhibited manufacturing shares well above the average for the nation.
All in all, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that systematic differences in the
industry mix compounded with differences in costs of adjustments and in factor
proportions across sectors (i.e., different shares of capital) result in dissimilar responses to
tax foresight across states. In particular, news regarding a future increase in federal taxes
will give firms and individuals an immediate incentive to increase production. Yet, states
where production activities with a higher capital-labor ratio represent a larger percent of
GDP are less able to take advantage of these news.
Although the first two regression in Table 2.7 reveal a larger increase in personal income
for the eight states (CA, NY, FL, TX, NJ, MI, OH, and PA) where most municipal bonds
are traded, this effect is statistically insignificant. These results suggest that news
regarding a future increase in federal personal income taxes has similar effects on states
where residents face a more liquid municipal bonds market than in states where this
market is less liquid (Ang et al., 2010).
As noted, demographics vary greatly across states. In turn, tax burden varies significantly
by income, age, etc. We thus included a number of demographic covariates in our
regression: population density, median income, median age, the percentages of white and
36
African American population, the percentage of females, and a measure of the education
level. Only median age appears to be a statistically significant determinant of how
responsive state personal income growth is to news of an increase in federal taxes. In
particular, an increase of one year in the median age of the state’s population results in a
reduction of 0.03% in the response of personal income (see column 5 of Table 2.7). This
result is consistent with the fact that occupational mobility decreases with age, thus
systematic differences in the degree of state labor mobility could result in differential
responses of personal income growth.
We conclude this section by noting that there is no significant difference in the
responsiveness of state personal income between states that levy taxes on personal income
and those that do not. Nor do we find the per-capita federal tax burden to have any
explanatory power, once we have controlled for education.
2.5.2.2 State employment: Similar covariates explain the differences in the magnitude
of the response of employment growth to implicit tax rate shocks. Coefficient estimates
and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported in Table 2.8. As it is the case with
personal income, employment growth appears to be more responsive to tax news in states
where the share of manufacturing is high. Similarly, states with a high retail component
are more able to take advantage of the tax news and exhibit a larger increase in
employment growth. (Examples of states with a high retail share are Maine and Florida.)
These results are consistent with House and Shapiro’s (2006) finding of a larger effect of
labor taxes for economies (i.e., states in our case) where the elasticity of labor supply is
larger and the costs of adjustments are smaller.
Regarding the demographic characteristics, both the percentage of the population with at
least a bachelor’s degree and the percentage of white population partially explain the
variation in the response of employment growth across states. Examples of states where
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over 20% of the population has at least a bachelor’s degree are Colorado, Connecticut,
Massachusetts and Maryland. It is worth noting that most of the highly educated states are
located in New England, a region where we estimated the dynamic response of
employment growth to implicit tax rate shocks to be not only stronger but faster (see
Figure 2.11). This finding points towards the ability of individuals with higher education
attainment to take advantage of tax news (Kueng 2014). All else equal, states with a
greater percentage of the population that is white14 exhibit a smaller increase in
employment growth when faced with news of a federal tax increase. Most of these states
are located in the Plains and Northern Plains regions (e.g., Iowa, Nebraska, North and
South Dakota), which were shown to have a slower response to implicit tax rate shocks
(see Figure 2.11).
Similar to what we found for personal income, the magnitude of the employment response
is not statistically different between the eight states where most municipal bonds are
traded and the rest of the states. On the other hand, states that face a higher federal tax
burden do exhibit a greater response of employment to tax news. This result points toward
a higher incentive to reoptimize for households and firms located in states where the
federal tax burden is greater.
2.5.3 Robustness Checks
2.5.3.1 Shorter and Longer Horizons: Our choice to focus on the one-year cumulative
response of personal income and employment growth, is driven by the fact that median for
the peak response of personal income growth is four quarters after the shock. Yet, the
reader might wonder whether the variation in the magnitude of the responses at different
horizons is explained by the same covariates. On the one hand, exploring the sources of
variation at a 2-quarter horizon is of interest as the peak response of employment growth
14Notice that the omitted group is other race. Thus a negative coefficient on white indicates that employment
growth is less responsive relative to states where the percentage of the population of other race (non-white,
non-black) is higher.
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to news regarding a federal tax increase occurs before a year has passed (see Table 2.3).
On the other hand, one might be interested in a longer horizon, say 6 quarters, when the
effect of tax foresight on aggregate GDP starts to decline as the anticipation effect fades
out.
Thus, we re-estimated our preferred cross-state regressions using as dependent variables
the cumulative change in personal income growth and the cumulative change in
employment growth computed two and six quarters after the shock. Estimation results
reported in column (2) and (3) of Table 2.9 indicate that our results for personal income
growth are robust to considering different horizons. Notice that all the covariates that enter
significantly in the regression where we use the cumulative response after four quarters,
∆pi4, in regression (2.5), enter significantly and exhibit the same sign when we use the
cumulative response after two, ∆pi2, or six quarters, ∆pi6. The only significant difference
at the two-quarter horizon is a reduction in the magnitude of the coefficients, which is due
to the smaller magnitude of the state-level cumulative responses. In contrast, the
differences in the magnitudes of the coefficients between the benchmark (4-quarters) and
the longer horizon (6-quarters) is minimal. We do observe a slight decrease in statistical
significance for federal tax burden and median age
A similar pattern is apparent for employment growth. That is, the sign of the coefficient is
unchanged, albeit their magnitude tends to be smaller when we consider the cumulative
response after two quarters, ∆emp2 (see column (2) and (3) of Table 2.10). In fact, at this
horizon the share of manufacturing in GDP becomes insignificant. Instead, when we
consider a six-quarter horizon, ∆emp6 , the results are similar to that of benchmark
specification except for the coefficient on the share of manufacturing in GDP, which
becomes statistically insignificant.
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2.5.3.2 The Political Process: In the U.S., as in most democratic countries, taxes are
the result of a political process. The conventional view is that the larger the inequality in
pretax earning the greater the pressure to approve redistributive income tax policies. Yet,
there is a trade-off between the possibility of increased redistribution that stems from
higher income taxes and the possible detrimental effect of these taxes on the efficiency of
the economy (Agranov and Palfrey, 2014). This trade-off constitutes a key source of
disagreement in the political and economic debate regarding the effects of income taxes on
economic activity. Given the striking rise in income inequality observed in the U.S. (Saez,
2013) and the polarization over tax policy, one could conjecture that the effect of tax news
might vary depending on the influence exerted by traditional political parties in each state.
As a rough control for differences in the state’s political process, we re-estimated the
benchmark regressions including two additional variables: (a) the fraction of Democrats in
the state house of representatives; and (b) the fraction of Democrats in the state Senate.
Both variables are computed as averages over the 1980-2006 period. These data were
obtained from the University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research (UKCPR).
Estimation results are reported in column (5) and (6) of Table 2.9 and 2.10. The estimated
coefficients on the control variables are in line with that of benchmark specification and
column (4) of Table 2.9 and 2.10. Yet, none of the political controls have explanatory
power for the cross-state variation in the responsiveness to tax news.
2.6 Conclusions
Do tax news related to federal income taxes depress or stimulate state-level economic
activity? Using a FAVAR model we found that tax news –measured as a 1 percentage
point increase in the implicit tax rate–resulted not only on larger aggregate GDP growth,
but also on increased personal income and employment growth across most states. The
shape of the impulse response functions suggested a somewhat shorter-lived response of
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employment growth, which peaks at three quarters, and a more persistent response of
personal income with a peak about a year after the shock. Although all states exhibited a
similar humped shaped response, with the anticipation period lasting about four quarters,
the timing and the magnitude of the effect varied greatly across states.
Which state-level characteristics explain these differences in the response of economic
activity to tax foresight? We addressed this question by regressing the one-year
cumulative response of personal income and employment growth on a set of state-level
covariates. We found a larger impact of tax news on personal income for states where the
share of agriculture is low and that of manufacturing and retail are high, and where the
median age is lower. As for the response of employment, we found the effect to be greater
for states where the shares of manufacturing and retail are high, where the proportion of
highly educated individuals is larger and that of whites is lower.
Whereas the finding of a positive response of aggregate economic activity to tax news is
not new (Yang, 2005; Leeper et al., 2012; Mertens and Ravn, 2011, 2012; Leeper et al.,
2013; Kueng, 2014), our findings provide new insights into how the response of economic
activity diverges across states and on the sources of these differences. Our results point to
the importance of three mechanisms in the transmission of tax news. First, as posited by a
number of studies, tax news appear to have a larger effect in economies with a larger
percentage of highly educated individuals –most likely high earners and savers– who have
the ability to re-optimize by changing their employment and investment decisions.
Second, differences in industry composition –possibly linked with differences in input
adjustment costs and capital-labor ratios- play a key role in how responsive personal
income and employment are to tax news. Third, the larger the tax burden faced in an
economy the greater the response of economic activity to tax news. Then, who gains and
who loses when news of an increase in federal income taxes hit the economy? States in the
Southeast and New England regions gain as they experience increases in employment and
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personal income. In contrast, the Northern Plains are the losers as households and firms
located in these states are less able to take advantage of tax news.
Our results have implications regarding the recent debates on increasing the federal
income tax rates for the top 1% of the income distribution. The existence of disparate
responses to an implicit tax rate shock across states underscores the difficulty of agreeing
on a national fiscal policy for such a diverse nation as the U.S., and raises issues of
cross-state equality. Regardless of how big the effect of implicit tax rate shocks on
aggregate GDP growth is, these cross-state differences make it difficult to reach an
agreement regarding who should be taxed more (or less) by the federal government.
Furthermore, although due to the aggregate nature of our data we are not able to
differentiate between news regarding a tax increase for high income earners and news
regarding an across the board tax increase, our results suggest that increasing the tax rates
of the top 1% of the income distribution would have differential impacts on income and
inequality across U.S. states. In brief, not all states are equal in regards to the quantitative
impact of tax foresight.
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Table 2.1: Granger Causality Tests
Null Hypothesis
Panel A: VAR Tax Shocks F-test p-value
VAR tax shocks do not Granger-cause
the implicit tax rate 1.094 0.360
Implicit tax rate does not Granger-cause
the VAR tax shocks 5.016 0.000
Panel B: Log Growth of Real Per-Capita Net Taxes F-test p-value
Log growth of real per-capita net taxes does not
Granger-cause the implicit tax rate 2.014 0.094
Implicit tax rate does not Granger-cause the
log growth of real per-capita net taxes 7.816 0.000
Panel C: Average Personal Income Tax Rate F-test p-value
Average personal income tax rate does not
Granger-cause the implicit tax rate 1.656 0.161
Implicit tax rate does not Granger-cause
average personal income tax rate 2.307 0.059
Panel D: Average Marginal Federal Income Tax Rate F-test p-value
Average marginal federal income tax rate does not
Granger-cause the implicit tax rate 0.904 0.463
Implicit tax rate does not Granger-cause
average marginal federal income tax rate 4.928 0.001
Panel E: Log Growth of Real Per-Capita Net Taxes in FAVAR χ2 p-value
Log growth of real per-capita net taxes does not
Granger-cause the implicit tax rate 3.532 0.473
Implicit tax rate does not Granger-cause
the log growth of real per-capita net taxes 16.675 0.002
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Table 2.2: U.S. States by Economic Regions
New England Mideast Southeast Great Lakes Plains Northern Plains Energy Belt Far West
Connecticut Delaware Alabama Illinois Iowa Idaho Colorado Arizona
Maine Maryland Arkansas Indiana Kansas Montana Louisiana California
Massachusetts New Jersey Florida Michigan Missouri Northern Dakota New Mexico Nevada
New Hampshire New York Georgia Minnesota Nebraska South Dakota Oklahoma Oregon
Rhode Island Pennsylvania Kentucky Ohio Texas Washington
Vermont Mississippi West Virginia Utah
North Carolina Wisconsin Wyoming
South Carolina
Tennessee
Virginia
The table lists the states corresponding to each of the eight economic regions identified by Crone (2005). Only the 48 contiguous states are included as the
classification is based on similarities in business cycles.
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Table 2.3: State Level Cumulative Personal Income Responses and Quarter of Peak Effect
State 4-quarter cumulative effect Peak response Peak quarter
Alabama 0.710 0.277 3
Arizona 0.411 0.255 4
Arkansas 0.491 0.186 3
California 0.453 0.273 4
Colorado 0.516 0.288 4
Connecticut 0.575 0.234 4
Delaware 0.300 0.210 4
Florida 0.345 0.264 4
Georgia 0.636 0.290 4
Idaho 0.429 0.149 3
Illinois 0.581 0.238 3
Indiana 0.637 0.276 3
Iowa 0.292 0.253 3
Kansas 0.307 0.187 3
Kentucky 0.554 0.283 3
Louisiana 0.365 0.178 4
Maine 0.478 0.131 4
Maryland 0.365 0.267 4
Massachusetts 0.780 0.268 4
Michigan 0.750 0.263 3
Minnesota 0.539 0.212 4
Mississippi 0.509 0.211 3
Missouri 0.555 0.191 4
Montana -0.051 0.149 3
Nebraska 0.218 0.196 3
Nevada 0.275 0.247 4
New Hampshire 0.630 0.285 4
New Jersey 0.627 0.265 4
New Mexico 0.356 0.210 4
New York 0.525 0.206 4
North Carolina 0.630 0.259 4
North Dakota -0.018 0.113 3
Ohio 0.774 0.305 3
continued on next page
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Table 2.3- Continued from previous page
State 4-quarter cumulative effect Peak response Peak quarter
Oklahoma 0.460 0.161 4
Oregon 0.576 0.242 4
Pennsylvania 0.555 0.313 3
Rhode Island 0.406 0.230 4
South Carolina 0.848 0.290 4
South Dakota 0.063 0.147 3
Tennessee 0.705 0.257 4
Texas 0.569 0.282 4
Utah 0.501 0.266 4
Vermont 0.496 0.242 4
Virginia 0.605 0.281 4
Washington 0.363 0.243 4
West Virginia 0.049 0.213 3
Wisconsin 0.552 0.208 4
Wyoming 0.216 0.216 3
State average 0.469 0.234 4
Aggregate GDP 0.883 0.288 4
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Table 2.4: State Level Cumulative Employment Responses and Quarter of Peak Effect
State 4-quarter cumulative effect Peak response Peak quarter
Alabama 1.339 0.429 3
Arizona 1.546 0.393 3
Arkansas 1.297 0.358 3
California 1.972 0.443 3
Colorado 1.523 0.390 3
Connecticut 1.630 0.408 3
Delaware 0.870 0.280 3
Florida 1.634 0.382 3
Georgia 1.580 0.435 3
Idaho 0.510 0.238 3
Illinois 0.987 0.330 2
Indiana 1.066 0.366 2
Iowa 0.989 0.312 2
Kansas 1.085 0.342 3
Kentucky 0.926 0.335 3
Louisiana 0.873 0.266 3
Maine 1.192 0.334 3
Maryland 1.335 0.326 3
Massachusetts 1.699 0.416 3
Michigan 0.977 0.357 2
Minnesota 1.178 0.363 3
Mississippi 1.354 0.363 3
Missouri 1.171 0.363 2
Montana 0.209 0.175 3
Nebraska 0.868 0.297 3
Nevada 1.463 0.324 3
New Hampshire 1.592 0.406 3
New Jersey 0.627 0.265 4
New Mexico 1.160 0.318 3
New York 1.284 0.355 3
North Carolina 1.509 0.397 3
North Dakota 0.801 0.200 3
Ohio 1.040 0.379 2
continued on next page
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Table 2.4- Continued from previous page
State 4-quarter cumulative effect Peak response Peak quarter
Oklahoma 1.155 0.350 3
Oregon 1.293 0.365 2
Pennsylvania 0.820 0.333 3
Rhode Island 1.149 0.308 2
South Carolina 1.437 0.399 3
South Dakota 0.519 0.216 3
Tennessee 1.277 0.396 3
Texas 1.517 0.427 3
Utah 0.947 0.309 3
Vermont 1.294 0.359 3
Virginia 1.555 0.366 3
Washington 1.060 0.305 3
West Virginia 0.204 0.190 3
Wisconsin 1.173 0.380 2
Wyoming 0.674 0.193 3
State average 1.153 0.338 3
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Table 2.5: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Standard
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
∆pi4 0.611 0.250 0.015 1.041
∆emp4 1.200 0.358 0.242 1.865
Agriculture 2.372 2.305 0.368 10.000
Oil 1.557 3.796 0.000 18.344
Construction 4.733 0.854 3.289 8.489
Manufacturing 16.618 5.970 4.119 30.198
Retail 8.334 0.881 5.944 10.442
FIRE 16.812 4.777 9.048 35.396
Female 51.118 0.707 49.200 52.580
White 85.960 9.111 63.070 98.420
Black 9.650 9.359 0.290 35.740
Education 15.421 2.791 9.900 21.700
Population density 179.36 244.39 4.90 1097.60
Median income 51029.40 7400.12 37516.00 67235.00
Median age 35.588 1.886 27.100 38.900
Per-capita federal tax burden 6774.458 1509.137 4287.00 11563.00
Municipal bond issuer 0.167 0.377 0.00 1.000
Exempt State 0.125 0.334 0.000 1.000
House 0.549 0.173 0.000 0.870
Senate 0.558 0.170 0.000 0.860
N = 48
The table reports the summary statistics for the variables included in the cross-state regressions. ∆pi4
denotes the 4-quarter cumulative response of real per-capita personal income growth. ∆emp4 denotes
the 4-quarter cumulative response of real per-capita employment growth. Both cumulative responses are
computed based on the estimated FAVAR impulse response functions. Agriculture, manufacturing, retail,
FIRE (finance, insurance and real estate), oil, and construction are the shares of each industry in the state
GDP. White is the percentage of the total state population that is white. Black is the percentage of the
total state population that is African American. Female is the percentage of the total state population
that is female. Education is the percentage of the total state population of 25 years and over with at least
a bachelor’s degree. Population density is the number of state inhabitants per square mile. Median age
is the median age of the state population. Median income is the median income of the state. Per-capita
federal tax burden is the ratio of per-capita state federal tax revenues to the state personal income. Tax
exempt state is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the state does not levy income taxes on individuals,
0 otherwise. Municipal bond issuer is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the state is one of the 8 states
(California, New York, Florida, Texas, New Jersey, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania) where most mu-
nicipal bonds are traded, 0 otherwise. House is the fraction of democratic state representatives. Senate is
the fraction of democratic state senators.
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Table 2.6: Correlation Matrix
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
(1) 1
(2) 0.02 1
(3) -0.08 0.05 1
(4) -0.18 -0.33 -0.50 1
(5) 0.20 -0.23 0.33 -0.00 1
(6) -0.23 -0.45 -0.15 -0.11 -0.42 1
(7) -0.28 -0.29 -0.61 0.54 -0.12 0.22 1
(8) 0.33 -0.13 0.02 -0.06 0.10 0.04 -0.29 1
(9) -0.32 0.03 -0.08 0.27 -0.07 -0.08 0.45 -0.90 1
(10) -0.26 -0.06 0.05 -0.40 -0.35 0.56 -0.18 0.09 -0.24 1
(11) -0.43 -0.22 -0.27 0.03 -0.39 0.56 0.46 -0.12 0.13 0.39 1
(12) -0.38 -0.28 0.03 -0.11 -0.43 0.64 -0.05 0.13 -0.15 0.80 0.57 1
(13) -0.00 -0.16 -0.18 0.06 0.048 0.13 0.34 0.24 -0.12 -0.14 0.24 -0.03 1
(14) -0.35 -0.16 -0.024 -0.27 -0.50 0.68 0.00 0.09 -0.15 0.71 0.65 0.85 0.24 1
(15) -0.26 -0.04 -0.16 0.02 -0.10 0.18 0.18 -0.18 0.09 0.071 0.30 0.16 0.05 0.24 1
(16) 0.11 0.28 0.40 -0.45 0.054 -0.05 -0.43 0.05 -0.14 -0.02 -0.15 -0.03 -0.01 0.17 0.16 1
(17) -0.46 0.01 -0.13 0.24 0.01 -0.10 0.50 -0.52 0.54 -0.21 0.29 -0.19 0.17 -0.07 -0.01 -0.15 1
(18) -0.38 0.04 -0.10 0.21 0.01 -0.07 0.43 -0.51 0.54 -0.20 0.25 -0.19 0.15 -0.11 -0.12 -0.14 0.93 1
Where 1-18 denote: Agriculture (1), Oil (2), Construction (3), Manufacturing (4), Retail (5), FIRE (6), Female (7), White (8), Black (9), Education (10),
Population density (11), Median income (12), Median age(13), Per-capita federal tax burden (14), Municipal bond issuer (15), Tax exempt state (16), House
(17) Senate (18). Agriculture, manufacturing, retail, FIRE (finance, insurance and real estate), oil, and construction are the shares of each industry in the state
GDP. White is the percentage of the total state population that is white. Black is the percentage of the total state population that is African American. Female is
the percentage of the total state population that is female. Education is the percentage of the total state population of 25 years and over with at least a bachelor’s
degree. Population density is the number of state inhabitants per square mile. Median age is the median age of the state population. Median income is the
median income of the state. Per-capita federal tax burden is the ratio of per-capita state federal tax revenues to the state personal income. Tax exempt state is a
dummy that takes the value of 1 if the state does not levy income taxes on individuals, 0 otherwise. Municipal bond issuer is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if
the state is one of the 8 states (California, New York, Florida, Texas, New Jersey, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania) where most municipal bonds are traded, 0
otherwise. House is the fraction of democratic state representatives. Senate is the fraction of democratic state senators.
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Table 2.7: Estimated Equations Explaining Cross-State Variation of Personal Income to
Implicit tax rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables cupi4 cupi4 cupi4 cupi4 cupi4
agriculture -0.0201 -0.0197 -0.0322*** -0.0327*** -0.0332***
(0.0160) (0.0129) (0.00820) (0.00797) (0.00786)
manufacturing 0.0269*** 0.0253*** 0.0248*** 0.0239*** 0.0235***
(0.00781) (0.00514) (0.00342) (0.00326) (0.00311)
retail 0.0382 0.0404 0.0410** 0.0427** 0.0457**
(0.0328) (0.0242) (0.0166) (0.0162) (0.0198)
fire -0.00940* -0.00929** -0.00688** -0.00595*
(0.00543) (0.00360) (0.00334) (0.00308)
oil -0.00156
(0.00900)
construction 0.0340 0.0216
(0.0442) (0.0359)
muni 0.0626 0.0472
(0.0441) (0.0364)
npitax -0.0380
(0.0784)
ftbp 8.78e-05* 5.25e-05** 5.15e-05*** 6.26e-05*** 4.98e-05**
(4.33e-05) (2.19e-05) (1.89e-05) (2.18e-05) (2.01e-05)
popdensity -6.49e-05
(8.48e-05)
medianincome -8.11e-06
(8.25e-06)
medianage -0.0308** -0.0244** -0.0270** -0.0313** -0.0309**
(0.0129) (0.00995) (0.0120) (0.0130) (0.0133)
white -8.67e-05 -0.00189
(0.00497) (0.00407)
black 0.00312 0.00177
(0.00483) (0.00423)
female 0.0389 0.0335
(0.0542) (0.0488)
education 0.0242 0.0175 0.00944
(0.0156) (0.0110) (0.00822)
Constant -1.710 -1.524 0.373 0.584* 0.539
(2.750) (2.424) (0.340) (0.341) (0.362)
Observations 48 48 48 48 48
R-squared 0.811 0.800 0.760 0.755 0.744
The table reports regressions coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) for the cross-state
regressions of the 4-quarter cumulative response of per-capita personal income growth on state-level
characteristics. The regressions are estimated by ordinary least squares. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2.8: Estimated Equations Explaining Cross-State Variation of Employment to
Implicit tax rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables cuemp4 cuemp4 cuemp4 cuemp4 cuemp4
agriculture -0.00796
(0.0360)
manufacturing 0.0355** 0.0223*** 0.0248*** 0.0194** 0.0186*
(0.0158) (0.00725) (0.00775) (0.00811) (0.0102)
retail 0.161** 0.148*** 0.133*** 0.167*** 0.120**
(0.0712) (0.0518) (0.0490) (0.0427) (0.0453)
fire 0.00327
(0.0142)
oil 0.00502
(0.0184)
construction 0.149 0.0941 0.0975
(0.101) (0.0718) (0.0717)
muni -0.0649
(0.149)
npitax -0.0527
(0.246)
ftbp 0.000290*** 0.000191*** 0.000160*** 9.02e-05
(0.000102) (6.84e-05) (5.58e-05) (5.72e-05)
popdensity -0.000760 -0.000755 -0.000715
(0.000492) (0.000488) (0.000480)
medianincome -2.39e-05
(2.02e-05)
medianage -0.0508 -0.0327
(0.0350) (0.0313)
white -0.0314** -0.0176*** -0.0198*** -0.0192*** -0.0181***
(0.0136) (0.00546) (0.00549) (0.00443) (0.00424)
black -0.0185
(0.0123)
female 0.214* 0.171 0.124
(0.116) (0.113) (0.110)
education 0.0537 0.0434* 0.0562*** 0.0529** 0.0815***
(0.0406) (0.0218) (0.0178) (0.0243) (0.0212)
Constant -9.219 -8.795 -7.306 -0.334 0.144
(5.947) (5.857) (5.819) (0.518) (0.688)
Observations 48 48 48 48 48
R-squared 0.619 0.564 0.550 0.451 0.397
The table reports regressions coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) for the cross-state
regressions of the 4-quarter cumulative response of per-capita employment growth on state-level charac-
teristics. The regressions are estimated by ordinary least squares. *, **, and *** denote statistical signifi-
cance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2.9: Robustness Checks: Shorter and Longer Horizons and Political
Controls-Personal Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables cupi4 cupi2 cupi6 cupi4 cupi2 cupi6
agriculture -0.0332*** -0.0240*** -0.0329*** -0.0300*** -0.0213*** -0.0274**
(0.00786) (0.00467) (0.00836) (0.00937) (0.00569) (0.0106)
manufacturing 0.0235*** 0.0118*** 0.0237*** 0.0234*** 0.0117*** 0.0235***
(0.00311) (0.00229) (0.00384) (0.00316) (0.00236) (0.00396)
retail 0.0457** 0.0471*** 0.0331 0.0449** 0.0480*** 0.0329
(0.0198) (0.0134) (0.0266) (0.0173) (0.0142) (0.0229)
ftbp 4.98e-05** 3.26e-05** 4.41e-05* 5.11e-05** 3.53e-05** 4.74e-05**
(2.01e-05) (1.29e-05) (2.19e-05) (2.07e-05) (1.40e-05) (2.32e-05)
medianage -0.0309** -0.0241*** -0.0296* -0.0322** -0.0257*** -0.0321**
(0.0133) (0.00836) (0.0147) (0.0129) (0.00818) (0.0142)
house 0.240 0.0518 0.306
(0.273) (0.183) (0.362)
senate -0.192 0.0117 -0.207
(0.270) (0.178) (0.351)
Constant 0.539 0.278 0.651 0.553 0.266 0.658
(0.362) (0.264) (0.412) (0.361) (0.268) (0.397)
Observations 48 48 48 48 48 48
R-squared 0.744 0.685 0.668 0.749 0.690 0.677
The table reports regressions coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) for the cross-state
regressions of the 4-quarter cumulative response of per-capita employment growth on state-level charac-
teristics. The regressions are estimated by ordinary least squares. *, **, and *** denote statistical signifi-
cance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2.10: Robustness Checks: Shorter and Longer Horizons and Political
Controls-Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES cuemp4 cuemp2 cuemp6 cuemp4 cuemp2 cuemp6
manufacturing 0.0186* 0.0104 0.0155 0.0160 0.00873 0.0125
(0.0102) (0.00733) (0.0122) (0.0108) (0.00780) (0.0131)
retail 0.120** 0.0778** 0.145** 0.116*** 0.0753** 0.141**
(0.0453) (0.0303) (0.0589) (0.0430) (0.0299) (0.0570)
white -0.0181*** -0.0119*** -0.0224*** -0.0137** -0.00915** -0.0170**
(0.00424) (0.00295) (0.00536) (0.00562) (0.00403) (0.00708)
education 0.0815*** 0.0499*** 0.102*** 0.0834*** 0.0512*** 0.104***
(0.0212) (0.0156) (0.0263) (0.0213) (0.0157) (0.0269)
house 0.783 0.488 0.729
(0.592) (0.424) (0.774)
senate -0.344 -0.211 -0.180
(0.569) (0.411) (0.736)
Constant 0.144 0.0968 0.195 -0.427 -0.263 -0.520
(0.688) (0.485) (0.821) (0.698) (0.503) (0.880)
Observations 48 48 48 48 48 48
R-squared 0.397 0.346 0.385 0.432 0.376 0.415
The table reports regressions coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) for the cross-state
regressions of the 4-quarter cumulative response of per-capita employment growth on state-level charac-
teristics. The regressions are estimated by ordinary least squares. *, **, and *** denote statistical signifi-
cance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Figure 2.1: Tax Rates and Tax Events, 1960-2006
Notes:The figure plots the implicit tax rate, top 1 % marginal tax rate, average personal income tax rate, and average marginal federal individual income tax rate
for the United States. The solid line is the implicit tax rate (ITR1Y) which is yield spread between the one year tax exempt municipal bond rate and one-year
taxable Treasury bond rate. The yields on tax-exempt prime graded general obligation municipal bonds and the taxable U.S. Treasury bonds data are obtained from
Leeper, Richter, and Walker (2012).The thin dashed line is the average personal income tax rate (APITR). The dotted line is the top 1 % marginal tax rate taken
from Saez (2004). The long dashed line is the average marginal federal individual income tax rate (AMTR) taken from Barro-Redlick (2011). The shaded regions
correspond to chronological tax events in the United States (See Table 3.1). The documented tax events is taken from Yang (2007).
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Figure 2.2: Ownership of Municipal Bonds
Notes:The figure plots the ownership of municipal bonds held by households, banks, and insurance
companies. The data is collected from the Flow of Funds Accounts provided by the Board of Governors.
The percentage of municipal bonds held by: (a) households includes direct and indirect ownership through
mutual funds, money market funds, and closed-end funds; (b) banks comprise of commercial banks and
savings institutions; and (c) insurance companies include life insurance companies and other insurance
companies.
56
Figure 2.3: Impulse responses for aggregate variables and estimated factors
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Notes:The figure shows the response of the aggregate variables and the regional factors to a one percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate. All responses are
reported in percentages. Full lines are point estimates; dashed and dash-dot lines indicate the 68 and 95 percent confidence intervals constructed using a recursive
wild-bootstrap method with 10,000 replications (Goncalves and Kilian (2004)).
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Figure 2.4: Impulse responses of state-level personal income
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Notes: The figure shows the response of real per-capita personal income growth for different states to a 1 percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate. Full
lines are point estimates; dashed and dash-dot lines indicate the 68 and 95 percent confidence intervals constructed using a recursive wild-bootstrap method with
10,000 replications (Goncalves and Kilian (2004)).
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Figure 2.5: Impulse responses of state-level personal income
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Notes: The figure shows the response of real per-capita personal income growth for different states to a 1 percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate. Full
lines are point estimates; dashed and dash-dot lines indicate the 68 and 95 percent confidence intervals constructed using a recursive wild-bootstrap method with
10,000 replications (Goncalves and Kilian (2004)).
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Figure 2.6: Impulse responses of state-level personal income
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Notes: The figure shows the response of real per-capita personal income growth for different states to a 1 percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate. Full
lines are point estimates; dashed and dash-dot lines indicate the 68 and 95 percent confidence intervals constructed using a recursive wild-bootstrap method with
10,000 replications (Goncalves and Kilian (2004)).
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Figure 2.7: Impulse responses of state-level employment
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Notes: The figure shows the response of real per-capita employment growth for different states to a 1 percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate. Full lines
are point estimates; dashed and dash-dot lines indicate the 68 and 95 percent confidence intervals constructed using a recursive wild-bootstrap method with 10,000
replications (Goncalves and Kilian (2004)).
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Figure 2.8: Impulse responses of state-level employment
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Notes: The figure shows the response of real per-capita employment growth for different states to a 1 percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate. Full lines
are point estimates; dashed and dash-dot lines indicate the 68 and 95 percent confidence intervals constructed using a recursive wild-bootstrap method with 10,000
replications (Goncalves and Kilian (2004)).
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Figure 2.9: Impulse responses of state-level employment
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Notes: The figure shows the response of real per-capita employment growth for different states to a 1 percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate. Full lines
are point estimates; dashed and dash-dot lines indicate the 68 and 95 percent confidence intervals constructed using a recursive wild-bootstrap method with 10,000
replications (Goncalves and Kilian (2004)).
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Figure 2.10: Cumulative response of state-level personal income
(a) 1 quarter after the implicit tax rate
shock
(b) 4 quarters after the implicit tax rate
shock
(c) 6 quarters after the implicit tax rate
shock
(d) 8 quarters after the implicit tax rate
shock
(e) 12 quarters after the implicit tax
rate shock
(f) 16 quarters after the implicit tax rate
shock
Notes: The figure illustrates the cumulative response of state-level personal income to one percentage point
increase in the implicit tax rate. Darker shades of red indicate larger positive responses to the implicit tax rate
shock. The lighter shades of red indicate smaller response to the implicit tax rate shock.
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Figure 2.11: Cumulative response of state-level employment
(a) 1 quarter after the implicit tax rate
shock
(b) 4 quarters after the implicit tax rate
shock
(c) 6 quarters after the implicit tax rate
shock
(d) 8 quarters after the implicit tax rate
shock
(e) 12 quarters after the implicit tax
rate shock
(f) 16 quarters after the implicit tax rate
shock
Notes:The figure illustrates the cumulative response of state-level employment to one percentage point in-
crease in the implicit tax rate. Darker shades of red indicate larger positive responses to the implicit tax rate
shock.The lighter shades of red indicate smaller response to the implicit tax rate shock.
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Figure 2.12: U.S. state-level industrial shares
(a) Average agriculture share of total
state GDP, 1963-2006
(b) Average manufacturing share of
total state GDP, 1963-2006
(c) Average construction share of total
state GDP, 1963-2006
(d) Average finance, insurance and real
estate (FIRE) share of total state GDP,
1963-2006
(e) Average retail share of total state
GDP, 1963-2006
(f) Average oil share of total state GDP,
1963-2006
Notes:The figure illustrates industrial composition across 48 contiguous states in the United States. We com-
pute the annual average output shares of the one-digit SIC sectors in a state’s GDP between 1963 and 2006.
The industrial shares are defined as the ratio of each sector’s output to the total GDP for the state. The darker
shades of red indicate states with larger shares of industrial sector output and the lighter shades of red indi-
cate the smaller share of the industrial sector output. The industrial shares are calculated using data from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
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3 Tax News and Economic Fluctuations: A Factor-Augmented Vector Autoregressive
(FAVAR) Approach
3.1 Introduction
How does economic activity respond to tax news? Does tax news stimulate or depress
economic activity? Through what transmission mechanism does tax news affect the U.S.
economy? More specifically, how does the output response to tax news vary across
industrial sectors and market groups that differ in their adjustment costs, output shares of
capital and labor, durability of the product and so on? A large body of literature in
macroeconomics has provided substantial evidence that predictable changes in the tax
rates can alter the economic behavior of firms and workers (see e.g., Barro (1979), Yang
(2005), House and Shapiro (2006), Mertens and Ravn (2011), Leeper et al. (2012), Leeper
et al. (2013), and Kueng (2014)). This literature has explored the importance of timing in
tax changes and their implications on the macroeconomy. The experiences of phased-in
tax changes introduced in the early 1980’s and 2001 suggest that expectations about future
tax cuts may have constrained the economic activity during the anticipation period and
that the subsequent implementation of tax cuts helped to boost the economy.15 The idea
that changes in expectations about future tax policy contribute to economic fluctuations
has led to an intense research effort into the importance of fiscal foresight, which seeks to
quantify the economic effects of anticipated and unanticipated tax changes. The main
focus of this chapter is to study how changes in expectations about future tax rates
contribute to fluctuations in macroeconomic aggregate and disaggregate variables during
the period 1960-2003.
Traditional empirical models that are used to estimate the tax effects on the economy do
15House and Shapiro (2006) evaluates the phased-in tax reductions enacted by 2001 Economic Growth and
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act and their effects on the economy. They suggest that the phased-in nature
of these tax cuts contributed to the slow recovery of U.S. economy from recession. They underline the
importance of timing and size of tax cuts assumptions in evaluating the tax policy
67
make an information assumption that tax policy changes are unanticipated by the
economic agents (i.e., no-foresight). In practice a tax reform law usually goes through a
legislation lag (i.e., when a new tax law is announced by the President and when the tax
bill is passed by Congress) and an implementation lag (i.e., lag between the time when the
bill is signed by the President and when it is actually implemented). These lags allow
economic agents to anticipate future changes in tax policy and subsequently alter their
economic behavior. For instance, a review of the tax events that took place in the United
States during the 1960-2003 period suggests a long lag of time arose between the tax law
that was first proposed by the President and the time it was enacted. Furthermore, the
process of changing taxes also involves an implementation lag: there is a delay between
the moment when a tax change is signed into law and when it is implemented. Table 3.1
summarizes major changes in the U.S. tax legislations during the period 1960-2003. The
table provides information related to the initial announcement of tax changes by the
President, the enactment date of the tax law, and the provisions in the tax law. The
information about each tax law and enactment dates are obtained from the Library of
Congress and Yang (2007).16 All of the tax events have undergone a significant delay in
the legislative process. The legislative lag ranged between 4 and 17 months for the period
1960-2003. Thus, the news about future changes in tax policies reached the individual
well before the change was effected, which implies that forward looking individuals will
adjust their consumption and work patterns before the tax change has been implemented.
This re-optimization takes place because news of a tax policy change alters the economic
agent expected income (Yang, 2005; House and Shapiro, 2006).
Recent work by Leeper et al. (2013) demonstrates that fiscal foresight poses a serious
16 The Library of Congress uses the data from the Office of Clerk of House of Representatives, the Office of
the Secretary of Senate, the Government Printing Office, Congressional Budget Office, and the Library of
Congress Research Service. The precise dates for signaling of tax changes can be found in the Presidential
speeches. The source is http://millercenter.org/president/speeches The bill records,
dates and its provisions during the period 1960-1974 are obtained from Yang (2007). The details of each
tax law provisions, enactment date since 1973 is obtained from https://beta.congress.gov.
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econometric problem in estimating the tax effects on the economy. They suggest that if
forward looking economic agents acquire the news about future tax changes and adjust
their behavior well before the actual tax changes, then it generates an equilibrium that
contains non-invertible moving average representations.17 They point out that this problem
arises because econometricians possess a smaller information set compared to economic
agents. Further, they suggest that ignoring fiscal foresight affects the prediction of how tax
changes affect the macroeconomic variables such as output, consumption, investment, and
employment.
Although the empirical literature has acknowledged the problem of fiscal foresight, there
is little consensus among researchers regarding the effect of tax news on the
macroeconomy and whether these effects are empirically relevant. In particular,
researchers have used different methodologies, data, and instruments to identify news
about tax policy changes. Three approaches have been commonly employed in the
empirical literature to identify anticipated tax shocks: Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) approach -hereafter BP (2002)- Mountford and
Uhlig (2009) sign restrictions approach -hereafter MU (2009)- and Mertens and Ravn
(2012) timing convention approach. BP(2002) use a VAR model to identify anticipated tax
shocks. They assume that the federal government does not respond to current- and
last-quarter real GDP shocks. Under this assumption, they find that “there is not much
evidence of the effect of anticipated tax changes on output”.18 MU (2009) use sign
restrictions on the impulse responses to identify anticipated and unanticipated tax shocks.
They find that the announcement of tax policy changes has little effect on output in the
short run. In contrast, Mertens and Ravn (2012) use the timing of tax liability changes to
differentiate between the anticipated and unanticipated tax shocks. They find evidence of
17This problem was first noted by Hansen and Sargent (1991)
18Leeper et al. (2013) augments the BP (2002) method with the data on yield spread between municipal and
Treasury bonds that captures the expectation of the future tax rates in the VAR framework. They find that
an anticipated increase in tax rates has a positive effect on the output in the short run.
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strong anticipatory effects on the real GDP in the short run.
While the three approaches recognize the problem of fiscal foresight and identify
anticipated tax shocks, their results vary based on the identification strategy. In addition,
they are subject to the criticism that the conventional VAR approach does make a strong
assumption on the nature of information flows in the model to identify anticipated tax
shocks Leeper et al. (2013). In this chapter, I follow the lead ofLeeper et al. (2013) to
identify news about future taxes. I use the yield spread between the one-year tax exempt
municipal bond and the one-year taxable Treasury bond− to isolate news about changes in
future taxes. This yield spread is also known as the implicit tax rate because it represents
the rate at which the investor is indifferent between the tax-exempt municipal bond and
the taxable Treasury bond. The advantage of using the implicit tax rate to predict expected
future tax rates is that it does not require setting the period of foresight a priori.
Another challenge in estimating the tax effects arises due to the limited information
problem attached to vector autoregressive (VAR) models (see Bernanke et al. (2005), and
Forni et al. (2011)). The identification of true tax shocks is sensitive to the information
included in the model. To conserve degrees of freedom, conventional VAR models use
small number of variables (i.e., between five to ten variables). In general, economic agents
or the policy makers base their forecasts and analysis on a large panel of information
rather than constrain themselves to few variables. Hence, the low dimensional vector
autoregressive (VAR) models are very to capture the large panel of information set used
by the policy makers. For this reason, the identified structural shocks in VAR models are
unlikely to suffer contamination. I attenuate the limited information problem attached to
small scale VAR models by using a Factor Augmented VAR (FAVAR) model similar to
that estimated by Bernanke et al. (2005). This method allows combining the VAR analysis
with a small set of factors extracted from a large data set while imposing minimal
short-run identifying restrictions to estimate the response to tax news for large number of
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variables.
This chapter contributes to the growing empirical literature in three specific ways. First,
although previous studies by Leeper et al. (2013) and Kueng (2014) study the impact of
tax news on U.S. economy, there has been little empirical analysis to understand the
propagation mechanism of tax news. More importantly, I study the impact of tax news on
a set of key disaggregate measures of industrial production, employment per-worker,
hours worked per worker, short term and long term unemployment rates, capacity
utilization rate, purchasing manager index, housing starts, price level, and financial
variables. Analyzing the responses of disaggregated data in industrial production and
labor inputs will enable us to understand the transmission mechanism of tax news on the
U.S. economy.
I find a positive relationship between anticipated tax changes and real economic activity in
the short run. Real GDP increases on impact and remains above the mean for about four
quarters. The result of a positive response of aggregate economic activity to tax news is in
line with the findings of Leeper et al. (2013) and Mertens and Ravn (2012). In addition, I
find that tax news has larger impact on the industries related to the manufacturing, and
mining. Also, non-durable manufacturing shows a significantly higher response compared
to the durable manufacturing sector. Regarding the response of industrial production based
on market group, I find that tax news have a larger effect on firms that supply business
equipment (i.e., industrial and defense equipment, oil and gas drilling) compared to firms
supplying consumer goods and services. Moreover, the response of the capacity utilization
rate shows that industrial plants operate at a higher capacity on the arrival of news about
higher taxes.
Having found a positive response of aggregate and disaggregate industrial production to
tax news, I then focus on the effect of tax news on labor market variables. The results
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indicate that the employment per-capita and total hours worked per worker increase with
news of a future tax increase. These findings are consistent with the positive effect on
GDP and industrial production to tax news shock. Leading indicators such as new orders
for consumer and manufacturing goods show a positive response to news of higher taxes. I
observe regional patterns in the response of the number of private housing units to tax
news. The number of housing units increases on impact of the shock and it is considerably
larger for northeastern and western regions of the United States. These results fall in line
with previous chapter results that anticipatory effects to tax news in northeastern states
compared to other regions of the United States. Overall, I find that the anticipation of a
higher income tax rate stimulates the economy in the short run.
Second, I ask how much of historical fluctuations in the real GDP is driven by the shocks
to the implicit tax rate (i.e., by tax news). Historical decomposition of the real GDP
indicates that shocks to the federal funds rate and tax news shocks have contributed
largely to the fluctuations in real GDP. In particular, I find that tax news associated with
legislation in 1969, 1975, 1986, 1993, and 2001 contributed to the historical fluctuations
in real GDP. Also, I find that peaks associated with the fluctuations in real GDP due to the
federal funds rate coincide with the tax news in early 1980’s, 1990 and 2001.
The results from historical decompositions do not allow us to distinguish the effects from
tax new shocks and the effect resulting from the response of monetary policy to tax news.
Thus, it leads to another interesting question: What is the role of the systematic monetary
policy response in accounting for the expansion that is due to news of a tax increase? To
answer this specific question, I conduct a counterfactual analysis that allows a one year
delay in the response of monetary policy during three major tax episodes: the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 (TRA86), the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, and the Economic
Growth and Tax Reconciliation Reform Act of 2001 (EGTRRA). The results show that the
announcement of future tax cuts in TRA86 and EGTRRA constrained the economic
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activity during the anticipation period. The news of higher income taxes in the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act increased the real economic activity during the anticipation
period. Moreover, the results show that shutting down the monetary policy response for
four quarters produces a higher peak deviation in output during 1993 and a lower peak
negative deviation during 1986. However, shutting down the systematic monetary policy
for four quarters during the tax announcement in 2001 had no significant effect.
Third, I ask how much of the anticipatory effects of tax news shock persists after policy
realization? I conduct a counterfactual analysis for the full sample to investigate whether
adding a tax policy realization shock diminishes the effect of the news shock on the
economy. I find that adding a tax realization shock tapered off the anticipatory effects on
the macroeconomic variables. These results are in line with the findings of those of Yang
(2005), and Mertens and Ravn (2012) who find significant pre- and post-implementation
effects of income taxes on the economy. Finally, I conduct another counterfactual analysis
targeting three tax events to test whether the results vary based on the length of foresight
and magnitude of the shock. The counterfactual results provide strong evidence of
anticipatory effects in all three tax events, which differ in the length of foresight. However,
the results vary based on the size of policy realization shock at the implementation date.
The results show strong pre- and post-implementation effects on real GDP for EGTRRA
2001. In contrast, I find a weak effect on real GDP after policy realization for TRA86 and
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the measure
of tax news and section 3.3 describes the factor augmented vector autoregression
(FAVAR) model. Implementation of the empirical methodology, data set, and model
specification are presented in section 3.4. Empirical results are discussed in section 3.5.
Finally, section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 A Measure of Tax News
As discussed in detail in section 2.2, I follow the lead of Leeper et al. (2013) and use the
yield spread between the one-year municipal bond and the one-year Treasury bill to
capture expectations about future tax policy changes. More specifically, I compute the
implicit tax rate as τ It =1− r
M
t
rTt
, where rMt represents the one year tax exempt municipal
bond rate, and rTt the one-year taxable Treasury bond rate at time t. Municipal bonds in
the United States are exempted from federal taxes and also sometimes from state and local
taxes, whereas interest on Treasury bonds are taxed by the federal government. If investors
are forward looking and anticipate that federal income taxes will rise (fall) then they will
demand higher (lower) interest on taxable bonds until they are indifferent between tax
exempt bonds and taxable bonds (Leeper et al., 2013).
In general, municipal bonds are issued by state and local governments, this include
counties and municipalities, and school districts. I consider the municipal bonds that are
AAA rated General Obligation (GO) bonds. These bonds have full faith, credit, and taxing
power pledged by the issuer and who is obligated to make the repayment of the bonds.
Usually, the GO bonds are used to fund public goods in the locality and these are free
from default risk. To predict news about future tax changes, both the municipal bond and
the Treasury bill should have the same maturity date, liquidity and transaction costs, credit
risk, call features, and market risk. Further, the US Treasury and municipal bonds should
have the same tax treatment of capital gains and losses.
Table 3.2 shows the state taxation on municipal and US Treasury bonds. The interest
income on the US Treasury bonds is taxed through federal income tax but it is exempted
from state taxes in the US. The interest income on municipal bonds is exempted from
federal taxes and almost all states exempt the interest income for in-state investors. Few
states such as Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming do not
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levy state income taxes. Table 3.2 shows that almost all states levy taxes on the individual
investors if the interest earned on a municipal bond is paid by an out-of-state issuer.
Hence, there is an advantage for the individuals to invest within their own state boundaries
to get tax exemption on interest income. Researchers have examined whether state income
tax affects the yield on the municipal bond. Fortune (1996) suggests that if out-of-state
investors buy the municipal bonds then state income taxes do not affect the yield on
municipal bonds. In addition, Kueng (2014) compares the yields on long term municipal
bonds for states that have a differential tax treatment on interest income and concludes
that state income taxes are not the key determinant on municipal yield spreads.
Using the implicit tax rate to capture tax news raises a key question, whether the implicit
tax rate has any predictive content for future tax rate changes. The work by Poterba (1989),
Fortune (1996), Leeper et al. (2012), and Kueng (2014) has documented the relationship
between the implicit tax rate and expected future tax rates. They conclude that the implicit
tax rate contains significant information about future tax rates. To illustrate this
relationship between the implicit tax rate and a few measures of personal income tax rates,
I plot the average federal marginal tax rate and the marginal tax rate faced by the top 1%
of the income distribution with an annualized one year lagged implicit tax rate (see Figure
3.2 and Figure 3.3). Figure 3.2 shows the relationship between the average marginal tax
rate and the one year lagged implicit tax rate. The data for the average marginal tax rate is
obtained from Barro and Redlick (2011). The correlation coefficient between both series
for the full sample is 0.61. However, the correlation coefficient from the 1970’s onwards is
0.82. The stronger relationship after the 1970’s can be associated with the dramatic rise in
the percentage of municipal debt owned by households (see Kueng (2014)). Household
ownership - either directly or through mutual funds- has increased since the 1970’s and
has fluctuated around 74% since the 1990’s (see Figure 3.1). Figure 3.3 illustrates the
relationship between the one year lagged implicit tax rate and the top one percent
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marginal tax rate for the period 1960-2003. The data for top one percent marginal tax rate
is obtained from Saez (2004). The correlation coefficient for the sample 1960-2003 is
0.79. Figure 3.3 reveals that the path followed by the implicit tax rate resembles that of the
marginal tax rate faced by the top 1% of the income distribution for the entire sample.
Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 show that the path of implicit tax rate moves very closely with
the actual marginal tax rates. Recent evidence by Kueng (2014) suggests that difference in
the level of the tax rate between the spread and the actual marginal tax rate is less concern
for the identification strategy because the effect of tax news depends upon the path of the
implicit tax rate rather than on the level of the tax rate. Kueng (2014) analysis therefore
implies that as long as the path of the implicit tax rate moves close enough to the true
marginal tax rate, using the spread between the one year municipal and the Treasury bond
does not pose a problem for the identification strategy.
Finally, to empirically test the hypothesis that the implicit tax rate is useful in predicting
actual tax rates, I perform a set of bi-variate Granger causality tests between the implicit
tax rate and marginal tax rates. Table 2.1 reports the results for the bi-variate Granger
causality tests between the implicit tax rate and average marginal tax rates. The tests
indicate that the implicit tax rate Granger-causes the average marginal federal tax rate and
the top 1% percent marginal tax rate, neither the average federal marginal income tax rate
nor the top one percent marginal tax rate help to forecast the implicit tax rate. Thus, all the
empirical evidence from Figure 3.2, Figure 3.3, and the Granger causality test points out
that the implicit tax rate predicts the future tax rate changes.
3.3 The Factor Augmented Vector Autoregressive Model
To study the effect of tax news on macroeconomic variables, I use a factor augmented
vector autoregressive (FAVAR) model that builds on Bernanke et al. (2005) and Boivin
et al. (2009). Traditionally, empirical studies investigating the effects of fiscal policy
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shocks on macroeconomy have employed small scale VAR models using a limited number
of variables for a single country. The sparse information set used in the VAR models can
lead to a limited information problem, whereby the information possessed by the policy
makers and private sector is not reflected in the VAR model. Using the FAVAR model
allows us to expand the econometrician information set and attenuates the limited
information problem. The key assumption in this model is that the dynamics of the large
panel of macro variables is captured by some observed and unobserved common factors.
The unobserved factors are extracted from a large set of macroeconomic data. The main
advantage of this technique is that it allows us to extract the responses of a wide range of
macroeconomic variables to structural shocks in the implicit tax rate and other policy
variables.
I formalize the model by assuming that the behavior of the U.S. economy can be captured
by a vector of observable variables (Yt) and unobservable factors (Ft). The vector Yt
consists of the log growth of real per-capita net taxes (∆Tt), the log growth of real
per-capita federal government spending (∆Gt), the log growth of real per- capita GDP
(∆GDPt), the federal funds rate (Rt), and the implicit tax rate (τt). The vector Xt consists
of 120 series of variables that capture U.S. economic performance. This vector comprises
measures of industrial production, labor market variables, consumption, housing,
inventories, price indexes, exchange rates, interest rates, stock prices, and hourly earnings
(see appendix Table A2.2 for a detailed list of variables in Xt).
The general form of FAVAR model is represented as
Yt
Ft
 = A(L) ∗
Yt−1
Ft−1
+ et (3.1)
where Yt is 5×1 vector of observed macroeconomic variables. Ft is a vector of k×1
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unobserved factors. A(L) is the matrix of lag polynomials of order p = 4. et are the
reduced form residuals and Ω is the covariance of reduced form residuals. Equation (1)
cannot be estimated without knowledge of the unobserved factors. The unobserved factors
Ft can be extracted from the vector Xt and they summarize the information contained in
the large number of macro-economic variables, Xt, of dimension N × 1.
The observation equation for the system can be written as
Xt = Λ
yYt + Λ
fFt + et. (3.2)
where Λy is a N × 5 matrix of coefficients on the observable variables, Λf is a N × k
matrix of factor loadings, and et is vector of series-specific components that are
uncorrelated with the Yt and Ft.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
3.4.1 Data and Model Specification
I use quarterly data from 1960Q1 to 2003Q4 yielding a total (T) of 175 observations. The
information series Xt consists of N= 120 variables listed in the appendix.19 The data are
collected from the FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis.20 The original
series for the variables in Xt are available at monthly frequency, and I have averaged
monthly data three at a time to compute quarterly data. The vector Xt includes data on
industrial production, labor market, consumption, housing, inflation, money, and interest
rates. The observable data series (Yt) consists of 5 variables described in the previous
section. I follow Blanchard and Perotti (2002) to measure two fiscal variables: net tax
revenues and government spending. The source of the data for government spending, net
19Table A.2.2 lists all 120 variables used in the FAVAR specification
20The complete data series can be obtained from FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis
which is based on paper by Stock and Watson (2005). I thank Mwzandile Ginindza for generously providing
Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005) data set.
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taxes, and real GDP is the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). I compute real
per-capita measures by deflating government spending, net taxes, and real GDP using the
GDP deflator and then dividing the real variables by the U.S. civilian non-institutional
population over 16 years. These three variables are transformed into growth rates by
taking first differences of the logs to obtain ∆Tt, ∆Gt, and ∆GDPt. The data for federal
funds rate (Rt) is collected from the Federal Reserve of St. Louis database, FRED. I
compute the implicit tax rate as the yield spread between the one year tax exempt
municipal bond rate (rMt ) and one year taxable Treasury bond rate (r
T
t ). More specifically,
τt= 1− r
M
t
rTt
. The yields on tax-exempt prime graded general-obligation municipal bonds
and the taxable U.S. Treasury bonds data are obtained from Leeper et al. (2012). Tables
A2.1 and A2.2 provide details on the data, data transformation, and the construction of
variables used in the FAVAR model.
The lag length is set to 4 quarters in the VAR specification in equation (1), which is
consistent with the previous literature (see Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Ramey (2011),
Mertens and Ravn (2013), among others). I follow the common practice in FAVAR models
to standardize each of the series in Xt, so that the data are demeaned and have unit
variance.
3.4.2 Estimation
The first step in the estimation of the model is to determine the number of unobserved
factors. I assume the number of factors to be unknown but constant as in Bai and Ng
(2002). I follow Bai and Ng’s (2002) ICp2 information criteria (see Bai and Ng (2002) for
details) to determine the number of factors. The information criteria selects a total of 8
factors i.e., 5 observed factors (Yt) and 3 unobserved factors (Ft). Having determined the
number of observed and unobserved factors for the model, I estimate the FAVAR model in
equations (3.1) - (3.2) using the two-step procedure proposed by Boivin et al. (2009). In
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the first step, I employ the iterative procedure of Boivin et al. (2009). to estimate the
unobserved factors. The estimated three factors are denoted as Fˆt = [ f1,t, f2,t, f3,t ] and
can be interpreted as the economic factors, which recover the common dynamics of U.S
macro economy that are not captured by the five observed variables.
In the second step, the estimated factors Fˆt are replaced in equation (3.1). Then they are
used in conjunction with the macroeconomic variables (Yt) to estimate the VAR. I use the
standard Cholesky decomposition method to identify the impulse response functions with
variables are ordered as follows: ∆Tt, ∆Gt, ∆GDPt, Rt, τt, Fˆt. This identification
scheme is close to that of Leeper et al. (2013). According to these restrictions, the implicit
tax rate has no contemporaneous effect on net taxes, government spending, real GDP, and
the federal funds rate. However, there is contemporaneous feedback from the observed
variables (i.e., net tax revenues, government spending, real GDP, and the federal funds
rate) to the implicit tax rate. I allow monetary policy to respond contemporaneously to the
net tax revenues, government spending and real GDP. In addition, I assume that the three
common factors in Fˆt do not contemporaneously affect the five observed variables (Yt). I
do not attach a particular economic interpretation to the factors but they can be considered
as common factors that affect the US economy that are not captured by fiscal, monetary
and business cycle shocks. Following the above identifying restrictions, the variables in
Xt are allowed to respond contemporaneously to the shocks in the implicit tax rate and all
other observable variables.
3.5 Quantifying the Macroeconomic Effect of Tax News
This section discusses the effect of one percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate
-hereafter called tax news. The main focus will be on the responses of aggregate GDP and
disaggregated variables related to industrial production, employment, new orders, housing
starts, prices, and consumer expectations. I present the results for 32 key variables of all
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120 variables in the FAVAR model. Point-wise confidence intervals for the impulse
response functions are computed using a residual based wild bootstrap (Gonçalves and
Kilian, 2004; Yamamoto, 2012). I use 10,000 replications and report 68% and 95%
confidence intervals.
Figure 3.4 shows the response of macroeconomic variables to one percentage point
increase in the implicit tax rate. The estimated impulse response shows that an unexpected
rise in the implicit tax rate immediately results in higher real per-capita GDP. The effect of
tax news on real GDP builds to a peak value of 0.77 percent in the fourth quarter and then
starts to decline. The response of GDP is statistically significant from two to five quarters
after the shock and becomes statistically insignificant thereafter. This behavior of real
GDP falls in line with the classical view whereby an anticipated rise in personal income
taxes leads to an increase in output because individuals and firms have an incentive to
switch production to the anticipation period where income taxes are expected to be lower.
The response of real per-capita net taxes follows a pattern similar to real per-capita GDP:
it increases for six quarters and reaches a peak value of 0.978 percent six quarters after the
shock. Higher income results in greater tax returns during the anticipation period but, as it
is the case for real GDP, the positive effect becomes statistically insignificant after the fifth
quarter. In contrast, a positive shock to the implicit tax rate results in a slightly lower but
statistically insignificant decrease in real per-capita government spending. Overall, the
results suggest that tax news has an expansionary effect on the economy that lasts slightly
over a year. This expansion in the aggregate output then results in tighter monetary policy,
which is reflected in a higher federal funds rate. This pattern is consistent with the Federal
Reserve acting to control possible inflationary pressures arising from an increase in
aggregate demand.
The evidence of an expansionary effect on the economy in the short run draws our
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attention to the following questions: Through what channels does tax news influence the
aggregate economy? How do the responses to tax news vary among industry groups or
different market groups? To explore these issues, I study the impact of tax news on
disaggregated measures of industrial production. Industrial Production is comprised of
two groups: the market group and the industry group. The market group includes final
products and materials. More specifically, the final products can be disaggregated into
consumer goods (durable and nondurable goods), business equipment, and materials. The
industry group includes durable and non-durable manufacturing, mining and utilities.
Figure 3.4 shows the impulse response for total industrial production (IP) and
disaggregated measures of production following a one percentage point increase in the
implicit tax rate. The response of industrial production (IP) shows a positive and
significant effect of tax news. Not surprisingly, the cumulative response of IP shows a
similar trajectory to that of the real GDP. IP rises on impact and reaches a peak value of
1.2 percent at fifth quarter. The magnitude of the peak response of IP (1.2 %) is higher
than that of the response real GDP (0.77%). Much of the difference between the real GDP
and industrial production arises due to the exclusion of the domestic service sector from
the index. This difference in the size of the effect shows that tax news has a larger impact
on industries related to the manufacturing, mining and electric industry.
Further, I examine the responses of 9 major market groups listed in Table A3.2. To
economize space, I display impulse responses for selected groups in Figure 3.4 (i.e.,
durable consumer goods, nondurable consumer goods, business equipment, and
materials).21 The impulse responses show a similar shape across different market groups
but the magnitude of the effect differs considerably. For instance, the peak effect of the
industrial production ranges from 0.609 to 1.561 percent for durable consumer goods and
business equipment, respectively. This difference in the magnitude of the effect indicates
21A full set of impulse responses for market groups and industrial sectors are available upon request from the
author
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that firms producing business equipments (industrial and defense equipment, oil and gas
drilling, information processing) mainly drive the response of aggregate industrial
production.
Another interesting result involves the dynamic effect of tax news on different industrial
sectors. In response to the tax news, manufacturing and mining show a strong and
persistent effect compared to the utilities sector (electric and natural gas). The response of
production in the manufacturing and mining sectors rises on impact and reaches a peak
value of 1.1 percent and 1.2 percent respectively, which occurs about five quarters after
the shock. The energy sector responds very little to tax news. Summarizing, Figure 3.5
illustrates a greater short-run sensitivity of production in the mining and manufacturing
sectors to tax news.
To further investigate what market groups drive the response of IP to tax news, I examine
the responses of durable and nondurable manufacturing. In response to tax news,
nondurable manufacturing rises on impact and subsequently increases to a peak value of
1.439 percent. Durable manufacturing follows similar dynamics but responds slower to
tax news and peaks at around 0.729 percent five quarters after the shock. The results
suggest that firms in nondurable manufacturing are more able to take advantage of tax
news and shift the production to the anticipation period.
The impulse responses for labor market variables are shown in Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6.
The effect of tax news on the labor market operates both at the intensive and extensive
margins. A one percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate leads to a statistically
significant increase in employment per-capita with a peak value of 0.40 percent at fourth
quarter.22 Hours worked per worker rise by 0.483 percent on impact and remain above the
22Employment and hours per-capita series are obtained from Francis and Ramey (2009). The data is available
on Valerie Ramey’s webpage. Employment per-capita is the logarithm of total employment divided by
population over age of 16 years.
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mean for the entire forecast horizon. The response of the short-term unemployment rate
rises on impact of tax news, but falls one quarter after the shock. Medium and long term
unemployment indicators defined as the number of jobless people based on the duration of
the unemployment spell (i.e., less than five weeks, between five and 14 weeks, and over 15
weeks) fall sharply on impact. These responses show a significant reduction in the
unemployment rate on impact and a gradual fall to reach the trough during the fourth
quarter. The rate of growth of civilian unemployment remains negative for most of the
time horizon.
The responses of labor market variables are consistent with the results of House and
Shapiro (2006), Mertens and Ravn (2012) and Leeper et al. (2013). In a theoretical paper,
House and Shapiro (2006) find that the phased-in-tax reductions enacted by the 2001
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA) delayed the production
decisions of firms and workers and resulted in a 0.37 percent decline in aggregate
employment. The authors suggest that the 2003 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) accelerated the schedule of tax reductions under EGTRRA
and gave incentive for firms and workers to alter their behavior immediately. While the
study by House and Shapiro (2006) focuses on tax cuts, their analysis on the timing of tax
cuts and their effects on the macro economy extends to tax increases as well.
The impulse responses for the capacity utilization rate and the purchasing managers index
(PMI) supports my finding that news of higher taxes has an expansionary effect on
economic activity in the short run. The capacity utilization rate measures the maximum
sustainable output which an industrial plant can produce with the available labor and
capital. This measure is aimed to know the operating capacity of manufacturing, mining
and utilities industries. The increase in the capacity utilization rate reflects an incentive to
increase the industrial production on receiving the news related to higher income tax.
Similarly, the Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) is a useful indicator that basically
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measures the growth in the manufacturing sector. The PMI rises on impact and shows a
sign of expansion for the next three quarters with a peak value at 0.40 in the third quarter.
Overall, the responses of industrial production, employment per-worker, hours per worker,
capacity utilization rate, and PMI index, and other disaggregated measures of economy
reflect that news of higher income taxes has an expansionary effect on the economy during
the anticipation period.
Finally, the increase in the real economic activity in the short run results in
demand-pull-inflation. This is reflected in the responses of consumer and producer price
indices. The response of CPI inflation for all items and PPI inflation for finished goods
shows a strong and persistent increase. Moreover, leading indicators, which tend to
fluctuate before the overall economy, also respond to tax news. New orders for consumer
goods and materials in the manufacturing sector responds positively on impact (see Figure
3.7). This increase in new orders is a signal for firms to increase production and
employment. One of the leading index components - new private housing units tends to
increase in response to tax news. Interestingly, I find that the rise in the number of housing
units is considerably larger in the northeast and western regions of the U.S. The peak
response is larger for the northeast region compared to all other regions. These results are
consistent with chapter 1 results where news of tax increase has a strong positive effect on
personal income and employment in the northeastern states (i.e. Connecticut, New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New Jersey) compared to other regions.
Three main findings follow from this analysis. First, the anticipation of an increase in the
income tax rate stimulates the economy; this stimulus lasts slightly over a year. Further,
the expansion then results in tighter monetary policy, reflected in a higher federal funds
rate. Third, the effect of tax news appears to be stronger for the manufacturing and energy
sectors than for services, with nondurables experiencing a greater expansion. These
differences in the responses are possibly driven by the dissimilarities in adjustment costs
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and capital-labor ratios across sectors. The investigation of what particular characteristics
account for this differential response will be addressed in future research.
3.5.1 What Shocks are Responsible for Fluctuations in the Real GDP?
This section focuses on the relative importance of fiscal, monetary, and tax news shocks in
explaining the fluctuations in U.S economic activity. More precisely, how much of the
historical fluctuations in real GDP was accounted for by innovations in net tax revenues,
government spending, the federal funds rate and the implicit tax rate?
To answer this question, I follow (Hamilton, 1994; Lütkepohl, 2007; Kilian, 2009) to
construct the historical decompositions of real GDP using the VAR model presented in the
earlier section (see equation (1)). For expository purpose, let me denote Ct as vector of
observable and factor estimates Ct =[Yt, Fˆt]. Where Yt is 5×1 vector of observed
macroeconomic variables, and Ft is a vector of k×1 estimated factors. Hence, the reduced
form equation (1) can be represented as:
Ct = A(L) Ct−1 + et (3.3)
where A(L) is lag order polynomial, and et is a 8× 1 vector of correlated errors.
Equivalently, the above reduced form VAR model can be represented by a structural VAR,
B0 Ct =
n∑
i=0
Bi Ct−i + vt (3.4)
where B0 is a lower triangular matrix with diagonal elements that equal one, Bi denotes
the lag coefficient matrices, and vt denotes the vector of mutually uncorrelated structural
shocks. To be precise, vt = [vTt , v
G
t , v
GDP
t , v
R
t , v
τ
t , v
F
t ]
′ is an 8 × 1 vector of structural
disturbances, where vFt is 3 × 1 vector of innovations in factors. Equation (3.4) has the
following structural moving average representation:
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Ct =
∞∑
i=0
Ψi vt−i ≈
t−1∑
i=0
Ψi vt−i (3.5)
where Ψˆi denotes the matrix of structural impulse responses at lag i = 0, 1, 2, ....23
The historical path for real GDP is constructed by following two steps: First, I use the
Aˆ(L) and eˆt estimates from the VAR described by equation (3.3) to compute Ψˆi and vt.
Second, I use the structural moving average representation shown by equation (3.5) to
decompose the historical real GDP series into the orthogonal components.
Figure 3.8 plots the cumulative contribution of each structural shock to the real GDP
based on the historical decomposition of the data. Panel 1 and Panel 2 show the
contribution of net tax revenues and government spending shocks to fluctuations in real
GDP. Panel 3 and Panel 4 show the contribution of the federal funds rate and the implicit
tax rate to real GDP. The vertical bars in Panel 4 correspond to the dates of announcement
of major tax policy changes in the United States (see Table 3.1 for more details). The
historical decomposition of real GDP allows us to assess the contribution of each shock at
each point in the time since 1960.
Figure 3.8 shows that the structural shocks to the federal funds rate and the implicit tax
rate significantly contributed to the fluctuations in real GDP (see the third and fourth
panels, respectively). The upward movement of the plotted line reflects the rise in real
GDP due to a specific shock and, similarly, the downward pressure in real GDP reflects the
fall due to the shock. The response of real GDP in panel 4 indicates a increase (decrease)
at various episodes of tax events. For instance, the announcement of a 10% increase in
individual and corporate income surtaxes in the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of
1967 resulted in a decline in real GDP in the year 1967 and 1968. The effect of tax news
on real GDP subsided between the period of 1970 and 1975. Indeed, the arrival of news
23The deterministic regressors in equation (3.3), and equation (3.4), and equation (3.5) are suppressed for
notational convenience.
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about the reduction in taxes between 1975 and 1978 had very little effect on real GDP.
In the 1980’s, the federal government mainly advocated for structural tax reforms aiming
for a fair and simple tax system that would broaden the tax base. The Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981-hereafter ERTA 1981- was announced by President Regan on February 5,
1981 and signed on August 13, 1981. The length of legislative lag ERTA 1981 was only 2
quarters. The law became effective immediately in August, 1981. The plot shows the
implementation of tax cuts introduced in ERTA 1981 stimulated the economy from 1981
to 1982. While the announcement of tax changes in the 1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act and the 1984 Deficit Reduction Act, which were aimed to close the
loopholes in tax structure, caused a significant slowdown in real GDP. Though the
announcement of tax cut provisions in the Tax Reform Act (TRA86) came as early as
1984-85 to economic agents, the cuts were actually implemented in phased-in nature (i.e.,
January, 1987 and January 1988).24 The initial fall in real GDP can be attributed to an
anticipation of tax cuts by economic agents. The plot shows that the implementation of tax
cuts stimulated the economy from 1986 onwards.
Panel 4 shows a sharp decline in real GDP in 1993 that can be attributed to news about
provisions in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. The decline in real GDP is
due to a rise in individual and corporate income taxes during the first term of President
Clinton. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 introduced new tax brackets
and raised top marginal tax rate to 36%. Followed by a series of deficit reduction measures
under the Clinton administration, the U.S. economy reached a budget surplus in 1998.
President Bush entered the office in 2001 and announced his intention to reduce federal
taxes. The announcement of phased-in tax cuts in the form of EGTRRA in June 2001
pushed the real GDP below the mean in 2001 and 2002. The slowdown in the real GDP
during 2001-2003 shows that the announcement and enactment of phased-in tax cuts did
24The economic effects of Tax Reform Act of 1986 is discussed in detail by Auerbach and Slemrod (1997)
88
not help the economy to bounce back to normal level.
Although, tax news played an important role in explaining the fluctuations in real GDP,
one cannot ignore the role of monetary policy. Panel 3 shows a long swing in the real GDP
during the 1970’s and 1980’s that can be associated with unexpected changes in monetary
policy. In particular, the upswing in GDP growth during the 1970s can be largely
associated with the expansionary monetary policy of the Burns-Mill era. In contrast, the
deflationary policy during the Volcker period resulted in lower GDP growth. Figure 8
shows that the impact of federal funds rate shocks fell in the late 1990’s during the
Greenspan era. Conversely, tax news shocks largely contributed to the fluctuations in
1993-1995 and 2002.
In summary, I conclude that tax news associated with legislations in 1969, 1975, 1982,
1986, 1993, and 2001 contributed to the historical fluctuations in the real GDP. In
addition, the peaks associated with the fluctuations in real GDP due to federal funds rate
shocks coincide with the tax announcements during the 1970’s, 1980’s, and 1990’s.
3.5.2 Is it Systematic Monetary Policy or Is it Tax News?
In the previous section, I showed that monetary policy and tax news have both contributed
to the historical fluctuations in the real GDP. To what extent are fluctuations in the real
GDP a result of tax news rather than of the subsequent response of monetary policy?
To answer this question, I follow Bernanke et al. (1997, 2004) and use the parameters
estimated in the VAR model (see equation 3.3) to conduct a counterfactual analysis in
which the response of monetary policy to the implicit tax rate is temporarily shutdown. To
be precise, I conduct a simulation in which a tax news shock (vτt ) hits the economy at time
t =0 − while all the other structural innovations in the system are set to zero − and the
federal funds rate is fixed at a historical value observed at t = 0 for four quarters (i.e., the
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value of {CR,t+s}4s=1 is assumed to remain unchanged for a year after the shock).25 I
compute the response of the economy to tax shocks with and without shutting off the
monetary policy response for three major tax episodes: the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA86), the Omnibus Reconciliation Relief Act of 1993, and the Economic Growth and
Tax Reconciliation Relief Act of 2001 (EGTRRA). Thus, in each episode I set the values
for Ct−1, Ct−2, Ct−3, Ct−4 equal to the historical values.
Before I proceed to estimate the responses for these three tax episodes, I need to
determine the timing and magnitude of the structural shock of interest. I assume the time
of the shock equals the quarter when the President announced the intended tax policy
change to the Congress. In other words if the investors are forward looking then
announcements of tax policy changes trigger movements in forward looking variables
(i.e., yields on similarly rated one year municipal and Treasury bonds) at the moment
when the policy change is announced. As for the size of the structural shock for (vτt ), it is
set equal to the difference between the observed implicit tax rate at the announcement date
and the value at the previous quarter.
Figure 3.9 shows the behavior of the key aggregate variables (net taxes, government
spending, real GDP, federal funds rate, and implicit tax rate) during the years
1984:I-1987:IV, 1993:I-1996:IV, 2000:I-2003:IV. The three panels in the Figure 3.9 are
associated with three different episodes of tax policy changes. Each figure illustrates three
paths: the dashed lines with square marker indicates the historical value; the solid line
(hereafter total effect) represents the predicted response of the variable given a shock to
the implicit tax rate while allowing for a monetary policy response;26 and the bold dashed
line (hereafter direct effect) represents the response to the implicit tax rate shock when the
25This counterfactual simulation is similar to that used in Hamilton and Herrera (2004), and Herrera and
Pesavento (2009) to analyze the contribution of oil prices shock and the role of systematic monetary policy
on the economy
26The solid lines in the Figure 3.9 for the years 1993:I - 1996:IV represents the response of variables to the
news about future tax increases, whereas for tax episodes during the years 1984:I-1987:IV and 2000:I-
2003:IV represents the response of variables to news about future tax cuts
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monetary policy is temporarily shutdown.
The first scenario in the Figure 3.9 (Panel 1) depicts the contribution of news regarding the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86). Most researchers agree that the TRA86 introduced
sweeping changes in the U.S. federal income tax post World War II. The TRA86 was not
signed by the President until late 1986, but one can trace a series of reforms introduced by
members of Congress or by the President before the bill was enacted and made public law.
The central provisions of TRA86 were initially proposed by Senator Bill Bradley and
Representative Richard Gephardt in 1983 (Auerbach and Slemrod, 1997). However, the
credible announcement about a policy change came from President Regan during his State
of the Union address on January 25, 1984 that commissioned Treasury-I and promised to
‘‘go forward with an historic reform for fairness, simplicity, and economic growth’’.27 I
map this news about TRA86 to the changes in the implicit tax rate. The announcement of
lowering personal income taxes reduced the implicit tax rate by 4.282 percentage points. I
then simulate the response of the variables of interest to a shock to the implicit tax rate
(i.e., vτ0 = -4.282).
The response of real GDP (solid and bold dashed line) in the Panel 1 shows a strong
evidence of anticipatory effects during 1984:I-87:IV. The announcement of future tax cuts
in TRA86 constrained the economy during the first four quarters of the forecast horizon.
Output fell below its mean on impact and reached a trough value of 3 percent at the end of
fourth quarter. One year after the shock, the response of output followed an upward
movement but remained negative for an extended period that extended beyond the length
of the foresight. I find there was no substantial difference between the total and the direct
response of output during the first four quarters after the initial shock. However, the drop
in real GDP was much higher for the direct effect (bold dashed line) after five quarters. In
27 The Library of Congress provides the information about U.S. federal legislative information. The Scripps
Library collects the presidential speeches in American History starting from 1789-2014. The precise
dates for signaling of tax changes can be found in the Presidential speech. The source is http://
millercenter.org/president/speeches
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this case, the difference between total and direct effect can be interpreted as the indirect
effect of the monetary policy response to tax news. This suggests that if the monetary
policy had not responded during the first year of the shock, then output would have
experienced a larger drop in its response to tax news in the medium run.
Panel 2 illustrates the news about the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 and its
impact on some key macro variables. In this case, the news about the tax increase was
announced by President Clinton in his address to a joint session of Congress on February
15, 1993. In his speech, the President announced the addition of a new tax bracket raising
the top marginal tax rate to 36%. The President also recommended 10% surtaxes on
income over $250,000 a year. The tax increase proposals were mainly targeted at higher
income groups. The announcement of a tax increase on individual and corporate income
raised the implicit tax rate by 1.292 percentage points. Panel 2 shows that real GDP
increased for four quarters following the shock to the implicit tax rate. The plot shows that
output reached a peak value of 3.5 percent at the end of 1994:III and thereafter output
gradually declined and moved slowly toward the mean level in the long run. In this
scenario, shutting down the response of monetary policy to tax news shock for the first
four quarters results in higher peak amplitude in the response of output.
Finally, Panel 3 shows the effect of tax news related to the 2001 EGTRRA. The major
provisions in the announcement of EGTRRA were aimed to cut the tax rates for the top
four brackets. These tax cuts were initially scheduled to take effect in 2002, 2004, and
2006. The results in Panel 3 show that the announcement of phased-in tax cuts in 2001
had a strong negative effect on the real GDP. Output fell below its trend during the
pre-implementation period (i.e. 2001:I-IV), while the implementation of tax cuts at the
end of 2002 resulted in a rise in the GDP growth. I find that shutting down the monetary
policy response in this case had no effect on the response of output. The paths of both
lines (solid and dashed) are almost on top of one another for the entire forecast horizon.
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Summarizing, during the three periods under analysis, changes in real GDP and inflation
were mainly due to the direct effect of tax news and not to the ensuing monetary policy
response. This result might not come as a surprise to the reader as it is unlikely that the
monetary authorities would have strongly reacted to a tax news shock before the tax
changes were implemented.
3.5.3 Pre-Implementation vs Post-Implementation Tax Effects
How much of the anticipatory effects to tax news shock persists after the policy change
was implemented? This section investigates the importance of before and after tax policy
changes in explaining U.S. macroeconomic fluctuations. More specifically, I analyze the
dynamic responses of the macroeconomic variables of interest to a combination of two
shocks. First an increase in the federal tax rate is announced at time t = 0, then a tax
increase is implemented at time t = 4. In principle, adding the policy realization shock to
the model should taper the anticipatory effects of the news shock.
To conduct this exercise I modify the FAVAR model described in the equation (3.1) - (3.2)
by replacing the log growth of net tax revenues (∆Tt) with the tax liability changes (taxt)
constructed by Romer and Romer (2010). Romer and Romer use Economic Reports of the
President, reports of Congressional committees, and presidential speeches to construct a
series of exogenous changes in the US federal tax liability changes. Tax liability changes
are computed as dollar changes in tax liabilities relative to nominal GDP at the time of
implementation. Given that net tax revenues are replaced by the tax liability changes, I
first re-estimate the FAVAR model using two-step estimation procedure and obtain the
alternative FAVAR model:
C˜t = E(L) C˜t−1 + ut (3.6)
where C˜t = [taxt, ∆Gt, ∆GDPt, Rt, τt, F˜t] is a vector of endogenous variables; F˜t
denotes the new estimated factors; taxt denotes tax liability changes; and ut = [utaxt , u
G
t ,
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uGDPt , u
R
t , u
τ
t , u
F
t ]
′ is an 8 × 1 vector of reduced form disturbances, where uFt is 3 × 1
vector of innovations in factors. The above equation may be represented as a structural
VAR:
D0 C˜t =
p∑
i=1
Di C˜t−i + t (3.7)
where D0 is lower triangular matrix with ones along the principal diagonal. t = [taxt , 
G
t ,
GDPt , 
R
t , 
τ
t , 
F
t ]
′ is an 8 × 1 vector of structural disturbances.
More precisely, I employ the coefficients estimated for equation (3.6) and simulate the
response of the economy to a tax news shock of 1% at time t = 0 (i.e., τ0 = 1). Then, I
assume that at time t = 4, tax liabilities experience an unexpected 1% increase (i.e., tax4 =
1). This is equivalent to assume that the change in the implicit tax rate does not perfectly
capture the subsequent change in tax liabilities. To be more precise, I use the structural
VAR described in equation (3.7) to compute the impulse response function (Ψ˜t) to a shock
in the implicit tax rate for t = 0,1,2,3. Then, at time t = 4, a tax policy shock (tax4 = 1) hits
the economy while we assume no additional shocks occur at that time or in the future. I
compute the impulse response functions for t ≥ 4 in the usual manner but with the
exception that I assume the lagged values C˜t−1 equal the values simulated in the previous
steps. This allows me to compute the values C˜t for t ≥ 4.
Figure 3.10 presents the impulse responses when only the implicit tax rate is shocked at
time t = 0 and the responses when an additional 1% increase in tax liabilities takes place
at time t = 4 (solid lines). Note that the dashed lines in figure 3.10 correspond to the
benchmark results in Figures 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6. Since the dynamic response to a 1% shock
in the implicit tax rate have been discussed in the previous sections, I will focus here on
what happens when an additional increase in the tax rate takes place later on. At time 0,
the arrival of news about an increase in income taxes has a expansionary effect on the
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economy: real GDP, employment per worker, hours per worker, aggregate and
disaggregate industrial production, and new orders rise immediately. Once the tax increase
is implemented, a a 1% shock to tax liabilities takes takes place at time t = 4, the macro
variables follow a path that is consistent with conventional wisdom. That is real GDP,
employment per worker, hours per worker, aggregate and disaggregate industrial
production, and new orders fall immediately.
These results provide some perspective on why there is no consensus regarding the effect
of tax shocks. First, if an increase in the federal tax rate is anticipated, then an
expansionary effect is observed. That is firms and workers have an incentive to move
production to the anticipation period where taxes are lower. However, once the tax
increase is implemented an economic contraction ensues. My results are consistent with
those of Yang (2005) and Mertens and Ravn (2012) who find substantial movement in
macroeconomic variables prior to policy realization and, once the taxes are realized,
actual tax changes offset the anticipatory effects on the macroeconomic variables.
3.5.4 Simulation across Tax Acts
In the previous section, I analyzed on counterfactual scenario without consideration of the
magnitude or the anticipation time implied by different historical tax policies. I assumed
that economic agents had a one-year foresight over future tax changes and the tax change
pre- and post-implementation equaled 1%. However, the length of foresight depends on
the legislative lag and the implementation lag, which differ for each tax law. Table 3.1
shows the variation in the length of the legislative lag for various tax events; the lag length
ranged between 4 and 17 months.28 In addition, the size of structural shock for news and
actual tax changes vary significantly for each tax law.29 Therefore it is interesting to
examine how the results depend on the length of foresight and the magnitude of the shock.
28See Mertens and Ravn (2012) for detailed summary of implementation lags for each of the tax event for the
period 1947-2003
29See Poterba (1986) for discussion on magnitude of the change in the implicit tax rate to different tax events.
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I investigate the same three tax episodes analyzed in section 3.5.2: Tax Reform Act of
1986 (TRA86), Omnibus Reconciliation Relief Act of 1993, and Economic Growth and
Tax Reconciliation Relief Act of 2001 (EGTRRA).
First, I use the parameters estimated in the VAR model (see equation 3.6) and then
conduct a counterfactual analysis for three different tax episodes. That is, for each episode
I first assume the economy is hit with a tax news shock (τt ) at the time of tax
announcement, t = 0. Then, at the implementation date an unexpected innovation to the
tax liabilities changes (taxt ) is observed. The estimation methodology is identical to the
method used for the general case in the previous section (see section 3.5.3) with the
exception that here I replace net tax revenues with tax liabilities changes to get a better
grasp of the historical changes in the latter.30
Two modeling choices need to be addressed: First, the timing of tax news and tax liability
shocks for each of three tax episodes has to be determined. Second, the size of structural
shock for tax news at the announcement date and the size of tax liability changes at the
implementation date has to be computed.
As in the previous sections, I assume that the announcement date corresponds to the date
at which the President announced his intention to change the taxes. The implementation
date is the date at which the tax legislation became effective. In addition, as discussed in
section 3.5.3, I measure the size of structural shock for tax news (τt ) as the difference in
the value of implicit tax rate between the announcement date and the previous quarter.
Regarding the shock to the tax liability changes (taxt ), I use the Romer and Romer (2010)
definition to measure the size of actual tax changes (i.e., dollar change in the tax liabilities
relative to the current price GDP at the implementation date). For instance, the tax liability
30First, I set C˜t−1 , C˜t−1, C˜t−1, C˜t−1 equal to their historical values for three tax episodes. I then estimate
equation (3.7) for C˜t+s values by feeding structural shock for news shock at the time of announcement
and tax liabilities shock at the implementation date. The impulse response functions are derived by plotting
C˜t+s, where s = 1,2,3...16.
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changes related to TRA86 were due in three separate phases i.e. 1986:III, 1987:I, and
1987:III. The change in tax liabilities in 1986:III corresponded to 0.50 percent of the GDP.
The latter two have reduced the tax liabilities approximately by 0.58 percent of annual
GDP. Similarly, the implementation of the Omnibus Reconciliation Relief Act of 1993
brought changes in tax liabilities in three separate phases (i.e., in 1993:III, 1993:IV, and
1994:I). The size of tax liabilities changes in 1993:III was 1.02 percent to annual GDP, a
cut in tax liabilities by 0.59 percent in 1993:IV, and increase in tax liabilities by 0.19
percent in 1994:I. Finally, the phased-in tax cuts introduced in the EGTRRA of 2001 were
scheduled initially to be implemented in 2004 and 2006. However, the enactment of the
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) in 2003 allowed the phased-in
tax cuts in EGTRRA to be implemented immediately in 2003. The implementation of
JGTRRA reduced the tax liabilities changes by 2.8 percent of annual GDP31.
Figure 3.11 illustrates the simulated response of the key macro variables for three specific
tax episodes: 1984:I-1987:IV, 1993:I-96:IV, and 2000:I-2003:IV. The dashed line
represents the response to the tax news shock (τt ). The solid line depicts the response to
the combination of shocks where the news shock (τt ) occurs at the time of the tax
announcement and, subsequently, a positive innovation in the tax liabilities (taxt ) occurs at
the implementation date −hereafter called total effect. The vertical lines in Figure 3.11
mark the phased-in implementation dates for three tax episodes.
The first panel of Figure 3.11 plots the simulation for the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA86), where the length of legislative lag was 17 months. The implementation for the
TRA86 was phased-in over three separate stages (i.e., 1986:IV, 1987:I, and 1987:III). As
the figure illustrates, during the pre-implementation period, news about lower taxes
resulted in a significant decline in output. Output reached a trough one year before the tax
cuts were implemented and increased thereafter. Note that starting in 1986:IV the
31The source for timing and size of tax liability changes is taken from Romer and Romer (2010)
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response of GDP shows upward movement due to the implementation of tax cuts.
Panel 2 of Figure 3.11 plots the results for the 1993:I-1996:IV period. The phased-in
implementation of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 was scheduled in
three separate stages (i.e., 1993:III, 1993:IV, and 1994:I). The 1993:III and 1994:I tax
changes correspond to increases in tax liabilities while the 1993:IV corresponds to a
decrease. At the beginning of 1993:I, the arrival of news about higher taxes had an
expansionary effect on real GDP. The rise in taxes in 1993:III shows no significant effect
on output but subsequent implementation of higher taxes in 1994:I resulted a immediate
fall in the real GDP, which moved slowly towards the steady state in the long run.
Finally, panel 3 of Figure 3.11 illustrates the simulation for 2000:I-2003:IV. The figure
shows that output declined sharply in response to tax news in 2001. Once the tax cuts were
implemented in 2003:II, a sharp increase in real GDP ensued. The increase in real GDP
can be attributed to the elimination of phased-in nature of tax reductions of EGTRRA
2001. These results are consistent with the findings of House and Shaipro (2006) who find
that phased-in tax cuts of EGTRRA 2001 contributed to the slow recovery from recession
in 2001 and the implementation of tax cuts in 2003 stimulated the economy.
Overall, the results show strong evidence of anticipatory effects for all three tax events,
which is consistent with the benchmark estimate where we used the net tax returns instead
of the tax liability changes. Whereas the implementation of the TRA86 and the Omnibus
Reconciliation Act of 1993 had a rather weak effect on economic activity, the mid-2003
implementation of the tax cuts proposed in the EGTRRA 2001, did have a positive effect
on GDP growth.
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3.6 Conclusions
The lack of consensus in explaining the macroeconomic effects of news about tax changes
can be associated with the empirical challenge in identifying the tax foresight. Existing
studies have used different methodologies, data, and instruments to estimate the
quantitative effect of tax policy changes. This chapter identifies tax news as a shock to the
implicit tax rate, measured by the yield spread between the one year tax-exempt municipal
bond and the one-year taxable Treasury bond. I investigate the effect of a tax news on U.S.
economy, using a factor-augmented vector autoregressive (FAVAR) approach.
The results suggest that tax news –measured as one percentage point increase in the
implicit tax rate– has an expansionary effect on real economic activity in the short run. I
find that real GDP increases in response to a tax news shock for about four quarters and
reaches a peak value of 0.77 percent in the fourth quarter. The magnitude and direction of
response of real GDP is consistent with the classical view where an anticipated rise in
personal income taxes leads to an increase in output, aggregate employment, and hours
worked per worker.
In addition, I investigate the effect of tax news on disaggregate measures of industrial
production, price level, housing units, and new orders in consumer goods. I find that a
positive shock to the implicit tax rate leads to large, persistent and positive effects on real
economic activity. Overall, the results suggest that that news regarding an increase in
future tax rates gives an incentive for firms and workers to switch the production over to
the anticipation period where taxes are expected to be lower.
A historical decomposition of the sources of fluctuations in GDP growth reveals that
shocks to the federal funds rate and tax news have been the main sources of fluctuations in
output during the 1960-2003 period. While monetary policy shocks largely explain the
99
variations in output during the 1975-85 period, tax announcements associated with
legislations in 1986, 1993, and 2001 contributed to the fluctuations in real GDP during the
past decades. Moreover, had the monetary authority not responded to news of tax changes
in 1986 and 1993, then the resulting fluctuations in GDP would have been somewhat
larger.
Finally, the counterfactual analysis of the pre- and post-implementation shocks sheds
some light on the controversy regarding the effect of tax changes. First, during the
anticipation period, news of a tax increase results in an expansion. Yet, once the tax
increase is implemented, the expansionary effect is tappered. Moreover, simulations for
three key historical tax episodes suggest that it is crucial to account for policy foresight in
order to get a better grasp of the true effects of a change in tax policy.
Copyright c©Sandeep K. Rangaraju, 2015
100
Table 3.1: Major Tax Legislations in the United States over the years 1964-2003.
Announcement Enactment Provisions in the Act
January 21, 1963 February 26, 1964 Revenue Act (H.R.8363) :Reduction in individual and
corporate income tax rates. The top rate for individual
tax rates in reduced from 91% to 70 % and top corpo-
rate tax rate reduced from 52% to 48 %.
January 26, 1967 June 28, 1968 Revenue and Expenditure Control Act(H.R.15414):
The tax law imposed a 10% surtaxes on individual and
corporate income for individuals and corporations.
April 21, 1969 December 30, 1969 Tax Reform Act (H.R. 13270): This law extended the
income surtaxes at 5% for six months. Also, increased
the personal income tax exemption from $600 to $750.
January 13, 1975 March 29, 1975 Tax Reduction Act (H.R.2166): The tax law provided
10% tax rebate up to maximum of $200. Increased the
minimum standard deduction to $1900 (joint filers).
Also, increased the percentage standard deduction to
16% for the year 1975.
January 26,1976 October 4,1976 Tax Reform Act(H.R.10612) : Increased percentage
standard deduction to 16 % (maximum $2,800) and
minimum standard deduction to $2,100 (joints filers).
Increased long-term capital gains holding period from
6 months to 1 year.
January 13, 1977 May 23, 1977 Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977(H.R.
3477): Increased the standard deductions and mini-
mum standard deduction with a single standard deduc-
tion $3,200 (joint filers).
January 19, 1978 November 6, 1978 Revenue Act (H.R. 13511): Increase the personal ex-
emption from $750 to $1000. Top corporate tax re-
duced from 48% to 46%. Increased the standard de-
duction from $3200 to $3400 (joint filers)
February 5, 1981 August 13, 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act(H.R. 4242): Amends
Internal Revenue Code to reduce individual rates by
5% effective October 1, 1981 to June 30, 1982. Fur-
ther, 10% effective from July 1, 1982 to June 30, 1983.
Finally an additional 10% effective on July 1, 1983.
The highest marginal tax rates for all types of income
reduced from 70% to 50% . Maximum tax rate on
long-term capital gains of 20 % is established.
January 26, 1982 September 3, 1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility(H.R.
4961):Increases the wage base for purposes of
the Federal unemployment tax from $6000 to $7000,
effective in 1983. Increases the unemployment tax
rate from 3.4 to 3.5 percent effective in 1983 and to
6.2 percent (a permanent tax of 6.0 percent and an
extended benefit tax of 0.2 percent) effective in 1985.
Increased excise taxes.
January 25, 1984 July 19, 1984 Deficit Reduction Act (H.R.4170): The act has placed
state volume limitation on private purpose tax exempt
bonds. The maximum estate tax rate at 55%. Increased
excise taxes.
Continued on next page
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Table 3.1 – Continued from previous page
Announcement Enactment Provisions in the Act
January 25, 1984 October 22, 1986 Tax Reform Act (H.R.3838): Reduced the number of
tax brackets from fourteen to two: 15% and 28%. Top
marginal tax rate is lowered from 50% to 28%. The
top corporate marginal tax rate is reduced to 34%. The
tax reform act tightened the limitations on states issu-
ing tax exempt bonds for private purposes. Increased
the standard deduction fro $5,000 for married couples.
Increased the personal exemption to $2,000 and also
increased earned income tax credit.
June 26, 1990 November 5, 1990 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (H.R. 5835):
Increased the top marginal tax rate from 28 percent to
31 percent. The capital gains tax rate is maintained at
28 percent. Individual alternative minimum tax rate is
increased from 21% to 24%.
February 15, 1993 August 10, 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (H.R. 2264):
The act has introduced a new tax bracket. The top
marginal tax rate increased to 36%. Corporate tax rates
were increased. The top corporate tax rate is increased
to 35%.
February 5, 2001 June 7, 2001 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act- EGTRRA (H.R.1826): Amends Internal Rev-
enue Code to replace five individual tax brackets (
15%, 28%, 31%, 36%and 39.6%) to six lower bracket
s(10%, 15%, 25%, 28%, 33%,and 35%). The phased-
in reductions of 28%, 31%, 36%and 39.6% brackets
will reduce by one percentage point annually until
2006 and thereafter the tax brackets will end up with
25%, 28%, 33%,and 35%. Finally, these tax brackets
will expire or sun set in 2011.
January 7, 2003 May 28, 2003 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act-
JGTRRA (H.R.2): Accelerated the tax provisions
from EFTRRA 2001, so that the 2006 rates become
immediate effective in 2003. The law has reduced the
tax rates on dividends and capital gains assets that held
for more than year. The top rate is reduced to 15%.
Provided $20 billion to states for fiscal releif for the
period over 2003 and 2004.
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Table 3.2: State Taxation of Municipal Bonds and US Treasury Bonds
State In-State Municipal Out-State Municipal US Treasury Bonds
Alabama Exempt Taxable Exempt
Alaska No Personal Income or Corporate Tax
Arizona Exempt Taxable Exempt
Arkansas Exempt Taxable Exempt
California Exempt Taxable Exempt
Colarado Exempt Taxable Exempt
Connecticut Taxable Taxable Taxable
Delaware Exempt Taxable Exempt
District of Columbia Exempt Taxable Exempt
Florida No Personal Income or Corporate Tax
Georgia Exempt Taxable Exempt
Hawaii Exempt Taxable Exempt
Idaho Exempt Taxable Exempt
Illinois Taxable Taxable Exempt
Indiana Exempt Exempt Exempt
Iowa Taxable Taxable Exempt
Kansas Exempt Taxable Exempt
Kentucky Exempt Taxable Exempt
Louisiana Exempt Exempt Exempt
Maine Exempt Taxable Exempt
Maryland Exempt Taxable Exempt
Massachusetts Exempt Taxable Taxable
Michigan Exempt Taxable Exempt
Minnesota Taxable Taxable Taxable
Mississippi Exempt Taxable Exempt
Missouri Exempt Taxable Exempt
Montana Taxable Taxable Taxable
Nebraska Exempt Taxable Exempt
Nevada No Personal Income or Corporate Tax
New Hampshire Exempt Taxable Exempt
New Jersey Exempt Taxable Exempt
New Mexico Exempt Taxable Exempt
New York Taxable Taxable Taxable
North Carolina Exempt Taxable Exempt
North Dakota Exempt Taxable Exempt
Ohio Exempt Exempt Exempt
continued on next page
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Table 3.2: Continued from previous page
State In-State Municipal Out-State Municipal US Treasury
Okalhoma Taxable Taxable Exempt
Oregon Exempt Taxable Exempt
Pennsylvania Exempt Exempt Exempt
Rhode Island Exempt Taxable Exempt
South Carolina Exempt Taxable Exempt
South Dakota No Personal Income or Corporate Tax
Tennessee Taxable Taxable Taxable
Texas Exempt Exempt Exempt
Utah Taxable Taxable Taxable
Vermont Exempt Taxable Exempt
Virginia Exempt Taxable Exempt
Washington No Personal Income or Corporate Tax
West Virginia Taxable Taxable Exempt
Wisconsin Taxable Taxable Exempt
Wyoming No Personal Income or Corporate Tax
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Figure 3.1: Ownership of Municipal Bonds
Notes:The figure plots the ownership of municipal bonds held by households, banks, and insurance
companies. The data is collected from the Flow of Funds Accounts provided by the Board of Governors.
The percentage of municipal bonds held by: (a) households includes direct and indirect ownership through
mutual funds, money market funds, and closed-end funds; (b) banks comprise of commercial banks and
savings institutions; and (c) insurance companies include life insurance companies and other insurance
companies.
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Figure 3.2: Tax Rates
Notes:The figure plots the implicit tax rate and average marginal federal individual income tax rate for the
United States. The solid line is the average marginal federal individual income tax rate (AMTR) taken from
Barro-Redlick (2011). The dashed line is the one year lagged annualized implicit tax rate (ITR1Y) which is
yield spread between the one year tax exempt municipal bond rate and one-year taxable Treasury bond rate.
The yields on tax-exempt prime graded general obligation municipal bonds and the taxable U.S. Treasury
bonds data are obtained from Leeper, Richter, and Walker (2012).
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Figure 3.3: Tax Rates
Notes:The figure plots the implicit tax rate and marginal tax rate of top one percent for the United States.
The solid line is the top 1 % marginal tax rate taken from Saez (2004). The dashed line is the one year lagged
implicit tax rate (ITR1Y) which is yield spread between the one year tax exempt municipal bond rate and
one-year taxable Treasury bond rate. The yields on tax-exempt prime graded general obligation municipal
bonds and the taxable U.S. Treasury bonds data are obtained from Leeper, Richter, and Walker (2012).
107
Figure 3.4: Impulse Responses Generated from FAVAR with Three Factors- Tax News Shock
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Notes: The figure shows the response of the aggregate variables to a one percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate. Full lines are point estimates; dashed
and dotted lines indicate the 68 percent and 95 percent confidence intervals constructed using a recursive wild-bootstrap method with 10,000 replications
(Goncalves and Kilian (2004)).
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Figure 3.5: Impulse Responses Generated from FAVAR with Three Factors- Tax News Shock
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Notes: The figure shows the response of the aggregate variables to a one percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate. Full lines are point estimates; dashed
and dotted lines indicate the 68 percent and 95 percent confidence intervals constructed using a recursive wild-bootstrap method with 10,000 replications
(Goncalves and Kilian (2004)).
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Figure 3.6: Impulse Responses Generated from FAVAR with Three Factors- Tax News Shock
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Notes: The figure shows the response of the aggregate variables to a one percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate. Full lines are point estimates; dashed
and dotted lines indicate the 68 percent and 95 percent confidence intervals constructed using a recursive wild-bootstrap method with 10,000 replications
(Goncalves and Kilian (2004)).
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Figure 3.7: Impulse Responses Generated from FAVAR with Three Factors- Tax News Shock
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Notes: The figure shows the response of the aggregate variables to a one percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate. Full lines are point estimates; dashed
and dotted lines indicate the 68 percent and 95 percent confidence intervals constructed using a recursive wild-bootstrap method with 10,000 replications
(Goncalves and Kilian (2004)).
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Figure 3.8: Historical Decomposition of Real GDP
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Notes: The vertical bars in panel 4 correspond to the announcement of tax policy changes in the United
States. The estimates are derived from structural VAR representation from equation (5).
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Figure 3.9: Simulation Exercises: Three Historical Tax News Shock
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Notes:For each of three historical tax episodes, the graphs compare actual behavior of variables with the predicted response. The solid red line represents the
predicted response calculated using VAR estimates. Dotted line represents the direct effect of implicit tax rate (shutting down the monetary policy). Dashed blue
line represents the actual data. The vertical axis scaling is in levels and measured in percent.
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Figure 3.10: Pre-Implementation and Post-Implementation Tax Effects
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Notes:The figure shows the response of the aggregate variables to a one percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate. Solid lines are point estimates; indicate
the responses to one point increase in implicit tax rate at time 0 i.e., vτ0 = 1 and subsequently to 1% increase in tax liabilities at time 4 i.e., v
tax
0 = 1. Dashed lines
are benchmark impulse responses to one percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate.
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Figure 3.11: Pre-Implementation and Post-Implementation Effects across Three Tax Acts
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Notes: For each of three historical tax episodes, the graphs compare actual behavior of variables with the predicted response. The solid green line represents the
predicted response of output to tax news and implementation of tax policy changes. Dashed red lines represents the response of output to tax news shock. The
vertical blue lines in each panel represents the implementation dates for tax policy changes.
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4 Tax News in Recessions and Expansions
4.1 Introduction
Recent macroeconomic literature has shifted its focus from explaining the economic
fluctuations through contemporaneous shocks to news shocks. While early studies have
focused on news shocks that are driven by future technology or productivity shocks and
their impact on the economy32, there is a recent surge in studying the role of news about
future government spending or tax changes and their impact on the economy (see
Blanchard and Perotti (2002); Mountford and Uhlig (2009); Ramey (2011); Leeper et al.
(2012)). The main idea is that economic agents anticipate future changes in government
spending or tax changes and adjust their behavior accordingly (see e.g. Yang (2005),
Leeper et al. (2013), Kueng (2014) and Mertens and Ravn (2012)). In this chapter, I
investigate whether tax news shocks exhibit a differential impact during recessions and
expansions.
A large set of empirical macro literature that evaluates the effect of tax policy changes on
the economy generally follows a linear structural vector autoregression (VAR) model.
While a linear model has numerous advantages (e.g., ease of computation and inference),
it imposes the restriction that the economy’s response to tax news shocks is identical
during different phases of the business cycle33. To overcome this drawback, this chapter
analyzes the role of news about future tax policy, in particular anticipation of future tax
cuts, on the economy in both a linear and a nonlinear framework. In addition, I investigate
whether the news about future tax cuts has a different effect depending on the state of the
economy. For this purpose, I employ the Jorda (2005) local projection method that allows
for state dependence.
32see Cochrane (1994), Beaudry and Portier (2006), and Lorenzoni (2011)
33see Parker (2011) for discussion on measuring fiscal policy effects during recessions.
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To investigate the effect of news shock conditioning on business cycle dynamics, I need to
identify news about future taxes, and measure slackness in the economy so as to
differentiate boom and bust periods. I follow the lead of Leeper et al. (2013) to identify
news about future taxes. That is, I use the yield spread between the one-year tax exempt
municipal bond and the one-year taxable Treasury bond − to isolate news about changes
in future taxes. The yield spread is known as the implicit tax rate.
Regarding the measure of slack, I follow Ramey and Zubairy‘s (2015) suggestion to use
the unemployment rate as a measure of slack. More specifically, the economy is
considered to be in a recession phase when the unemployment rate is above a threshold
value and in an expansion phase when the unemployment rate is below a threshold value.
The threshold value is set to be 6.5%. Figure 4.1 plots the real GDP growth rate over the
sample period. The shaded regions indicate when the unemployment rate is above the
threshold value (i.e., 6.5%) and the vertical lines indicate the tax events that are motivated
to stimulate the economy or fight recession.34 I find that during much of the 1970’s period,
tax changes are used as a discretionary countercyclical policy to counteract poor economic
conditions 35 Note that the Revenue Act of 1964, the Revenue Act of 1971, the Tax
Reduction Act of 1975, the Tax Reform Act of 1976, and the Tax Reduction and
Simplification Act of 1977 were mainly used to confront the recessions and tax cuts were
introduced to promote economic growth (Romer and Romer, 2010; Yang, 2007). There
were no countercyclical tax policy changes in the1990’s. However, I find that phased in
tax policy of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 and the Job
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 were used to stimulate the economy
following the recession in 2001. As is evident from the above figure, real GDP
34 The details about each countercyclical tax law, enactment dates and its provisions during the period 1960-
2005 are obtained from the Library of Congress, Yang (2007), and Romer and Romer (2010).
35see Romer and Romer (2010) for detailed description on post war legislated tax changes. They classify the
legislated tax changes as exogenous and endogenous by looking at the motivation of the tax policy. They
define endogenous tax changes as those that are motivated to bring output growth to normal. Further, they
label the endogenous tax changes that are not related to spending changes as countercyclical tax changes.
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predominantly moves upward followed by a realization of tax cuts in the sample.
Figure 4.2 shows the implicit tax rate, log of real per capita tax revenues, and
unemployment rate. In the top panel, I plot the implicit tax rate along with shaded regions
indicating the time between the initial tax policy proposal and its enactment. As is evident
from this figure, the path of the implicit tax rate is followed by the signaling of initial tax
policy proposal by the U.S President to the Congress. Recent work by Kueng (2014), and
Leeper et al. (2013) has documented the empirical relationship between the implicit tax
rate and expected future tax rates. Table 2.1 shows the empirical relationship between the
implicit tax rate and actual tax rates. The results from Table 2.1 conclude that lags of the
implicit tax rate have predictive content for the average marginal tax rate, and the top one
percent marginal tax rate. Their empirical evidence therefore suggests that the implicit tax
rate predicts future tax rate changes.
The middle panel shows the logarithm of real per capita net tax revenues along with tax
cuts realization dates. The vertical lines show the tax cuts that were implemented to
confront recessions. There were a total of 9 tax events in the sample motivated to
stimulate the economy. It is clear from the above graph that the Tax Reduction Act of
1975 has caused the largest tax revenue changes in the sample. The bottom panel shows
the unemployment series for the sample period and the unemployment rate reached its
peak value of 10.1 percent in 1983:IV. Also, the rise in the unemployment rate to 9
percent in May 1975 caused President Ford to announce a large tax rebate to stimulate the
economy (Romer and Romer, 2010; Yang, 2007).
This chapter contributes to the previous literature in several ways. First, I depart from
using standard VAR models to use a local projection technique to estimate the effects of
news shock on the economy. Second, I compute the impulse responses to tax news shocks
conditioning on business cycle dynamics (i.e. in boom and bust periods separately). I find
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that news about future tax cuts has a contractionary effect on the economy for about four
quarters. The behavior of output and investment following tax news shocks is similar in
both high unemployment and low unemployment states of the economy. Additionally, the
state dependent model shows that news shocks have a stronger positive impact on
consumption expenditures and residential investment in the recession phase than in the
expansion phase.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the data and econometric
methodology. In section 4.3, I present the baseline estimates of the local projection
method. First, I present the results from a linear model, where the coefficients do not vary
with the state of the economy. Second, I present results from a nonlinear framework in
which estimates vary according to the slack in the economy. Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 Data and Methodology
4.2.1 Data
I follow Leeper et al. (2012) to measure tax news. I use the yield spread between one year
municipal bond and one -year Treasury bill to capture the foresight regarding future tax
changes. The tax rate derived from the yield spread is called the implicit tax rate. More
specifically, the implicit tax rate is constructed as τ It =1− r
M
t
rTt
where rMt represents the one
year tax exempt municipal bond rate, and rTt the one-year taxable Treasury bond rate at
time t. I follow Blanchard and Perotti (2002) to measure the government spending and net
tax revenues. The data for real GDP, net tax revenues, government spending, and GDP
components are obtained from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)-
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). I compute real per-capita measures of GDP (yt) and
its components, net tax revenues (Tt), and government spending (Gt) deflating with GDP
deflator and dividing by the U.S. civilian non-institutional population ages over 16 years
and older. The data for the civilian unemployment rate series is obtained from the Federal
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Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED database. I use quarterly data from 1956Q1 to 2006Q4
yielding a total of 200 observations.
4.2.2 Methodology
I follow the Jorda (2005) local projection method to compute the impulse responses to tax
news shock. The advantage of using this single equation local projection method is that it
does not impose any dynamic restrictions on the macro variables and it allows us to
include nonlinearities in the response function.36 The linear model can be written as
follows:
xt+h − xt−1
yt−1
= αh + δht+ γht
2 + Φh(L)zt−1 + βh τ It + t+h (4.1)
xt is our variable of interest, zt consists of lags of log of real per capita net tax revenues,
log of real per capita government spending, log of real per-capita GDP, and the implicit
tax rate(τ It ). Φh(L) is polynomial of order 4. The estimated coefficient βh gives the
impulse response of xt+h at horizon h to a shock to τ It as suggested by Jorda (2005). More
specifically, I estimate a series of regressions for our variable of interest xt+h (i.e.,for each
horizon h = 0,1, 2, 3....H) on implicit tax rate (τ It ) in period t, as well as four lags of
logarithm of real per capita tax revenues, real per capita government spending, real per
capita GDP and the implicit tax rate to extract impulse response as a sequence of βh to
news shock. For example, if the variable of interest xt is real per capita GDP (yt), then
equation (1) reduces to the following form 37 :
yt+h − yt−1
yt−1
= αh + δht+ γht
2 + Φh(L)zt−1 + βh τ It + t+h (4.2)
Moreover, I obtain the impulse responses for six variables (i.e., components of GDP).
These include real per-capita personal consumption expenditures, real per-capita durable
36I build this empirical model based on Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) and Ramey and Zubairy (2014).
37I follow Hall (2009) and Ramey and Zubairy (2014). to write the variables on the left hand side of equation
(4.1), equation (4.2), and equation (4.3) relative to lag of real per capita GDP (yt−1)
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goods spending, real per-capita non-durable goods spending, real aggregate gross private
sector investment, real per-capita residential investment, and real per-capita
non-residential investment. I rotate the six variables in xt and include the corresponding
lags in zt−1, one at a time. One advantage of using the Jorda (2005) method is that the
control variables are not necessarily required to be the same for each regression (Ramey
and Zubairy, 2014).
To investigate whether the tax news shocks exhibit a differential impact during recessions
and expansions, I follow the approach taken by Ramey and Zubairy (2014) to modify the
above linear model (1) to a state-dependent model. The nonlinear model can be written in
a single equation as following:
xt+h − xt−1
yt−1
= dt−1[αR,h + ΦR,h(L)zt−1 + βR,h τ It ] +
+ (1− dt−1)[αE,i + ΦE,h(L)zt−1 + βE,h τ It ] + t+h (4.3)
As discussed above, xt+h is the variable of interest, yt−1 is the lag of output, zt−1 consists
of control variables, and d is the dummy variable that takes the value of one or zero. The
variable d is equal to one when the civilian unemployment rate (Ut) is above the threshold
value (c) and zero when the civilian unemployment rate (Ut) is below the threshold value
(c). I follow Ramey and Zubairy (2014) criteria to choose the threshold value (c) as 6.5 %
percent in the baseline model. All the coefficient estimates except the constant, linear
trend, and quadratic trend terms vary depending on the state of the economy. I label the
coefficient estimates with recession state (‘R’) when Ut > c and expansion state (‘E’)
when Ut < c. The impulse responses are constructed for the high unemployment state
using the coefficient estimates βR,i and the low unemployment state using the coefficient
estimates βE,i.
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4.3 Empirical Results
This section discusses the effect of one percentage point decrease in the implicit tax rate-
hereafter news about future tax cuts. I focus on the response of real aggregate per capita
GDP and real per-capita tax revenues and components of GDP. The 95 percent confidence
intervals for the impulse responses are computed based on Newey-West standard errors
that correct for the serial correlation. The impulse responses are shown for a horizon of 20
quarters after the shocks. First, I present the impulse responses estimated using the linear
model shown in equation (4.1). Second, I examine the impact of news shocks on
macroeconomic variables using the nonlinear model represented in equation (4.3).
4.3.1 Linear Model
Figure 4.3 illustrates the benchmark results in a linear framework. The linear model
assumes that the point estimates do not vary based on the state of the business cycle. The
left panel of Figure 4.3 shows that anticipation of future tax cuts has a negative effect on
output in the short run. Notice that tax news shock is persistent for the entire horizon. The
effect on output is consistently negative for the entire horizon and significant for about
eight quarters. The decline in output occurs gradually over time with the peak decline
being reached four quarters after the shock. The maximum effect is a fall in real GDP per
capita of -0.118 percent after four quarters (t-stat = −4.0893). Thereafter, output remains
below the trend for an extended time period. The right panel of Figure 4.3 shows the path
of real per-capita net tax revenues to news shock. Tax revenues fall initially then rises after
5 quarters. The response becomes statistically insignificant after 9 quarters to news shock.
Thus, I find that output responds to current and lagged values of news about future tax
cuts, which can be interpreted as an evidence of anticipation effects. The results are in
agreement with previous studies in this literature. For example, Mertens and Ravn (2012)
show a very strong evidence of anticipation effects to tax cuts, with output declining to 1.5
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percent four quarters after the shock. The key difference in their model and the one in this
paper is that Mertens and Ravn (2012) control for anticipation horizon; this paper uses the
implicit tax rate which does not require setting the period of foresight a priori. Mertens
and Ravn (2012) suggest that the response of output is sensitive to length of foresight and
conclude that the longer the anticipation horizon the stronger the anticipation effect on the
economy. My estimation results are important as they help in understanding the impact of
tax news shocks on the economy, when the length of the foresight is unconstrained.
Overall, the evidence of a contractionary effect on output to news shocks indicate that
forward looking individuals and firms postpone their production decisions until the tax
cuts are actually realized. The anticipation effect is pronounced for four quarters. This
effect diminishes gradually and output starts to rise eventually. However, it remains below
the trend line for the entire forecast horizon. The response of output suggests that tax cuts
that result in large anticipation effects may not be a good countercyclical policy tool. This
result is in line with the results of House and Shapiro (2006) and Yang (2005). The
theoretical model constructed by House and Shapiro (2006) show that phased in tax cuts
enacted in the 2001 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act lead the
economy to contract and resulted in a slower recovery from the 2001 recession.
Further, I examine the response of the GDP components such as personal consumption
expenditures, durable goods purchases, nondurable goods purchases, gross private
domestic investment, residential investment, and nonresidential investment to news about
future tax cuts. Figure 4.4 shows that personal consumption expenditures decline in
response to news shocks. The effect of a tax news shock on the personal consumption
expenditures and nondurable consumption expenditures is very mild and significant only
for three quarters. The response of durable good purchases is not statistically different
from zero. According to the Permanent-Income Hypothesis (PIH) theory, households
increase the consumption based on long term resources and in the absence of cash or credit
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constraints, the consumption spending increases to news about tax cuts. In contrast to PIH
theory, aggregate consumption responds negatively to news shock and shows no evidence
of anticipation effects. The lack of an anticipation effect on consumption is in line with
results of Poterba (1989), Reis (2006), and Mertens and Ravn (2012). They suggest that
households facing liquidity constraints or some decision costs will find it difficult to adjust
their consumption to tax news shocks. In addition, empirical work by Kueng (2014) finds
that liquidity constraints do affect the response of nondurable goods consumption to tax
news shocks. More specifically, low income households facing liquidity constraint show a
weaker response to news shocks. These results suggest that aggregate consumption
expenditures and its components react very sluggishly to news shocks.
The bottom panel of Figure 4.4 shows the response of gross private investment, residential
investment, and nonresidential investment. The responses of investment and its
components are negative and stay below their initial levels after news shocks. Gross
private domestic investment declines for about four quarters and then rises for the
remaining horizon. The decline in investment and its components to a news shock is due
to the forward looking nature of the firms and individuals, which provides an incentive to
postpone investment decisions. All in all, the estimates of output, gross private domestic
investment, residential, and nonresidential investment in a linear model provide evidence
of anticipation effects on the economy.
4.3.2 Nonlinear Model
I now investigate whether the response of output and its components varies with the state
of the economy. I estimate the state-dependent model represented in equation 3 to
compute the impulse responses for real per capita GDP, real per-capita net tax revenues,
and GDP components. The impulse response functions are derived from the estimated
coefficient βR,h and βE,h for real GDP, net tax revenues, and GDP components in equation
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4.3. Figure 4.5 illustrates the output response to anticipation about future tax cuts in both
recessionary and expansionary phases of the economy. Output declines in the first four
quarters and then starts to rise for the remaining time horizon. The effect of news shocks
on output is significant for four quarters in the recession phase, whereas the anticipation
effect is significant for six quarters in the expansion phase. In addition, the response of
output in the recessionary phase diverges from the response in the expansion period by
rising steadily and reaching 0.2 percent after 20 quarters. In contrast, the response of
output in the expansionary phase consistently remains below zero and never becomes
positive. The left panel of Figure 4.5 shows that on the one hand anticipation of a future
tax cut shock is more persistent in the long run for the recessionary phase, and on the
other hand, it shows a stronger effect on output in the short run in the expansionary phase
of the economy. The response of tax revenues follows a similar path to output and declines
with a fall in real GDP.
Just as we saw when the response of output differs according to the regime in which a
news shock hits the economy, the response of components of GDP to news shocks also
diverge depending upon the state of the economy. Figure 4.6 shows that consumption
expenditures drop on impact in the recession phase and then rise immediately. Thereafter,
they remain positive for the entire horizon. However, the response of consumption
expenditures in the expansion phase remains below the initial level and is statistically
insignificant. The response of durable and nondurable good purchases in the recession
phase of the economy shows a similar shape to that of consumption expenditures and is
significant for multiple quarters. Overall, the responses show a strong and persistent effect
of news shocks in the recession phase. The rise in consumption indicates that the wealth
effect dominates the substitution effect. Surprisingly, the response of consumption
expenditures in the recessionary phase is very different to that of the response estimated in
the linear model. This indicates that the response of consumption expenditures to news
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shocks is not appropriately characterized by the linear model.
The bottom panel of Figure 4.6 shows the estimated responses of gross private domestic
investment, residential, and nonresidential investment. The impact on gross private
domestic investment is uniform across the two states of the economy for about four
quarters. The response of private investment declines for about four quarters and then
increases for the remaining time horizon in the recessionary phase. Much of this decline in
gross private domestic investment is driven by the non-residential investment as can be
seen from the above figure. Surprisingly, the residential investment response increases and
remains positive in the recessionary phase. The response of residential investment in the
expansion is similar to that of private investment. Overall, the news about future tax cuts
has a strong impact on gross private and non-residential investment in the short run. The
results presented here are consistent with a larger literature. For example, studies by
Parker (2011), and House and Shapiro (2006) analyze the impact of tax changes on output
and the components of GDP in the recession state of the economy. My results suggest that
households experience stronger wealth effects in response to news shocks during
recessions than in expansions.
In summary, the results suggest that anticipation about future tax cuts reduces economic
activity for about four quarters. However, the response of aggregate GDP, and components
of investment rebound to their mean after four quarters. The rebound effect is much
stronger in the recessionary phase of the economy. In addition, the results suggest that
countercyclical tax news shocks shows a stronger positive wealth effect on personal
consumption expenditures in the recessionary phase than in the expansionary phase.
4.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, I analyze the impact of anticipation of future tax cuts on the economy
using the local projection model developed by Jorda (2005). The non-linearities are
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constructed using a single equation state dependent regression model, where the business
cycle dynamics are defined by the unemployment rate. I follow Ramey and Zubairy
(2014) and use the unemployment rate to measure the slackness in the economy. I use
6.5% as threshold value to define the slackness in the economy.
I find that anticipation of future tax cuts has a negative effect on output for four quarters in
both linear and nonlinear models. While this result is consistent with previous literature,
my approach generates markedly different results in expansion and recession phases for
consumption, durable goods purchases, nondurable good purchases and nonresidential
investment. These variables show a strong positive response to news shock in recession
time. Additionally, I find that output and gross private domestic investment show stronger
rebound effects in a recession phase than in an expansion phase.
Finally, it would be interesting to compare the results presented here to that of impulse
responses computed using traditional VAR model. A recent paper by Kilian and Kim
(2011) compares the finite sample performance of impulse response functions computed
using Jorda ‘s local projection method and the usual VAR models. They conclude that
with a low sample size, the local projection method confidence intervals are less accurate
than the bias adjusted- bootstrapped VAR models. Also, it would be interesting to extend
this model to estimate news shocks on the economy in good and bad times controlling for
monetary, or anticipated productivity shocks.
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Figure 4.1: Chronological Tax events motivated by stimulating the U.S. economy
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
−0.03
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Tax Ref Act
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Tax Red Act
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Rev Act of
1978
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Rev. Act of 1964 Rev. Act of 1971
Tax Red Act
of 1975
JGTRRA of 2003
Notes: The figure plots the real per-capita GDP growth rate. The shaded regions reflect the time periods
when the unemployment rate is above the threshold value. The vertical line shows the tax events that are
motivated to stimulate the economy.
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Figure 4.2: Implicit Tax Rate, Tax Revenues, and Unemployment Rate
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Panel B: Log of real per−capita tax revenues
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Notes: The figure plots the implicit tax rate, log of real per capita net tax revenues, and unemployment rate.
The shaded regions correspond to legislative lags that are documented by Yang (2007). The vertical lines in
Panels B and Panel C shows the realized tax cuts dates.
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Figure 4.3: Response of GDP and Tax Revenues to Tax News Shock, Linear Model
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Notes: Solid lines show the point estimates and gray shaded areas are 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 4.4: Response of GDP Components to Tax News Shock, Linear Model
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Notes: Solid lines show the point estimates and gray shaded areas are 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 4.5: Response of GDP and Tax Revenues to Tax News Shock, Non-Linear Model
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Notes: Solid black lines are the point estimates of GDP and tax revenues in the high unemployment state
and a blue line with circles are point estimates in the low unemployment state. Gray shaded areas and
dashed lines are 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 4.6: Response of GDP Components to Tax News Shock, Non-Linear Model
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Notes: Solid black lines are the point estimates of GDP components in the high unemployment state and a
blue line with circles are point estimates in the low unemployment state. Gray shaded areas and dashed lines
are 95 percent confidence intervals.
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5 Conclusion
Tax policy changes are well known to public in advance of their implementation. These
policy changes may affect the economy prior to their actual implementation. Given the
relevance of tax foresight and the lack of consensus among researchers in explaining the
macroeconomic effects of news about tax changes, a fundamental question that arises is:
Does tax news stimulate or depress economic activity? To address this question, one needs
to identify tax news shocks. Here tax news is identified as an unexpected innovation in the
implicit tax rate, measured by the yield spread between the one year tax-exempt municipal
bond and the one year taxable Treasury bond. In the first two chapters, I have investigated
the impact of tax news shocks on the U.S. economy, using a factor augmented vector
regression model. While, the third chapter estimates the effect of anticipated tax cuts on
the economy conditioning on business cycle dynamics.
The results from three chapters contribute to the discussion regarding the economic effects
of anticipated and unanticipated tax changes and whether anticipatory effects are
empirically relevant. This dissertation provides evidence of anticipation effects and does
make an effort to understand the mechanism through which tax news shocks impact the
economy. The first chapter shows whether tax news related to federal income taxes
depress or stimulate state-level economic activity. I find that tax news - measured as a 1
percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate- resulted not only on larger GDP growth,
but also increased personal income and employment growth across most states. States
exhibit a similar hump shaped response but the timing and magnitude of the effect varied
greatly across the states.
Further, I investigate which state-level characteristics explain the differences in the
responses of economic activity to tax foresight. The results point to the importance of
three mechanisms in the transmission of tax news at the state-level. First, as posited by a
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number of studies, tax news appear to have a larger effect in economies with a larger
percentage of highly educated individuals most likely high earners and savers who have
the ability to re-optimize by changing their employment and investment decisions.
Second, differences in industry composition play a important role in how responsive
personal income and employment are to tax news. Third, the larger the tax burden faced in
an economy the greater the response of economic activity to tax news.
The second chapter focuses on understanding the propagation mechanism of tax news at
national level. I study the impact of tax news on disaggregate measures of industrial
production, employment per-worker, hours worked per worker, short term and long term
unemployment rates, capacity utilization rate, purchasing manager index, housing starts,
price level, and financial variables. I find that a positive shock to the implicit tax rate leads
to large, persistent and positive effects on real economic activity. Overall, the results
suggest that that news regarding an increase in future tax rates gives an incentive for firms
and workers to switch the production over to the anticipation period where taxes are
expected to be lower. I also show that tax news associated with legislations in 1986, 1993,
and 2001 contributed to the fluctuations in real GDP.
The counterfactual analysis of the pre-and post-implementation shocks show that news of
a tax increase results in an expansion. Yet, once the tax increase is actually implemented,
the expansionary effect is tappered. Furthermore, simulations for three key historical tax
episodes suggest that it is crucial to account for policy foresight in order to get a better
grasp of the true effects of a change in tax policy.
Finally, the third chapter contributes to the empirical wok by allowing state dependence to
measure the effect of tax news shocks on the economy. The impulse responses are
computed to tax news shocks conditioning on business cycle dynamics (i.e., in boom and
bust periods separately). The results indicate that news about future tax cuts has a
135
contractionary effect on the economy for about four quarters. I also show that the response
of consumption expenditures, durable goods purchases, nondurable good purchases and
nonresidential investment is different in the recessionary phase to that in the expansionary
phase of the economy. In light of these results, the dynamic effects estimated in the first
two chapters should be interpreted as the estimated effect over periods of expansions and
recessions.
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A Appendix
A.1 Chapter 2 Appendix
Table A1.1: Data definitions and sources used in the FAVAR
Variable Frequency Description Source and Construction
rMt Quarterly Yield on municipal bonds (1
year)
Leeper, Richter and Walker
(2012)
rTt Quarterly Yield on Treasury bonds (1
year)
Leeper, Richter and Walker
(2012)
τt Quarterly Implicit tax rate (1 year) 1 − r
M
t
rTt
GCE Quarterly Federal government
expenditures
BEA (Table 1.1.5)
P16 Quarterly Civilian non-institutional
population, over 16
BLS (LNU00000000Q)
GDP Quarterly Gross domestic product BEA (Table 1.1.5)
RGDP Quarterly Real gross domestic product BEA (Table 1.1.6)
GDPDEF Quarterly GDP deflator GDPRGDP
gt Quarterly Real per-capita federal
government spending
GCE
P16∗GDPDEF
Net Tax Quarterly Federal tax receipts net of
transfer payments
BEA (Table 3.2)
tt Quarterly Real per capita federal taxes Nettax(P16)∗(GDPDEF )
yt Quarterly Real per-capita GDP RGDPP16
∆pit Quarterly Personal income growth rates
for individual states, first
differences of its log levels
BEA (Regional Data)
∆empt Quarterly Employment growth rates for
individual states
Hamilton and Owyang(2012)
continued on next page
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Table A2.1: Continued from previous page
fft Quarterly Federal funds Rate Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
NBR Quarterly Nonborrowed reserves Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
TS Quarterly Term spread Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
PCT Quarterly Personal income taxes BEA
CS Quarterly Contributions for government social
insurance
BEA (Table 2.2)
PTI Quarterly Personal taxable income BEA (Table 2.1)
APITR Quarterly Average personal income tax rate
(APITR)
(PCT+CS)
PTI
AMTR Quarterly Average marginal income tax rate
(AMTR)
Barro and Redlick (2011)
The aggregate variables tt, gt, yt are converted to growth rates by taking first differences of its log levels
and then included in the FAVAR model.
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Table A1.2: Data definitions and Sources used in Cross State Regression Analysis
Variable Description Source
Dependent variable:
∆pi4 Estimated cumulative response of
personal income (4 quarter’s)
Computed from IRF
∆emp4 Estimated cumulative response
employment (4 quarter’s)
Computed from IRF
Independent variables:
Agriculture Average agriculture share of total
state GDP over the years
1963-2006
BEA (Regional Data)
Construction Average construction share of total
state GDP over the years
1963-2006
BEA (Regional Data)
Manufacturing Average manufacturing share of
total state GDP over the years
1963-2006
BEA (Regional Data)
Retail Average retail share of total state
GDP over the years 1963-2006
BEA (Regional Data)
FIRE Average finance, insurance and
retail share of total state GDP over
the years 1963-2006
BEA (Regional Data)
Municipal bond issuer Dummy variable for states where
most municipal bonds are issued
Bloomberg’s Municipal Fair
Market Bond Index.
Tax exempt state Dummy variable for states where
there is no personal income tax
U.S. Internal Revenue Service
Female Annual average percent of total
population that is female,
1970-2006
U.S. Census Bureau
Education Annual average percent of the total
population 25 years and over with
a bachelor degree or higher
education, 1960-2000
U.S. Census Bureau
Nonwhite Annual average percent of total
population that is nonwhite,
1970-2006
U.S. Census Bureau
Median income Median income is the average over
years 1984-2006
U.S. Census Bureau
Median age Median age for U.S. states, 2000 U.S. Census Bureau
Population density Population density per square mile,
2000
U.S. Census Bureau
Per-capita federal tax burden Federal tax burden (per-capita),
2005
Tax Foundation
House Fraction of state representatives
that are democrat,1980-2006
UKCPR
Senate Fraction of state senators that are
democrat,1980-2006
UKCPR
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Table A1.3: Correlation with factors
States Personal income Employment
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
New England Region:
Maine 0.481 -0.197 -0.008 0.670 0.270 0.206
New Hampshire 0.636 -0.654 0.220 0.680 0.337 0.113
Vermont 0.706 -0.549 0.012 0.686 0.274 0.093
Massachusetts 0.661 -0.446 -0.086 0.686 0.330 0.185
Rhode Island 0.586 -0.470 -0.033 0.701 0.217 0.183
Connecticut 0.646 -0.487 -0.026 0.679 0.346 0.180
Mean 0.619 -0.467 0.013 0.684 0.296 0.160
Mideast Region:
New York 0.513 -0.329 -0.125 0.680 0.252 0.134
New Jersey 0.685 -0.509 -0.029 0.705 0.338 0.200
Pennsylvania 0.582 0.184 -0.388 0.715 0.368 0.078
Delaware 0.585 -0.638 0.010 0.520 0.270 0.071
Maryland 0.620 -0.708 0.128 0.727 0.150 0.145
Mean 0.597 -0.400 0.081 0.669 0.275 0.126
Southeast Region:
Virginia 0.618 -0.634 0.185 0.782 0.159 0.134
North Carolina 0.676 -0.511 0.073 0.763 0.345 0.134
South Carolina 0.724 -0.395 0.090 0.727 0.375 0.111
Georgia 0.655 -0.636 0.197 0.780 0.361 0.089
Florida 0.544 -0.758 0.252 0.631 0.292 0.118
Kentucky 0.605 0.022 -0.511 0.653 0.435 0.074
Tenessee 0.744 -0.395 -0.161 0.779 0.406 0.049
Alabama 0.670 -0.076 -0.427 0.727 0.494 0.065
Missisppi 0.252 0.208 -0.394 0.660 0.406 0.045
Arkansas 0.421 -0.101 -0.427 0.659 0.399 0.044
Mean 0.591 -0.327 -0.112 0.716 0.367 0.086
Great Lakes Region :
West Virgnia 0.002 0.539 -0.479 0.411 0.204 -0.151
Michigan 0.680 -0.043 -0.222 0.605 0.469 0.108
Ohio 0.774 -0.053 -0.294 0.774 0.427 0.108
Indiana 0.763 -0.122 -0.347 0.750 0.421 0.121
Illinois 0.688 -0.215 -0.380 0.726 0.347 0.190
Wisconsin 0.754 -0.371 -0.236 0.767 0.376 0.177
Minnesota 0.649 -0.439 -0.293 0.771 0.322 0.114
Mean 0.616 -0.100 -0.322 0.686 0.367 0.095
Plains Region:
Missouri 0.627 -0.347 -0.385 0.754 0.379 0.161
Kansas 0.340 -0.079 -0.478 0.630 0.334 0.069
Nebraska 0.300 -0.026 -0.616 0.584 0.318 0.055
Iowa 0.278 0.163 -0.718 0.657 0.370 0.166
Mean 0.386 -0.072 -0.549 0.656 0.350 0.113
Continued on next page
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Table A1.3 – Continued from previous page
States Personal income Employment
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Mountain/Northern Region:
South Dakota 00.120 0.122 -0.542 0.497 0.269 0.052
North Dakota 0.095 0.064 -0.461 0.294 0.192 0.019
Montana 0.223 0.069 -0.500 0.373 0.346 -0.003
Idaho 0.528 -0.249 -0.253 0.503 0.306 -0.105
Mean 0.242 0.002 -0.439 0.417 0.278 -0.009
Energy Belt Region:
Louisiana 0.483 -0.246 -0.368 0.433 0.222 -0.035
Wyoming 0.103 0.299 -0.508 0.210 0.178 -0.051
Utah 0.581 -0.693 0.148 0.567 0.288 0.030
Colorado 0.612 -0.681 -0.010 0.574 0.305 -0.052
Texas 0.582 -0.667 0.128 0.582 0.341 -0.012
Oklahoma 0.385 -0.327 -0.453 0.437 0.288 -0.116
New Mexico 0.392 -0.541 0.074 0.499 0.311 -0.062
Mean 0.449 -0.408 -0.141 0.472 0.276 -0.043
Far west Region :
Arizona 0.577 -0.716 0.260 0.622 0.321 0.039
California 0.574 -0.741 0.253 0.697 0.371 0.200
Nevada 0.500 -0.771 0.232 0.546 0.259 0.065
Oregon 0.716 -0.528 0.003 0.685 0.356 0.147
Washington 0.563 -0.600 0.134 0.607 0.301 0.189
Mean 0.586 -0.671 0.176 0.631 0.322 0.128
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Table A1.4: Average growth rate of personal income and employment (measured in
percentage points) from 1957Q1-2006Q4.
States Average growth rate of personal Income Average growth rate of employment
Alabama 0.686 0.502
Arizona 0.593 1.205
Arkansas 0.746 0.657
California 0.508 0.628
Colorado 0.598 0.823
Connecticut 0.593 0.317
Delaware 0.430 0.534
Florida 0.654 1.031
Georgia 0.678 0.729
Idaho 0.570 0.765
Illinois 0.499 0.264
Indiana 0.495 0.397
Iowa 0.571 0.436
Kansas 0.581 0.464
Kentucky 0.644 0.541
Louisiana 0.626 0.464
Maine 0.625 0.409
Maryland 0.632 0.558
Massachusetts 0.650 0.290
Michigan 0.437 0.311
Minnesota 0.641 0.566
Mississippi 0.778 0.591
Missouri 0.552 0.383
Montana 0.489 0.499
Nebraska 0.604 0.497
Nevada 0.485 1.412
New Hampshire 0.676 0.638
New Jersey 0.590 0.376
New Mexico 0.590 0.725
New York 0.560 0.175
North Carolina 0.687 0.677
North Dakota 0.612 0.553
Ohio 0.471 0.273
Oklahoma 0.625 0.524
Oregon 0.512 0.649
Pennsylvania 0.558 0.210
Rhode Island 0.592 0.281
South Carolina 0.714 0.653
South Dakota 0.649 0.559
Tennessee 0.684 0.589
Texas 0.594 0.735
Utah 0.544 0.845
Vermont 0.667 0.547
Virginia 0.704 0.697
Washington 0.560 0.666
West Virginia 0.585 0.191
Wisconsin 0.557 0.469
Wyoming 0.647 0.620
Average values 0.60 0.560
142
Figure A1.1: Impulse response of real per-capita GDP with respect to different tax variables in the FAVAR
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Notes:The figure shows the response of real per-capita GDP to one percentage point increase in implicit tax rate. Full lines are point
estimates of real GDP from benchmark model. Dotted lines are point estimates using average personal income tax rate (APITR) in the
benchmark specification. Dashed lines are point estimates for real GDP using average corporate tax rate (ACITR) in the benchmark
specification. Finally, dashed-dot lines are point estimates for real GDP using average marginal tax rate (AMTR) in the benchmark
specification. Computations are based on 10,000 simulations of model (equations 2.1 and 2.2).
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Figure A1.2: Impulse responses of state-level personal income with respect to different tax variables in the FAVAR
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Benchmark APITR ACITR AMTR
Notes:The figure shows the response of real per-capita personal income growth for different states to a 1 percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate. Full
lines are point estimates with benchmark specification; dotted, dashed, and dashed-dot lines indicate point estimates using different tax variables. Computations
are based on 10,000 simulations of model (equations 2.1 and 2.2).
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Figure A1.3: Impulse responses of state-level personal income with respect to different tax variables in the FAVAR
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Benchmark APITR ACITR AMTR
Notes:The figure shows the response of real per-capita personal income growth for different states to a 1 percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate. Full
lines are point estimates with benchmark specification; dotted, dashed, and dashed-dot lines indicate point estimates using different tax variables. Computations
are based on 10,000 simulations of model (equations 2.1 and 2.2).
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Figure A1.4: Impulse responses of state-level personal income with respect to different tax variables in FAVAR
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Benchmark APITR ACITR AMTR
Notes:The figure shows the response of real per-capita personal income growth for different states to a 1 percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate. Full
lines are point estimates with benchmark specification; dotted, dashed, and dashed-dot lines indicate point estimates using different tax variables. Computations
are based on 10,000 simulations of model (equations 2.1 and 2.2).
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Figure A1.5: Impulse responses of state-level employment with respect to different tax variables in the FAVAR
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Benchmark APITR ACITR AMTR
Notes:The figure shows the response of real per-capita employment growth for different states to a 1 percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate. Full lines are
point estimates with benchmark specification; dotted, dashed, and dashed-dot lines indicate point estimates using different tax variables. Computations are based
on 10,000 simulations of model (equations 2.1 and 2.2).
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Figure A1.6: Impulse responses of state-level employment with respect to different tax variables in the FAVAR
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Benchmark APITR ACITR AMTR
Notes:The figure shows the response of real per-capita employment growth for different states to a 1 percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate. Full lines are
point estimates with benchmark specification; dotted, dashed, and dashed-dot lines indicate point estimates using different tax variables. Computations are based
on 10,000 simulations of model (equations 2.1 and 2.2).
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Figure A1.7: Impulse responses of state-level employment with respect to different tax variables in the FAVAR
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Notes:The figure shows the response of real per-capita employment growth for different states to a 1 percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate. Full lines are
point estimates with benchmark specification;dotted, dashed, and dashed-dot lines indicate point estimates using different tax variables. Computations are based
on 10,000 simulations of model (equations 2.1 and 2.2).
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Figure A1.8: Impulse response of real per-capita GDP (using 5-year bonds)
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Response of Real Per−Capita GDP to Implicit Tax Rate(1Y)−Benchmark
Notes: The figure shows the response of real per-capita GDP to a 1 percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate (5-year). Full lines are point estimates; dashed
indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals constructed following Kilian and Gonclaves (2004) recursive wild-bootstrap method using 10,000 replications.
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Figure A1.9: Impulse responses of state-level personal income (using 5-year bonds)
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Notes:The figure shows the response of real per-capita personal income growth for different states to a 1 percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate (5-year).
Full lines are point estimates with benchmark specification; dashed lines indicate point estimates of robust specification. Computations are based on 10,000
simulations of model (equations 2.1 and 2.2).
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Figure A1.10: Impulse responses of state-level personal income (using 5-year bonds)
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Notes:The figure shows the response of real per-capita personal income growth for different states to a 1 percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate (5-year).
Full lines are point estimates with benchmark specification; dashed lines indicate point estimates of robust specification. Computations are based on 10,000
simulations of model (equations 2.1 and 2.2).
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Figure A1.11: Impulse responses of state-level personal income (using 5-year bonds)
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Notes:The figure shows the response of real per-capita personal income growth for different states to a 1 percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate (5-year).
Full lines are point estimates with benchmark specification; dashed lines indicate point estimates of robust specification. Computations are based on 10,000
simulations of model (equations 2.1 and 2.2).
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Figure A1.12: Impulse responses of state-level employment (using 5-year bonds)
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Notes:The figure shows the response of real per-capita employment growth for different states to a 1 percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate (5-year). Full
lines are point estimates with benchmark specification; dashed lines indicate point estimates of robust specification. Computations are based on 10,000 simulations
of model (equations 2.1 and 2.2).
154
Figure A1.13: Impulse responses of state-level employment (using 5-year bonds)
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Notes:The figure shows the response of real per-capita employment growth for different states to a 1 percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate (5-year). Full
lines are point estimates with benchmark specification; dashed lines indicate point estimates of robust specification. Computations are based on 10,000 simulations
of model (equations 2.1 and 2.2).
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Figure A1.14: Impulse responses of state-level employment (using 5-year bonds)
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Notes:The figure shows the response of real per-capita employment growth for different states to a 1 percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate (5-year). Full
lines are point estimates with benchmark specification; dashed lines indicate point estimates of robust specification. Computations are based on 10,000 simulations
of model (equations 2.1 and 2.2).
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Figure A1.15: Impulse response of real per-capita GDP with respect to monetary policy variables in the FAVAR
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Benchmark Specification	
Without Federal Funds Rate in the FAVAR model
Using Term Spread (one year and Tend year Yield)
Using FFR and Nonborrwed Reserves in the FAVAR model
Notes: The figure shows the response of real per-capita GDP to a one percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate with respect to different monetary policy
variables. The benchmark specification includes the federal funds rate as the monetary policy variable in the FAVAR model. The alternative specification consists:
(a) without FFR: excluding federal funds rate from benchmark specification; (b) Long term spread: we augmented our benchmark specification by including the
term spread as alternative indicator for monetary policy; (c) nonborrwed reserves: we augment our benchmark specification by including log growth of
nonborrwed reserves in addition to federal funds rate in the benchmark specification.
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Figure A1.16: Impulse responses of state-level personal income with respect to monetary policy variables in the FAVAR
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Benchmark Without FFR Term Spread FFR and Nonborrowed Reserves
Notes:The figure shows the response of real per-capita personal income growth for different states to a 1 percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate. Full
lines are point estimates with benchmark specification; dashed lines indicate point estimates of robust specification. Computations are based on 10,000 simulations
of model (equations 2.1 and 2.2).
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Figure A1.17: Impulse responses of state-level personal income with respect to monetary policy variables in the FAVAR
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Benchmark Without FFR Term Spread FFR and Nonborrowed Reserves
Notes:The figure shows the response of real per-capita personal income growth for different states to a 1 percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate. Full
lines are point estimates with benchmark specification; dashed lines indicate point estimates of robust specification. Computations are based on 10,000 simulations
of model (equations 2.1 and 2.2).
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Figure A1.18: Impulse responses of state-level personal income with respect to monetary policy variables in the FAVAR
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
PI_Ohio
Quarters after the shock
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
PI_Oklahoma
Quarters after the shock
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
PI_Oregon
Quarters after the shock
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
PI_Pennsylvania
Quarters after the shock
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
PI_Rhode Island
Quarters after the shock
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
PI_South Carolina
Quarters after the shock
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
PI_South Dakota
Quarters after the shock
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
PI_Tennessee
Quarters after the shock
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
PI_Texas
Quarters after the shock
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
PI_Utah
Quarters after the shock
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
PI_Vermont
Quarters after the shock
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
PI_Virginia
Quarters after the shock
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
PI_Washington
Quarters after the shock
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
PI_West Virginia
Quarters after the shock
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
PI_Wyoming
Quarters after the shock
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
PI_Wisconsin
Quarters after the shock
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
 
Benchmark Without FFR Term Spread FFR and Nonborrowed Reserves
Notes:The figure shows the response of real per-capita personal income growth for different states to a 1 percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate. Full
lines are point estimates with benchmark specification; dashed lines indicate point estimates of robust specification. Computations are based on 10,000 simulations
of model (equations 2.1 and 2.2).
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Figure A1.19: Impulse responses of state-level employment with respect to monetary policy variables in the FAVAR
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Benchmark Without FFR Term Spread FFR and Nonborrowed Reserves
Notes: The figure shows the response of real per-capita employment growth for different states to a 1 percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate. Full lines
are point estimates with with benchmark specification; dashed lines indicate point estimates of robust specification. Computations are based on 10,000 simulations
of model (equations 2.1 and 2.2).
161
Figure A1.20: Impulse responses of state-level employment with respect to monetary policy variables in the FAVAR
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Benchmark Without FFR Term Spread FFR and Nonborrowed Reserves
Notes:The figure shows the response of real per-capita employment growth for different states to a 1 percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate. Full lines are
point estimates with with benchmark specification; dashed lines indicate point estimates of robust specification. Computations are based on 10,000 simulations of
model (equations 2.1 and 2.2).
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Figure A1.21: Impulse responses of state-level employment with respect to monetary policy variables in the FAVAR
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Benchmark Without FFR Term Spread FFR and Nonborrowed Reserves
Notes:The figure shows the response of real per-capita employment growth for different states to a 1 percentage point increase in the implicit tax rate. Full lines are
point estimates with with benchmark specification; dashed lines indicate point estimates of robust specification. Computations are based on 10,000 simulations of
model (equations 2.1 and 2.2).
163
Figure A1.22: U.S. state-level demographic characteristics
(a) Population density, 2000 (b) Median income, 1984-2006
(c) Median age, 2000 (d) Education, 1960-2000
(e) Female, 1970-2006 (f) Nonwhite, 1970-2006
Notes:The figure illustrates demographic characteristics across 48 contiguous states in the United States. The
darker shade of red indicate the states with higher share to the specific demographic variable. Similarly, lighter
shade of red indicate the states with smaller share to the related demographic variable. Population density is
person per square mile of land area for the year 2000. Median income is the average median income of
state over the 1984-2006 period. Median age corresponds to the median age in the state for the year 2000.
Education is annual percent of total population of 25 years and over with bachelors degree or higher education
over 1960-2000 period. Female is the annual average percent of total population that is female over 1970-
2006 period, and Nonwhite is the annual average percent of total population that is nonwhite over 1970-2006
period. The data is collected from U.S. Census Bureau.
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A.2 Chapter 3 Appendix
Table A2.1: Data definitions and sources used in the FAVAR
Variable Frequency Description Source and Construction
rMt Quarterly Yield on municipal bonds (1 year) Leeper, Richter and Walker (2012)
rTt Quarterly Yield on Treasury bonds (1 year) Leeper, Richter and Walker (2012)
τt Quarterly Implicit tax rate (1 year) 1 − r
M
t
rTt
GCE Quarterly Federal government expenditures BEA (Table 1.1.5)
P16 Quarterly Civilian non-institutional
population, over 16
BLS (LNU00000000Q)
NGDP Quarterly Gross domestic product BEA (Table 1.1.5)
RGDP Quarterly Real gross domestic product BEA (Table 1.1.6)
GDPDEF Quarterly GDP deflator NGDPRGDP
Gt Quarterly Real per-capita federal government
spending
GCE
P16∗GDPDEF
Net Tax Quarterly Federal tax receipts net of transfer
payments
BEA (Table 3.2)
Tt Quarterly Real per capita federal taxes Nettax(P16)∗(GDPDEF )
GDPt Quarterly Real per-capita GDP RGDPP16
Rt Quarterly Federal funds Rate Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
taxt Quarterly Tax liability changes Romer and Romer (2010)
The aggregate variables Tt, Gt, GDPt are converted to growth rates by taking first differences of its log
levels and then included in the FAVAR model.
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Table A2.2: Data definitions used in the FAVAR
Variable Description Transformation
IPP INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - PRODUCTS, TOTAL 5
IPF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - FINAL PRODUCTS 5
IPC INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - CONSUMER GOODS 5
IPCD INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - DURABLE CONSUMER GOODS 5
IPCN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - NONDURABLE CONSUMER GOODS 5
IPE INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - BUSINESS EQUIPMENT 5
IPI INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, INTERMEDIATE PRODUCTS (FUELS) 5
IPM INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - MATERIALS 5
IPMD INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - DURABLE GOODS MATERIALS 5
IPMND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - NONDURABLE GOODS MATERIALS 5
IPMFG INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - MANUFACTURING (SIC) 5
IPD IP: DURABLE MANUFACTURING 5
IPN IP NONDURABLE MANUFACTURING 5
IPMIN IP MINING 5
IPUT INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - RESIDENTIAL UTILITIES 5
IP INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - TOTAL INDEX 5
IPXMCA CAPACITY UTILIZATION - MANUFACTURING (SIC) 1
PMI PURCHASING MANAGERS’ INDEX (SA) 1
PMP NAPM PRODUCTION INDEX (PERCENT) 1
GMPPYQ PERSONAL INCOME (AR, bil. chain 2000 $) 5
GMYXPQ PERSONAL INCOME LESS TRANSFER PAYMENTS (AR, bil. chain 2000 $) 5
LHEL INDEX OF HELP-WANTED ADVERTISING IN NEWSPAPERS (19671¯00;SA) 5
LHELX EMPLOYMENT: RATIO; HELP-WANTED ADS:NO. UNEMPLOYED CLF 4
LHEM CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE: EMPLOYED, TOTAL (THOUS.,SA) 5
LHNAG CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE: EMPLOYED, NONAGRIC.INDUSTRIES (THOUS.,SA) 5
LHUR UNEMPLOYMENT RATE: ALL WORKERS, 16 YEARS OVER (%,SA) 1
LHU680 UNEMPLOY.BY DURATION: AVERAGE(MEAN)DURATION IN WEEKS (SA) 1
LHU5 UNEMPLOY.BY DURATION: PERSONS UNEMPL.LESS THAN 5 WKS (THOUS.,SA) 1
LHU14 UNEMPLOY.BY DURATION: PERSONS UNEMPL.5 TO 14 WKS (THOUS.,SA) 1
LHU15 UNEMPLOY.BY DURATION: PERSONS UNEMPL.15 WKS (THOUS.,SA) 1
LHU26 UNEMPLOY.BY DURATION: PERSONS UNEMPL.15 TO 26 WKS (THOUS.,SA) 1
EMP TOTAL ECONOMY EMPLOYMENT (Francis and Ramey (2009) 5
LPNAG EMPLOYEES, NONAG.PAYROLLS - TOTAL 5
LP EMPLOYEES, NONFARM - TOTAL PRIVATE 5
LPGD EMPLOYEES, NONFARM - GOODS-PRODUCING 5
LPMI EMPLOYEES, NONFARM - MINING 5
LPCC EMPLOYEES, NONFARM - CONSTRUCTION 5
LPEM EMPLOYEES, NONFARM - MFG 5
LPED EMPLOYEES, NONFARM - DURABLE GOODS 5
LPEN EMPLOYEES, NONFARM - NONDURABLE GOODS 5
LPSP EMPLOYEES, NONFARM - SERVICE-PROVIDING 5
LPTU EMPLOYEES, NONFARM - TRADE, TRANSPORT, UTILITIES 5
LPTU EMPLOYEES, NONFARM - WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE 5
LPFR EMPLOYEES, NONFARM - FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES 5
LPS EMPLOYEES, NONFARM - SERVICES 5
LPGOV EMPLOYEES, NONFARM - GOVERNMENT 5
LPHRM AVG WKLY HOURS, PROD WRKRS, NONFARM - GOODS-PRODUCING 1
LPMOSA AVG WKLY OVERTIME HOURS, PROD WRKRS, NONFARM - MFG 1
PMEMP NAPM EMPLOYMENT INDEX (PERCENT) 1
HOURS HOURS PER-CAPITA (Francis and Ramey (2009) 1
GMCQ PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES, PRICE INDEX (2000=100) , SAAR 5
GMCDQ PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES- DURABLE GOODS, PRICE INDEX(2000=100) , SA 5
GMCNQ PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES - NONDURABLE GOODS, PRICE INDEX (2000=100) 5
GMCSQ PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES - SERVICES, PRICE INDEX (2000=100) , SAAR 5
GMCANQ PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES-NEW CARS 5
HSFR HOUSING STARTS:NONFARM(1947-58);TOTAL FARM&NONFARM 4
HSNE HOUSING STARTS:NORTHEAST 4
HSMW HOUSING STARTS:MIDWEST 4
HSSOU HOUSING STARTS:SOUTH 4
HSWST HOUSING STARTS:WEST 4
HSBR HOUSING AUTHORIZED: TOTAL NEW PRIVATE HOUSING UNITS 4
HMOB MOBILE HOMES 4
PMNV NAPM INVENTORIES INDEX (PERCENT) 1
PMNO NAPM NEW ORDERS INDEX (PERCENT) 1
PMDEL NAPM VENDOR DELIVERIES INDEX (PERCENT) 1
MOCMQ NEW ORDERS (NET) - CONSUMER GOODS MATERIALS, 1996 DOLLARS (BCI) 5
MSONDQ NEW ORDERS, NONDEFENSE CAPITAL GOODS, IN 1996 DOLLARS (BCI) 5
FSNCOM COMMON STOCK PRICES: DOW JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE 5
FSPCOM S&P’S COMMON STOCK PRICE INDEX: COMPOSITE (1941-43=10) 5
FSPIN S&P’S COMMON STOCK PRICE INDEX: INDUSTRIALS (1941-43=10) 5
FSPCAP S&P COMMON STOCK : CAPITAL GOODS (TOTAL SHARE INDEX) 5
FSPUT S&P COMMON STOCK : UTILITIES 5
FSDXP S&P’S COMPOSITE COMMON STOCK: DIVIDEND YIELD (% PER ANNUM) 1
FSPXE S&P’S COMPOSITE COMMON STOCK: PRICE-EARNINGS RATIO (%,NSA) 1
continued on next page
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Table A3.2: Continued from previous page
Variable Description Transformation
EXRSW FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATE: SWITZERLAND (SWISS FRANC PER U.S.$) 5
EXRJAN FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATE: JAPAN (YEN PER U.S.$) 5
EXRUK FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATE: UNITED KINGDOM (CENTS PER POUND) 5
EXCAN FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATE: CANADA (CANADIAN PERU.S.) 5
FYFF INTEREST RATE: FEDERAL FUNDS (EFFECTIVE) (% PER ANNUM,NSA) 1
FYGM3 INTEREST RATE: U.S.TREASURY BILLS,SEC MKT,3-MO.(% PER ANN,NSA) 1
FYGM6 INTEREST RATE: U.S.TREASURY BILLS,SEC MKT,6-MO.(% PER ANN,NSA) 1
FYGT1 INTEREST RATE: U.S.TREASURY CONST MATURITIES,1-YR.(% PER ANN,NSA) 1
FYGT5 INTEREST RATE: U.S.TREASURY CONST MATURITIES,5-YR.(% PER ANN,NSA) 1
FYGT10 INTEREST RATE: U.S.TREASURY CONST MATURITIES,10-YR.(% PER ANN,NSA) 1
FYAAAC BOND YIELD: MOODY’S AAA CORPORATE (% PER ANNUM) 1
FYBAAC BOND YIELD: MOODY’S BAA CORPORATE (% PER ANNUM) 1
SFYGM3 SPREAD FYGM3-FYFF 1
SFYGM6 SPREAD FYGM6-FYFF 1
SFYGT1 SPREAD FYGT1-FYFF 1
SFYGT5 SPREAD FYGT5-FYFF 1
SFYGT10 SPREAD FYGT10-FYFF 1
SFYAAAC SPREAD FYAAAC-FYFF 1
SFYBAAC SPREAD FYBAAC-FYFF 1
FM1 MONEY STOCK: M1 5
FM2 MONEY STOCK:M2 5
FM3 MONEY STOCK: M3 5
FM2DQ MONEY SUPPLY - M2 IN 1996 DOLLARS (BCI) 5
FMFBA MONETARY BASE, ADJ FOR RESERVE REQUIREMENT CHANGES 5
FMRRA MONETARY BASE, ADJ FOR RESERVE REQUIREMENT CHANGES 5
FMRBA DEPOSITORY INST RESERVES:TOTAL,ADJ FOR RESERVE REQ CHGS 5
FCLNQ COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL LOANS AT ALL COMMERCIAL BANKS (FRED) Billions 5
FCLBMC WKLY RP LG COM’L BANKS:NET CHANGE COM’L & INDUS LOANS 5
CCINRV CONSUMER CREDIT OUTSTANDING - NONREVOLVING 5
PMCP NAPM COMMODITY PRICES INDEX (PERCENT) 1
PWFSA PRODUCER PRICE INDEX: FINISHED GOODS (82=100,SA) 5
PWFCSA PRODUCER PRICE INDEX:FINISHED CONSUMER GOODS (82=100,SA) 5
PWIMSA PRODUCER PRICE INDEX:INTERMED MAT.SUPPLIES & COMPONENTS(82=100,SA) 5
PWCMSA PRODUCER PRICE INDEX:CRUDE MATERIALS (82=100,SA) 5
PSM99Q INDEX OF SENSITIVE MATERIALS PRICES (1990=100)(BCI-99A) 5
PUNEW CPI ALL ITEMS 5
PU83 CPI-U: APPAREL 5
PU84 CPI-U: TRANSPORTATION 5
PU85 CPI-U: MEDICAL CARE 5
PIC CPI-U: COMMODITIES 5
PICD CPI-U: DURABLES 5
PUS CPI-U: SERVICES 5
PUXF CPI-U: ALL ITEMS LESS FOOD 5
PUXHS CPI-U: ALL ITEMS LESS SHELTER 5
PUXM CPI-U: ALL ITEMS LESS MEDICAL CARE 5
LEHCC AVG HOURLY EARNINGS, PROD WRKRS, NONFARM - CONSTRUCTION 5
LEHM AVG HOURLY EARNINGS, PROD WRKRS, NONFARM - MFG 5
HHSNTN UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS 5
The raw data is transformed to have stationarity in the model: 1 = No Transformation, 2 = First Differ-
ences, 4 = Logarithm, 5 = First Differences in Logs.
167
References
Acemoglu, D. and V. Guerrieri (2006). Capital deepening and non-balanced economic
growth. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Agranov, M. and T. R. Palfrey (2014). Equilibrium tax rates and income redistribution: A
laboratory study.
Ang, A., V. Bhansali, and Y. Xing (2010). Taxes on tax-exempt bonds. The Journal of
Finance 65(2), 565–601.
Ang, A. and M. Piazzesi (2003). A no-arbitrage vector autoregression of term structure dy-
namics with macroeconomic and latent variables. Journal of Monetary economics 50(4),
745–787.
Auerbach, A. J. (1989). Tax reform and adjustment costs: The impact on investment and
market value. International Economic Review, 939–962.
Auerbach, A. J. and Y. Gorodnichenko (2012). Measuring the output responses to fiscal
policy. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 4(2), 1–27.
Auerbach, A. J. and J. Slemrod (1997). The economic effects of the tax reform act of 1986.
Journal of Economic Literature, 589–632.
Bai, J. and S. Ng (2002). Determining the number of factors in approximate factor models.
Econometrica 70(1), 191–221.
Bai, J. and S. Ng (2013). Principal components estimation and identification of static
factors. Journal of Econometrics 176(1), 18–29.
Bania, N., J. A. Gray, and J. A. Stone (2007). Growth, taxes, and government expenditures:
growth hills for us states. National Tax Journal, 193–204.
Barro, R. J. (1979). On the determination of the public debt. The Journal of Political
Economy, 940–971.
Barro, R. J. and C. J. Redlick (2011). Macroeconomic effects from government purchases
and taxes. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126, 51–102.
Beaudry, P. and F. Portier (2006). Stock prices, news, and economic fluctuations. American
Economic Review 96(4), 1293–1307.
Bernanke, B., J. Boivin, and P. Eliasz (2005). Measuring the effects of monetary policy:
a factor-augmented vector autoregressive (favar) approach. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 120(1), 387–422.
Bernanke, B., M. Gertler, and M. W. Watson (2004). Oil shocks and aggregate macroeco-
nomic behavior: The role of monetary policy: A reply. Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking 36(2), 287–291.
168
Bernanke, B. S., M. Gertler, M. Watson, C. A. Sims, and B. M. Friedman (1997). System-
atic monetary policy and the effects of oil price shocks. Brookings papers on economic
activity, 91–157.
Blanchard, O. and R. Perotti (2002). An empirical characterization of the dynamic ef-
fects of changes in government spending and taxes on output. the Quarterly Journal of
economics 117(4), 1329–1368.
Boivin, J., M. P. Giannoni, and I. Mihov (2009). Sticky prices and monetary policy: Evi-
dence from disaggregated us data. The American Economic Review, 350–384.
Caballero, R. J., E. M. Engel, and J. Haltiwanger (1997). Aggregate employment dynamics:
Building from microeconomic evidence. The American Economic Review, 115–137.
Carlino, G. and R. DeFina (1998). The differential regional effects of monetary policy.
Review of Economics and Statistics 80(4), 572–587.
Carlino, G. A. and R. P. Inman (2013). Local deficits and local jobs: Can us states stabilize
their own economies? Journal of Monetary Economics 60(5), 517–530.
Christiano, L. J., M. Eichenbaum, and C. L. Evans (1999). Monetary policy shocks: What
have we learned and to what end? Handbook of macroeconomics 1, 65–148.
Cochrane, J. H. (1994). Shocks. 41, 295–364.
Cooper, R. W. and J. C. Haltiwanger (2006). On the nature of capital adjustment costs. The
Review of Economic Studies 73(3), 611–633.
Crone, T. M. (2005). An alternative definition of economic regions in the united states
based on similarities in state business cycles. Review of Economics and Statistics 87(4),
617–626.
Fernández-Villaverde, Jesús, J. F. R.-R. T. J. S. and M. W. Watson (2007). Abcs (and ds)
of understanding vars. American Economic Review 97(3), 1021–1026.
Forni, M., L. Gambetti, et al. (2011). Testing for sufficient information in structural vars.
Fortune, P. (1996). Do municipal bond yields forecast tax policy? New England Economic
Review (Sep), 29–48.
Francis, N. and V. A. Ramey (2009). Measures of per capita hours and their implications for
the technology-hours debate. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 41(6), 1071–1097.
Gonçalves, S. and L. Kilian (2004). Bootstrapping autoregressions with conditional het-
eroskedasticity of unknown form. Journal of Econometrics 123(1), 89–120.
Gruber, J. and E. Saez (2002). The elasticity of taxable income: evidence and implications.
Journal of public Economics 84(1), 1–32.
169
Hall, R. E. (2004). Measuring factor adjustment costs. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 899–927.
Hall, R. E. (2009). By how much does gdp rise if the government buys more output?
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity.
Hamermesh, D. S. and G. A. Pfann (1996). Adjustment costs in factor demand. Journal of
Economic Literature, 1264–1292.
Hamilton, J. D. (1994). Time series analysis, Volume 2. Cambridge Univ Press.
Hamilton, J. D. and A. M. Herrera (2004). Comment: oil shocks and aggregate macroe-
conomic behavior: the role of monetary policy. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
265–286.
Hamilton, J. D. and M. T. Owyang (2012). The propagation of regional recessions. Review
of Economics and Statistics 94(4), 935–947.
Hansen, L. P. and T. J. Sargent (1991). Two difficulties in interpreting vector autoregres-
sions. Rational expectations econometrics 77, 120.
Helms, L. J. (1985). The effect of state and local taxes on economic growth: A time series–
cross section approach. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 574–582.
Herrera, A. M. and E. Pesavento (2009). Oil price shocks, systematic monetary policy, and
the great moderation. Macroeconomic Dynamics 13(01), 107–137.
House, C. L. and M. D. Shapiro (2006, September). Phased-in tax cuts and economic
activity. American Economic Review 96(5), 1835–1849.
Jones, C. I. (2003). Growth, capital shares, and a new perspective on production functions.
Berkeley University Manuscript.
Jorda, O. (2005). Estimation and inference of impulse responses by local projections.
American Economic Review 95(1), 161–182.
Kilian, L. (2009). Not all oil price shocks are alike: Disentangling demand and supply
shocks in the crude oil market. The American Economic Review, 1053–1069.
Kilian, L. and Y. J. Kim (2011). How reliable are local projection estimators of impulse
responses? Review of Economics and Statistics 93(4), 1460–1466.
Kueng, L. (2014, August). Tax news: Identifying tax expectations from municipal bonds
with an application to household consumption. Working Paper 20437, National Bureau
of Economic Research.
Leeper, E. M., A. W. Richter, and T. B. Walker (2012). Quantitative effects of fiscal fore-
sight. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 4(2), 115–144.
170
Leeper, E. M., T. B. Walker, and S.-C. S. Yang (2013). Fiscal foresight and information
flows. Econometrica 81(3), 1115–1145.
Lorenzoni, G. (2011). News and aggregate demand shocks. Annu. Rev. Econ. 3(1), 537–
557.
Lütkepohl, H. (2007). New introduction to multiple time series analysis. Springer.
Mankiw, N. G. (2013). Defending the one percent. The Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives 27(3), 21–34.
Mertens, K. and M. O. Ravn (2011). Understanding the aggregate effects of anticipated
and unanticipated tax policy shocks. Review of Economic Dynamics 14(1), 27–54.
Mertens, K. and M. O. Ravn (2012, September). Empirical evidence on the aggregate ef-
fects of anticipated and unanticipated us tax policy shocks. American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy 4(2), 145–81.
Mertens, K. and M. O. Ravn (2013, September). The dynamic effects of personal and
corporate income tax changes in the united states. American Economic Review 103(4),
1212–47.
Mountford, A. and H. Uhlig (2009). What are the effects of fiscal policy shocks? Journal
of applied econometrics 24(6), 960–992.
Mullen, J. K. and M. Williams (1994). Marginal tax rates and state economic growth.
Regional Science and Urban Economics 24(6), 687–705.
Nakamura, E. and J. Steinsson (2014). Fiscal stimulus in a monetary union: Evidence from
us regions. American Economic Review 104(3), 753–92.
Owyang, M. T. and S. Zubairy (2013). Who benefits from increased government spending?
a state-level analysis. Regional Science and Urban Economics 43(3), 445–464.
Parker, J. A. (2011). On measuring the effects of fiscal policy in recessions. Journal of
Economic Literature 49(3), 703–718.
Piketty, T., E. Saez, and S. Stantcheva (2014). Optimal taxation of top labor incomes: A
tale of three elasticities. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 6(1), 230–71.
Porter, E. (2012, March). The Case for Raising Top Tax Rates. The Newyork Times.
Poterba, J. M. (1986). Explaining the yield spread between taxable and tax-exempt bonds:
The role of expected tax policy. pp. 5–52.
Poterba, J. M. (1989). Tax reform and the market for tax-exempt debt. Regional Science
and Urban Economics 19(3), 537–562.
Ramey, V. (2011). Identifying government spending shocks: It’s all in the timing*. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 126(1), 1–50.
171
Ramey, V. A. and S. Zubairy (2014). Government spending multipliers in good times and
in bad: Evidence from us historical data.
Reed, W. R. (2008). The robust relationship between taxes and us state income growth.
National Tax Journal, 57–80.
Reis, R. (2006). Inattentive consumers. Journal of monetary Economics 53(8), 1761–1800.
Romer, C. D. and D. H. Romer (2010). The macroeconomic effects of tax changes: Es-
timates based on a new measure of fiscal shocks. American Economic Review 100(3),
763–801.
Rossi, B. and S. Zubairy (2011). What is the importance of monetary and fiscal shocks in
explaining us macroeconomic fluctuations? Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 43(6),
1247–1270.
Saez, E. (2004). Reported incomes and marginal tax rates, 1960-2000: evidence and policy
implications. In Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 18, pp. 117–174. MIT Press.
Saez, E. (2013). Striking it richer: The evolution of top incomes in the united states (up-
dated with 2012 preliminary estimates). Berkeley: University of California, Department
of Economics.
Schwert, G. W. (2002). Tests for unit roots: A monte carlo investigation. Journal of Busi-
ness & Economic Statistics 20(1), 5–17.
Stock, J. H. and M. W. Watson (2005). An empirical comparison of methods for forecasting
using many predictors. Manuscript, Princeton University.
Trichet, J.-C. (2013). Unconventional monetary policy measures: Princi-
ples—conditions—raison d’être. International Journal of Central Banking 9(1),
229–250.
Wildasin, D. E. (2006). Fiscal competition. The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy.
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 502–520.
Wildasin, D. E. (2011). Fiscal competition for imperfectly-mobile labor and capital: a
comparative dynamic analysis. Journal of Public Economics 95(11), 1312–1321.
Yamamoto, Y. (2012). Bootstrap inference for impulse response functions in factor-
augmented vector autoregressions. Technical report, Institute of Economic Research,
Hitotsubashi University.
Yang, S.-C. S. (2005). Quantifying tax effects under policy foresight. Journal of Monetary
Economics 52(8), 1557–1568.
Yang, S.-C. S. (2007). A chronology of postwar us federal income tax policy.
172
Vita
Sandeep K.Rangaraju
Education
• M.S. Economics, University of Kentucky, 2011
• M.A., Economics, Central Michigan University, July 2010
• MBA., Management Consulting, Central Michigan University, December 2008
• Bachelor of Technology (B-Tech), Electronics and Instrumentation Engineering, Jawa-
harlal Nehru Technological University, May 2006.
Employment
• Instructor of Record, University of Kentucky, 2011-2015.
– Principles of Microeconomics (4 sections)
– Principles of Macroeconomics (6 sections)
– Business and Economic Statistics (4 section)
– Intermediate Macroeconomics (1 section)
• Teaching Assistant, University of Kentucky, 2010-2012.
– Principles of Microeconomics
– Intermediate Microeconomics
– Neoclassical Macroeconomic Theory- I (Graduate Level)
– Neoclassical Macroeconomic Theory- II (Graduate Level)
• Research Assistant, Central Michigan University, 2009-2010
• Math Tutor, Central Michigan University, 2009-2010
• Graduate Assistant, Central Michigan University, 2007-2008
• SAP Consultant, Itelligence Inc, 2008-2009
• Payroll Assistant, University Recereation, Central Michigan University, 2007-2008.
Awards
• Gatton Fellowship (2012-2013), University of Kentucky.
• Gatton Teaching Assistantship (2010-2015), University of Kentucky.
173
